THE GERMANS

—

J. M. ROBERTSON

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THE GERMANS

I

THE TEUTONIC GOSPEL OF RACE

II

THE OLD GERMANY AND THE NEW

BY THE RIGHT HON.

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AUTHOR OF "THE SAXON AND THE CELT," "THE EVOLUTION OF STATES," "WAR AND CIVILIZATION," ETC.

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PREFACE

THE views concerning German evolution set forth in these pages are not products of the World War. Alike with regard to the ethnological and to the sociological question, they were substantially set forth by the author in four works written or published before 1900, at a time when he had small expectation of such a war, but was much concerned to combat the forces which can now be seen to have made for it. Formed originally in no spirit of national antagonism, they cannot now be reasonably charged with cultivating that spirit. They were shaped, and are now restated, in the spirit of social science.

Dr. Eduard Meyer, once regarded as a scholar so actuated, has latterly undergone a marked transformation, flagrantly exhibited in his charge that English writers had long written habitually of Germans with marked malice. That charge, promptly and explicitly denied by one of his own countrymen, is sufficiently disposed of by the evidence here given of a long predominant English tendency to glorify alike Germans and Anglo-Saxons on the score of racial virtues claimed as common to both. The exposure of the common fallacy can hardly do such harm as has been wrought by its cultivation.

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I

THE TEUTONIC GOSPEL OF RACE

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Part I

THE TEUTONIC GOSPEL OF RACE

§ 1. *Presuppositions of Ethnologists.*

Ethnology has been condemned as a barren[1] science; and one might retort with a wish that it were. The trouble is that some of its cultivators are still so anxious to "take a breed of" their lore in an unscientific way. As with all sciences, its first true service is to dispel the error which broods on every field of inquiry before science comes. But it is a far cry from primary tradition, the systematised error of the ages before science strictly so-called, to the sheer truth, be it scant or satisfying, that men can gather by loyal reasoning from all the facts. Systematised error is prejudice; and prejudices, as George Eliot tells us, have like odorous bodies a double existence, both solid and subtle,

[1] Some have even pronounced it bankrupt. See Dr. E. Richard's *History of German Civilisation*, 1911, p. 11.

" solid as the pyramids ; subtle as the twentieth echo of an echo." Correct errors of concrete fact, and you leave still lingering the errors of feeling which were their atmosphere, partly cause, partly effect.

In the case of ethnology, the first obstacles to science were those set up by the Biblical tradition, which obstructed alike all the paths of cosmology. Twenty years ago, a leading ethnologist had still to speak propitiatorily of the claim that man had existed in the pliocene and even in the early pliocene period[1] ; and in the 1907 edition of the great Webster's Dictionary, " pleistocene " is still defined as the epoch " immediately preceding man." Such conservatism is probably by this time discredited,[2] with the resistance to evolutionary science in general.[3] But in substituting the evolutionary for the catastrophic conception, ethnology was still at the scientific beginning of its work. Racial predilections are as strong as religious ;

[1] A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 1895–96, pref. ed. 1909, p. ix.

[2] In his *Man, Past and Present*, 1899, Dr. Keane took the existence of pliocene man for granted.

[3] But quite recently we have Signor Angelo Mosso announcing that " the doctrine of evolution cannot be applied to man of the Mediterranean race, for the form of his brain and the size of his skull had already reached their complete development when he appeared on the threshold of modern civilisation " (*The Dawn of Mediterranean Civilisation*, Eng. tr. 1910, p. 401). Signor Mosso might have learned from De Quatrefages (*The Human Species*, Eng. tr., ch. xxx, § 7 ; ch. xi of Fr. ed. 1889) that brain evolution proceeds by increase of convolutions when size limit is reached.

and it would be hard to find yet an ethnological treatise which is delivered from them.

Upon one point, happily, the scientific and the traditional views have a result in common. Despite a frequent recurrence, in France and elsewhere, to the "polygenist" idea, the theory of a multiplicity of origins for the human species, Darwin's position holds good, that when once the conception of the evolutionary emergence of mankind is cleared, there is no real meaning[1] in the old debate between "monogeny" and "polygeny." At its outset, at least when it was fought about the middle of the nineteenth century, that debate arose out of the natural concern of the American slaveholders to establish a separate act of creation for the negro. From the old standpoint, they had a certain case. How were such different forms of man as white and black to be biologically conceived as descended from an original White Pair? But when the "pair" dogma had been put aside, the biological puzzle had disappeared. Long ago, the theologians could see that nations are not formed in the manner set forth in the legend of the Hebrew Patriarchs.[2] No more could the race have been. The conception of an immensely slow emergence of the species Man excludes

[1] *Descent of Man*, ed. 1891, i, p.280. J. Deniker (*Les races et les peuples de la terre*, 1900, p. 9) pronounces the discussion "sterile and pointless."

[2] Kuenen, *The Religion of Israel*, Eng. tr. 1874, i, p. 110.

once for all the notion of an original pair, because at no point in the whole process is the concept of an "original" relevant.

And all that is finally valid in the revived polygenism of some ethnologists is a mere negation of the primary pair, or patriarch, for the human as for every other species. As well plead polygeny for the dog or the horse as for man; nay, much more plausibly might it be claimed for the animals, whose variations are so wide. Hardly ever does a clear issue emerge in the debate. The argument of Gumplowicz[1] against Haeckel, for instance, partly resolves itself into a zoological misconception, partly into an abstract thesis. From the assumption that a process of oceanic protoplasm could go on equally in different oceans, Gumplowicz leaps to the assumption that any zoogenic process could go on equally on any part of the earth's surface. To Haeckel he ascribes, quite without ground, the assumption that the genesis of Man occurred in "one place." From the Darwinian point of view, a "place" would be primarily any region or regions in which there could be intercommunication; and the "place" for the emergence of Man would be secondarily within a certain thermal range. All that went on in that place and range would be at once monogeny and polygeny, and the former would necessarily

[1] *Der Rassenkampf*, ed. 1909, p. 71 *seq.*

remain the significant term (the "pair" being negatived) in contradistinction to the alien connotations of the latter.

Gumplowicz's term "syngenism" is in itself a solution of the ostensible strife. In his sociology, psychic states are social products—a thesis capable of being turned to either true or false conclusions. On any view, physical type is equally a social product, and to neither process is there a tribal limit. Gumplowicz of all men, with his pessimist view of the perpetuity of strife *within* as *between societies*, had no need of the separatist idea of polygenesis.

The problem is practically simplified the moment we note that even professed polygenists, as Hovelacque and Hervé, admit the derivation of men in the New World from those of the Old,[1] simply because there have been no anthropoids there from whom they could be evolved. The further limitation of the "place" to a given climatic area is determined by the observed incapacity of the anthropoids to sustain removal to a different zone.[2] The "place" thus left would of course be anciently wide enough for many variations; and we may, if we like, surmise with Vogt[3] that species once formed have tended to coalesce or re-approxi-

[1] De Quatrefages, *Introd. à l'étude des races humaines*, Pt. II, p. 476.

[2] Darwin, *Descent*, i, p. 292.

[3] *Lectures on Man*, Eng. tr. 1864, end.

mate[1]—a virtual qualification of Vogt's own doctrine of a plurality of "parallel" evolutions. But, either way, the resultant is that by extinction in struggle and by crossing, by continually repeated contacts through whole epochs, there was constituted in endless varieties the form Man, separated at length by a great psychic distance from the anthropoids, and everywhere capable of inter-breeding.

Thus zoologically at one, the various races are necessarily to be regarded as in the main alike capable of "progress," given only the right conditions. If all alike have evolved from pre-human forms, there is no point in singling out any as specifically "lower," unless as a pretext for exterminating them—a course considerably less defensible than would be the deliberate extermination of "unfits" of our own race. The polygenetic theory is in fact either a pragmatic cancelment of the evolution theory, which it professes to accept, or a mere confusion of ideas as to the development of species in general. Given the Darwinian principle, polygenesis (in any thinkable sense) and monogenesis (in the only thinkable sense) are the same thing. If Man is not one species, much less is Dog.

If we seek for a cause of some men's clinging to the "poly" side of the shield, so to speak,

[1] The theory of Gratiolet on this head, accepted by Vogt, has not been sustained.

we are almost driven to surmise that it lies in some presupposition akin to that of the American slaveholders, some desire to differentiate *morally* between the families of men. All dogmas of "race characters," in effect, work logically back to the assumption of "a different kind of gorilla"[1] for the starting-point; and polygenists and other ethnologists who debate over their clashing generalisations of race-form are significantly found to differ primarily in their assumptions as to race-character. Thus Professor Sergi holds by an early "Eurafrican" race, in large part long-headed, of which the Nordic or Teutonic, Keltic, and Slavic races are the northern representatives, driven north by savage invading broad-headed Aryans from Asia; while Taylor believes the invaders to have been superior civilisers; and M. de Lapouge, whose views Signor Sergi considers to be at certain points fantastic, is convinced that long-heads are somehow superior to broad-heads, and that the growing scarcity of the former is a sign of progressive human degeneration. For him and his school, the long-heads are the "aristocrats" of the species, a notion about as solidly founded as any other form of the gospel of aristocracy.

[1] Here the term is of course used loosely. The gorilla is not, for zoologists, in the line of human evolution, but a variant from the main stem.

The serious scientific trouble, however, is that even professed monogenists, like our own Dr. Keane, hold by the conception of specific and persistent race characters. With M. le Bon, they decide in advance that "a race possesses psychological characters almost as fixed as the physical"[1]—which last they also take for granted. Affirming that Man is alike zoologically and psychically One, they are always reverting to assumptions of persistent racial psychic differences, not reducible to mere difference of culture-stage, or mere degree of character development. For them the Ephesian character is this, the Galatian that, and the Colossian another, whether they class the groups under the same or under different "types" of "Caucasian family" or under different families. And herein they go about their work exactly as did their pre-Darwinian predecessors, making no attempt at a psychic analysis in the spirit and on the scale of their anthropometric analysis, but summarily making "science" of the empiricism of the average traveller and the average historian.

It is thus with ethnology as with historiography and economics: the proper work of the science is done with progressive exactitude: the crowning process of sociological inference, no part of ethnology proper, is arbitrarily imposed upon it; but this final work is done as by the man

[1] *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, ed. 1898, p. 174.

in the street, from hand to mouth, without even a suspicion that that is the most recondite scientific process of all. Infinite patience is bestowed upon the documents, the records, the remains, the statistics, in order to establish their precise purport: that done, any dinner-table comment serves for the final application of the whole lore to life and feeling. Science is not thus attainable. No more unfounded censure was ever passed than the common one upon economists on the score that they did not, or do not, draw the moral lessons of their science. It would have been a vital error if they did, *qua* economists, that is. The drawing of the sociological lesson is another function than theirs. If the economist will also be a sociologist, well and good; but he is ill-advised if he carries on the two tasks concurrently.

And no better advised, surely, is the ethnologist who encrusts upon his manual of the lore of race-distribution a set of off-hand prescriptions, or predictions, for international policy in terms of his predilections among the races, or a set of sweeping and superficial generalisations about race-character and race-destiny which figure as scientific data for politicians. Scientific data they are not. They have not been scientifically reached, still less scientifically tested. Worst of all, they will not bear any scientific testing. No true part of scientific ethnology, they are

still less part of scientific politics, to which ethnology is only in some degree ancillary.

How the ethnolgists tend to express themselves may be indicated by a few sample extracts. It is Dr. Keane who, after reiterating some of the popular generalisations about the Saxon and the Kelt which have so long done duty in his fatherland, pronounces that the English-speaking races of America and the Dominions,

> with forty millions in the home lands, make collectively some 120 millions,[1] enough perhaps to *ensure the future control of human destinies* to a composite people who may now be defined with some approach to accuracy as Ibero-Kelto-Teutons of Teuton (English) speech.[2]

The family likeness, not generally suspected in 1900, of this kind of thing to the more highly evolved Teutonic Gospel of Germany, is now somewhat disconcertingly obvious. And no less disconcerting, for some, will be a recollection of the attempt made, not so many years ago, to combine the two competing gospels in a popular work by Mr. N. C. Macnamara :—

> They [the Teutons] are domineering, and consequently apt to ruffle the temper of more sensitive people. As a whole they possess splendid traits of character, unsurpassed by any other race of men. . . .
>
> We could hardly select more typical examples of genuine Teutons than the present Emperor of Germany,

[1] Written in 1899.

[2] *Man, Past and Present*, p. 533.

his illustrious father and grandfather, and Frederick the Great. If the character of any or of all of these chiefs be compared with that extraordinary genius Napoleon I, a typical Iberian, we may appreciate the value which is to be attached to inherent racial character as guiding the lives and actions of individuals.

We do not imagine that all Teutons are of the same stamp as their Emperor, or that all Iberians are of the same character as Napoleon I, but we believe that the qualities which distinguish these great men are typical of the inherited nature of the bulk of the people who constitute these races. . . .

For us, the unity and integrity of the great Teutonic race, of which the Anglo-Saxons form so important an offshoot, is of paramount importance, for *upon this union the progress and the freedom of the human family depend.* But from the predominating qualities of this race arises one of its special weaknesses: the pure Teuton is *warlike and aggressive* [hence the safeguard of other people's freedom!], his patriotism turns towards a chief. . . . And so from early Sanskrit times up to the present, history teaches us how constantly Teutonic tribes and nations have destroyed one another. . . . One of the first steps towards overcoming this fatal error is that we should endeavour to know ourselves and our own history, that we may realise how unspeakably important it is that the whole Teutonic race, whether in the continent of Europe, of America or Australia, should work together.[1]

Despite this diagnosis of Teutonic character, Mr. Macnamara was able to explain the Boer War as due to the fact that the Boers, not being

[1] *Origin and Character of the British People*, 1900, pp. 214–23.

"thoroughly acquainted with the English language, and so with our real sentiments and ideas," were "led by interested persons" into strife. It would seem then that the Briton is not a true Teuton, not rightly domineering and aggressive, whereas the Boers held the proper Teutonic attitude. How writers of this school will explain the World War, it is hard to guess. "That great man," the Kaiser, has of late been described by irreverent Iberians as a paranoid or degenerate. Perhaps that unkind view may prevail. We must await developments. Whether interested persons got at the Germans, or the Serbians, or the Russians, or the French, or the British, or all alike, must be left to the next flight of race-gospellers to establish—with some elucidation of the ethnology of the "interested persons." Meantime we are beginning to see what measure of science enters into race-gospels in general.

The most fruitful of evil, certainly, have been the German, inasmuch as they have been materialised in a militarist system and policy that give them such effect as the Moslem sword once gave to the Moslem faith, and the Christian sword to the Crusades. But it is important to realise that the Germanic gospel, with a general Teutonic application, has been extensively preached in Anglo-Saxondom in the name of ethnology. American specialists have vied with

the English. Thus the late Dr. D. G. Brinton, Professor of Ethnology at the Philadelphia Science Academy, and of American Archæology and Linguistics in the Pennsylvania University, thought fit to present as an ethnological proposition his personal opinion that

> The German, the Englishman, and the Anglo-American *now control the politics of the world*, and their contributions to every department of literature, science, and the arts have been the main stimuli of the marvellous progress of the nineteenth century.[1]

Without pausing to raise such minor considerations as those of nomenclature and international courtesy, one is moved to note the vigour of the nationalistic self-sufficiency which ignores alike in the field of politics and in the field of literature the entire mass of the Slav peoples, and in science the entire output of France and Italy. Even if the peoples of Norway and Denmark were content to be called "Germans," which they are not, the device of so naming them would set up the insoluble problem of their complicity in "controlling the politics of the world"; while their exclusion from notice in the sphere of literature raises the question of how many "Anglo-Americans" in the past century are to be named alongside of Ibsen and Björnson in drama and fiction. The Anglo-American has now had a run of a century or

[1] *Races and Peoples*, 1890, p. 164.

two, without producing a name that will fit into the line of Vico, Montesquieu, Beccaria, or the line of Lagrange, Lalande, Delambre, D'Alembert, Clairaut and Laplace, all of the eighteenth century, when Italy was "decadent" and France so often and so heavily defeated.

In the nineteenth century, with a rapidly increasing population and an immense material prosperity, the United States have produced not one great historian or poet or dramatist, or a novelist of the highest rank; and only latterly one or two great artists. Beside the art of France, theirs for three-quarters of a century was hardly perceptible. Even in science, they can claim not one of the great epoch-marking names, despite abundant cultivation of the sciences. And if Dr. Brinton had been of the calibre of Broca, he could not have penned the kind of thing we are examining, which scientific-minded Frenchmen are wont to dismiss with contempt as "*de la littérature.*" As to the share of Anglo-America in the "control of the politics of the world" it would be difficult to find corroboration in Europe.

It will not, I trust, be supposed that this rejoinder implies any such disrespectful estimate of either the capacity or the character of the population of the United States as Dr. Brinton passes by implication upon the bulk of the population of Europe. I am simply applying

Dr. Brinton's own tests to the subject matter. It is only on the pseudo-ethnological methods of Dr. Brinton and other professed ethnologists that such judgments as his are possible; and for any thoughtful American a moment's contemplation of the main facts should suffice to reduce such pseudo-ethnology to absurdity. For any reflective mind the relative absorption of American faculty in industrial enterprise is plainly a matter of economic evocation and causation, not of any specific defect. The more reason why there should be an attempt on the part of professed ethnologists, if they must meddle with these matters at all, to substitute ideas of social causation[1] for the worthless formulas of race pride and prejudice.

A patriotic historian of German civilisation tells us that "The man who tries to prove his descent from what he believes to be the superior race takes the superior mind of this race to be the emanation or manifestation of the spirit of the universe. It is a more spiritual modification of the Biblical conception of the chosen people; from this authority he derives his mission as the leader of the nations to a better, a higher life. If this be vanity, it is at least a kind of vanity nobody need be ashamed of."[2] It happens to be just the kind of vanity which Lessing in

[1] As is creditably done by Professor Ripley.

[2] E. Richard, *Hist. of German Civilisation*, pp. 11–12.

his day imputed to the French, and reckoned intolerable in them. He could hardly have foreseen the rise of a Germany in which it would be demonstrated that vanity is a thing to be proud of.

That pronouncement on the "mission" of the German race to lead the nations to a better and higher life was published in 1911. In 1914–1915 we have seen the kind of fulfilment that might have been expected.

§ 2. *Teutonism in Britain.*

As it is the Teutonic race-gospel that has most profoundly disturbed the world, it is to that that we may most fitly turn our attention. Through fully two-thirds of the nineteenth century, it was in its Anglican form the ethnic shibboleth of English popular literature. As Mr. Luke Owen Pike put the case fifty years ago :—

> There are probably few educated Englishmen living who have not in their infancy been taught that the English nation is a nation of almost pure Teutonic blood ; that its political constitution, its social customs, its internal prosperity, the success of its arms, and the number of its colonies, have all followed necessarily upon the arrival, in three vessels, of certain German warriors under the command of Hengist and Horsa. Hengist and Horsa are a necessary part of a child's education ; so are Rowena, and Vortigern, and the Heptarchy, and many other pretty stories, which have found their way, under the disguise of facts, into respectable histories. The press even now seems generally to assume that the ordinary Englishman does not carry his historical criticism beyond the point which it reached in his childhood ; and a Cambridge Professor of History [Kingsley] does not scruple to dilate upon the merits

of "our Teutonic race." When a new discovery is made by a diligent search for facts, by a cautious or a brilliant generalisation, and by an ingenious series of experiments, the Teutonic intellect receives its meed of praise; when a war is satisfactorily concluded, it is Teutonic energy and perseverance which accomplish the feat; when a trading treaty is ratified between England and some effete eastern power, it is the commercial enterprise of the Teutonic race which triumphs over every obstacle. When Germany is in distress, we are invariably reminded that Germans are our kinsmen; when she does wrong, we are to judge her mercifully, because we have much in common with her, and have ere now sinned just us she has sinned.[1]

Half a dozen popular historians and publicists bear out in their language this humorous presentment. Kingsley, in his unscholarly professorial lectures on "The Roman and the Teuton," proclaimed that "the hosts of our forefathers were the hosts of God." Carlyle and his disciple, Froude, applied the racial assumption inexpensively in their solutions of the problems of French and Irish history; and Motley, drawing his confused and wholly untenable distinctions between Gaul and German in Batavia, informed his readers that the Germans were monotheists, that "the purity of their religion was soon stained by their Celtic neighbourhood," and that "the German was loyal as the Celt was dissolute."[2]

[1] *The English and their Origin*, 1866, pp. 15–16.
[2] *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, ed. 1863, pp. 5, 6.

After expressly recording that the early population of the Netherlands was "partly Celtic, partly German," and that "of these two elements, dissimilar in their tendencies and always difficult to blend, the Netherland people has ever been compounded," he chose to treat the north-eastern provinces as "the German Netherlands," and to give all thé credit of their later political development to their Teutonicity. All the while, "Celtic" brachycephaly is highly pronounced in the province of Holland so called.[1]

Motley's tone was echoed in the United States by Lowell, who, always resentful of disparagement of his own people and prompt to disparage others, penned the egregious proposition: "I like Man better than I do any special variety of man—and I think the Keltic variety one of the poorest."[2] In England, even technical or "scientific" history was invaded by the empirical thesis of national character: Stubbs put it in the forefront of his Constitutional History; and, while incidentally avowing that "to a German race of sovereigns Spain finally owed the subversion of her national system and ancient freedom," undertook to show that English constitutional evolution, which becomes libertarian only after the Conquest, is the nearest approach to a "perfectly pure development of Germanic

[1] Prof. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, 1900, pp. 296–7.
[2] *Letters of J. R. Lowell*, i, pp. 442–3.

principles." Boldly applying his assumption all round, he hardily affirmed that the "breath of life" of all the Romance literature was "Germanic"; that the Romance poetry of South France and Spain was "Visigothic"; and that "even in Italy it owes all its sweetness and light to the freedom which has breathed beyond the Alps."[1] In the field of exact archæology, as late as 1886, we have the translator of the Danish Worsaae's *Pre-History of the North* jealous for the Scandinavian side of the cult, exhorting us to "cease to shudder sentimentally at the dark deeds of a dark age, and learn to take a just pride in that 'pirate' ancestry which gave us trial by jury,"[2] and all the rest of it. And in 1900 we had Dr. Keane, one of our most accomplished English ethnologists, still presenting us with this kind of "science":—

> Strange to say, the element that appears to have undergone the least change is the racial temperament. The Kelt is still a Kelt, mercurial, passionate, vehement, impulsive, more courteous than sincere, voluble or eloquent, fanciful, if not imaginative, quick-witted and brilliant rather than profound, elated with success, but easily depressed, hence lacking steadfastness, and still as of old *novarum rerum cupidissimus*. The Saxon also remains a Saxon, stolid and solid, outwardly abrupt but warm-hearted and true,

[1] *Const. Hist.*, 3rd ed., i, pp. 5, 6, 7.
[2] H. F. M. Simpson, Memoir in trans. cited, p. xv.

haughty and overbearing through an innate sense of superiority, yet at heart sympathetic and *always just*, hence a ruler of men; seemingly dull or slow, yet pre-eminent in the realms of philosophy and imagination (Newton, Shakespeare).

While the Saxon prefers duty to glory, both are largely gifted with some of those qualities which make for empire (pluck), or personal valour as distinguished from courage in the mass, the spirit of daring adventure for its own sake. Jointly they have struggled to the front.[1]

In a previous work, Dr. Keane had remarked that branches of the Aryan stock language have been spoken by "'Kelts' of so many types that the word has long ceased to have any ethnical significance."[2] He had further indicated, in his list of the varieties of the Caucasic peoples, that the South Germans, who commonly figure in popular discussion as Teutons, belong to the "Alpine" family, with the Welsh and the Slavs. All the while, the name "Teuton" is that of an admittedly Keltic tribe,[3] uncritically transferred to German in the mass. Yet again, Dr. Keane had duly remarked that the Belgæ whom Cæsar mentions as having entered Britain were "no doubt originally of Teutonic speech," though "soon Kelticised"[4]; and he had generally indicated that in Ireland and the Scotch

[1] *Man, Past and Present*, p. 532.
[2] *Ethnology*, p. 397.
[3] This is admitted by Dr. Richard, p. 74.
[4] *Man*, p. 528, *note*.

Highlands there had been large admixtures of what pass for "Teutonic" as well as residues of so-called Iberian stocks. For Professor Ripley, again, there are practically no "Alpine" stocks in the British Islands at all; we are substantially long-headed, being mostly under the eighty index,[1] except in one spot of Ireland. In the British Isles the cephalic index is "practically uniform from end to end."[2] Why, then, Dr. Keane should elect to draw up an account of British race-characters under the rubrics of terms which he has shown to be devoid of ethnical significance, is a puzzling question for those who want to see ethnology treated as a science.

It is certainly not so treated in his wholesale ascription of virtues and defects to mixed stocks. By implication, the supreme virtue of being "always just," ascribed to a whole much-mixed community, is treated as a matter of "temperament"; even as Newton, supreme in physics, is ranked as a pre-eminent "philosopher" in the age of Descartes, Spinoza, Pascal, and Vico; while Shakespeare, supposed to have been short and red-haired, is unhesitatingly

[1] The "index" is the proportion of the breadth of the head to the length, taking the latter as 100. It should be noted that in some classifications, all above 75 are reckoned long; in others, all from 73 to 78 "mesocephalic" or medium.

[2] *Races of Europe*, p. 305. Here Professor Ripley falls back on "less stable" traits, as pigmentation (p. 319).

made to figure as a typical "Saxon," "stolid and solid . . . . haughty and even overbearing through an innate sense of superiority." Whether the account of the Kelt as "brilliant rather than profound" is meant to imply that the stolid and solid Saxon *is* profound in virtue of the occurrence of a Newton, may be left to the surviving adherents of the school to explain. Pascal, we know, is claimed as a Teuton; but is Vico? And was Burke, who had vehemence, passion, volubility, eloquence, and fancy, less profound than the English statesmen of his generation?

The value of Dr. Keane's other generalisations concerning "Keltic" and Saxon character we shall discuss in some detail later. Meanwhile, seeking further for the ethnological content of his contrasted categories, we note that for him, to begin with, most of the Irish (whom he would seem to have had in view in his account of the Kelt) *and* of the English and Scotch, belong to the Caucasic "type" *homo Europæus*, which includes the Scandinavians, the North Germans, some Kurds, most West-Persians, and some other sections of mankind, including "many Hindus."[1] At the same time he expressly declares that "the peoples of Keltic speech can never be shown to be true Aryans of the Teutonic type, but only tribes most probably of the

[1] *Races of Europe*, p. 443.

Alpine type, Aryanised in speech in very remote times, and apparently before their appearance in Europe. . . . As far back as they can be traced, they are already found split into two linguistic sections. . . . Both still survive in what has been called the 'Keltic fringe,' . . . Brittany, Wales, parts of Ireland, the Scotch Highlands, and the Isle of Man, where Keltic dialects are still spoken."[1]

All the while, be it observed, the peoples of Teutonic speech can no more than those of Keltic be shown to be "true Aryans of the Teutonic type." Only parts of Ireland, with Wales and the Scotch Highlands, are even Keltic in speech; and these, we are told, belong to the type *homo Alpinus*; while the rest are no more Kelts by race than they. But on the other hand, not only are the *South* Germans, including the Bavarians and the Würtembergers, avowedly in the lump not Teutons or Germans at all, being also of the type *Alpinus*, as are most of the French, the Welsh, the Russians, the Slavs in general, and many Kurds; but on Dr. Keane's own principles, as well as on Professor Sergi's, the Teutonic-speaking peoples can no more than the Keltic-speaking be shown to be "true Aryans," inasmuch as all the Aryan languages are held by both experts to have been imposed by Aryan conquerors from the East

[1] *Races of Europe*, p. 523.

upon non-Aryan peoples in Europe. To the non-Aryan type *Mediterranensis*, the Mediterranean man, again, belong the Italians, Sicilians, Corsicans, Sards, Greeks, Berbers and other Hamites; Arabs and other Semites; and the primitive Dravidas, Todas, and Ainus of the East.

And while the temperament of *homo Europæus* in the lump is certified as "steadfast, stolid and solid; outwardly reserved, thoughtful, and deeply religious; humane, firm, but not wantonly cruel," the other two types are described as alike "brilliant, quick-witted, excitable and impulsive; sociable and courteous, but fickle, untrustworthy, and even treacherous (Iberian, South Italian); often atrociously cruel (many Slavs, Persians, Semites, Indonesians, and even South Europeans); aesthetic sense highly, ethic slightly developed. *All* brave, imaginative, musical, and richly endowed intellectually." Thus the Slav "temperament" is substantially the French and the Italian and the Semite temperament; and under temperament are included the intellectual endowments so liberally allowed to the bulk of Europe, but somehow not in this connection credited to *homo Europæus*. The equally invidious ascription of music to *Alpinus* and *Mediterranensis*, to the exclusion of the "typical" Teuton, may have been due to the difficulty of persuading Teutonia to share

the label for that endowment with Anglo-Saxon-dom. As to religion, on the other hand, the Slav, the Greek, the Welshman, and the Semite, must go unlabelled because they are the ethnic cognates of the French and the Italians.

To find John Bull diploma'd as "deeply religious" in contrast with Slavs, Semites, and Welsh, is to be set upon inquiring yet further as to the scientific principles in virtue of which the three last are placed under one type-heading, with French and Italians and South Germans and Greeks, while the bulk of the population of Sussex is classed with the Prussians, the Swedes, the Afghans, the bulk of the English, Scotch and Irish, the West Persians, many Hindus, and the Thrako-Hellenes. The answer is that it is in respect (1) of their hair, which is "very light brown, flaxen, *or red*, rather long, straight or wavy, smooth and glossy"; (2) of their florid colour; (3) of their generally long skulls (which they have in common with the Mediterranean type, as with Eskimos and negroes); (4) of their mainly blue eyes (which also they have in common with "many Hamites"); and (5) of their "rather large" feet. As regards ancient remains, of course, colour of hair and eyes is taken primarily on the faith of Roman and Greek testimonies and Egyptian monuments, and secondarily on the presumed continuity

of all physical characteristics in given skeletal types.

And here we come to one of the cruces of ethnology, as well as to one of the most hollow places in the ethno-sociology we have been considering. The great majority of ethnologists have taken for granted the virtual fixity of mass skull form as a race-mark—here in a manner countenancing, unwittingly, the line of reasoning followed by the polygenists. Long (dolichocephalic) and broad (brachycephalic) or round skulls are taken as inevitably heritable characteristics, barring cross-breeding. Longs are assumed to breed longs, and broads, broads, for all time, unless long marries broad, when there is modification. It is apparently not asked how an original monogeny yielded such permanent differentiations. Yet Darwinian monogenism implies either an original mixture or a variety which only in virtue of special *conditions* yielded persistent variants ; and though given conditions long continued admittedly give *relative* permanence to variations, yet change of conditions will in time, for the same reasons, cause or conserve re-variation.

Long skulls and broad skulls, then, stand for certain originating or determining life-conditions. That they tend to involve certain specialisms of inner life is a priori quite conceivable ; but this obviously important problem

seems never to have been scientifically faced. It is admitted that a pure "race," in the sense of a race wholly of one physical type, no longer exists on any scale large enough to be worth considering,[1] all "races" now exhibiting broads and longs, blonds and brunettes, though they are supposed to have been at one time uniform. There are then abundant opportunities in all races for ascertaining whether broads and longs respectively connote either types of faculty or types of temperament. But no such collected data seem to be available.

What has been commonly done is simply to assume that the mental and temperamental characters of given races can be rationally generalised in terms of the phrases of empirical historians; and that these generalisations are legitimately to be connected with the skull shape believed to be predominant in the given race at a given time. So long as the *average* is known to adhere or approximate to that form, the given characteristics are held to persist. That is the gist of what passes for ethnosociology.

[1] The African pygmies might perhaps be reckoned an exception in respect of stature. Brinton specifies the Wolofs (p. 189) as an absolutely pure Negro race; but admits (p. 227) that "in New Guinea tribes of equally pure blood have the skull sometimes broad, sometimes long," and that "pure" Papuans vary greatly in colour. Professor Ripley (p. 16) notes "isolated little pools of population" where types have remained unchanged, he believes, for æons.

Obviously it is all empirical, aggressively so. In no race or country can it be pretended that broad-heads or long-heads, darks or fairs, conform respectively to any mental type. Professor Ripley, the leading American ethnologist, pronounces that "Europe offers the best refutation of the statement that the proportions of the head mean anything intellectually." [1]

Some kind of case, perhaps, might be made out for the relative gravity, in the average, of blond long-heads,[2] but the exceptions would be fatally numerous. Ethnologically speaking, no true psychic generalisation is possible. Energy and persistence and other virtues are associated with the dolichocephalic type in Teutophile discourses about the Aryanised Teuton-speakers, who are held to have been originally dolicho. The Teutons, or some of them, "got on." But the ancient "Hamite" Libyans, of the same somatic type,[3] did not "get on." Further, the great mass of all three divisions of the Negro family are all dolichocephalic, and they have not "got on,"

[1] *The Races of Europe*, 1900, p. 41. The Professor adds, whether or not as a clincher, "The English, as our map of Europe will show, are distinctly long-headed." The "distinctly" is rather an exaggeration if it is to carry the force of "markedly." A vast number are merely "medium."

[2] Ripley suggests such a generalisation, p. 208, where he contrasts the "un-Teutonic" broad-heads of Norway with the Teutonic long-heads.

[3] Brinton, who insists (p. 51) that "it is the psychical endowment of a tribe or people which decides fatally its luck," insists also on the "Libyo-Teutonic type." Pp. 106, 118, 147.

and are not credited with energy and persistence, or any particular racial virtue. Only the Negritos are noted as brachycephalic. The Bushmen and the Hottentots, who have got on least of all, are noted as distinctly dolicho, while the more progressive Bantu are "generally dolicho, but variable." And while the African Negrito is described by Keane as "bright, active, and quick-witted, but *vindictive and treacherous* [*i.e.*, to their enemies!], apparently *not cruel to each other, but rather gentle and kindly*," the long-headed Bushman is declared to be "in *all* these respects very like the Negrito, but more intelligent."[1]

Temperament, in the ordinary sense, is ethnologically shown to be as little determined by skull shape as racial success. The Papuasian, who is "extremely dolicho," is described as "very excitable, voluble and laughter-loving, fairly intelligent and imaginative, but even more cruel than the African negro;"[2] while the markedly unsuccessful and dolichocephalic Australians and Tasmanians are pronounced "distinctly less excitable and intelligent, but also far less cruel." Yet the difference in dolichocephaly is only that between 68°–72° and 70°–72°. It seems idle to suggest, with an eye on ethnology, that dolichocephaly, thus seen to be morally and temperamentally non-significant in

[1] *Man*, p. 83. [2] *Id.* p. 127.

the negro families, is significant in the white. Ethnologists of many schools unite in the admission that not only do the negro and negroid races exhibit the dolichocephalic skull, but the Teutonic physiognomy and colouring are exhibited among the Kabyles and other descendants of the ancient Libyans,[1] who are not claimed as fulfilling the high Teutonic destiny. Prevalent race-characters, so-called, if they exist, are evidently conditioned by something else than average skull-shape.

Of course the current descriptions of temperament, so flagrantly indiscriminating in regard to the white families, may be equally so in regard to the others. Deniker expressly discredits all alike, declaring that while the Mongoloids in general may be said to tend to gravity, dulness, and melancholy, and the negroes and Melanesians to gaiety and superficiality, there are very many exceptions; and for him the verdicts passed by travellers on savages are for the most part simply *banal.*[2] But these generalisations are what the other school of ethnologists offer; and their sociology is fairly to be tested by their

[1] Sergi, pp. 62–69; Brinton, as last cited; De Quatrefages, Introd., Pt. II, p. 486.

[2] *Les Races et les Peuples de la Terre,* 1900, pp. 143–4. It is noteworthy that the more the ethnologists study sociological problems, the less they tend to frame "race-characters" in accordance with general skull shapes. Ripley, though he leans to "temperamental" generalisations in certain cases, is much nearer to the point of view of Deniker than to that of Keane.

own evidence. So judged, they are seen to have no right to their sociological opinions.

It seems unnecessary, then, for sociological purposes, to settle whether mass shape of skull is or is not a fixed racial character, yielding only to cross-breeding. Latterly there has been a tendency to recognise, what was suggested a generation ago,[1] and what an open-minded inquirer might readily surmise, that it is variable in terms of life conditions. Nomadic peoples might plausibly be expected to be dolichocephalic in respect of the probable survival of the best walkers of both sexes, who might be expected to be those with a narrow pelvis. A Kaffir woman, tall, narrow, and dolichocephalic, has a magnificent stride. Women broaden pelvically with repeated child-bearing, given static conditions, thus making possible, if not probable, the birth of broader-skulled children. But this is only a guess, and the true primary determinants may be dietetic.[2]

On the other hand, Dr. Keane has given a ready reception to the thesis of Professor A. Macalister that "the infantile *and primitive* skull is relatively long, and that there is a gradual

[1] By J. Ranke and others cited by Karl Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, 1886, pp. 138–41.

[2] Vogt (*Lectures on Man*, Eng. tr. 1864, p. 121) noted fifty years ago that "pelvic variations are certainly connected with the formation of the cranium." Cp. p. 178. And he also suggested (pp. 26–27, 428) dietetic causation.

change, phylogenetic (racial) as well as ontogenetic (individual), toward brachycephaly, which is certainly correlated with—and is apparently produced by—cerebral activity and growth."[1]

On this view, the long-heads were and are, in the main, the peoples of the more primitive life conditions, in at least certain respects. But as this carries a suggestion of racial predilection or prejudice, it is not to be stressed in an inquiry which aims at getting rid of such bias. Let it but be noted that the people of Britain are on the average even more dolichocephalic than those of North Germany.

Professor Ripley, who is so far from a thoroughgoing belief in the immutability of somatic forms that he finally dismisses Deniker's multiplication of races and sub-races by pinning it to such a conclusion,[2] is nevertheless firm for the immutability (save for crossing) of dolichocephaly and brachycephaly. He sees clearly that "pigmentation is a trait which is affected by environment";[3] and when faced by a group of tall broad-heads in Burgundy, he will rather set it down to "the material prosperity of the district than to a Teutonic strain,"[4] where Deniker decides for a particular "sub-race," *not* locally evolved. Thus recognising pigmentation and

[1] *Man*, p. 520, citing *Nature*, 1897, p. 487.
[2] *Races of Europe*, App. D., p. 605.
[3] *Id.* p. 77.
[4] *Id.* pp. 144, 602.

stature to be amenable to environment, he is still content to regard skull-shape in mass as wholly hereditary. I respectfully confess myself unable to follow his reasoning, especially after his avowal that he can make no cranial discriminations in the British Isles, while bound to recognise race varieties. Even if J. Ranke's theory of mountain habitat be found inadequate to the phenomena,[1] the possibility of variation in cranial as in other somatic directions is not in the least excluded. The best ethnologist must be on his guard against letting himself be tied to a presupposition by his apparent need for something that will clearly give him an *ethnos*.

Suffice it to say (1) that there is no clear biological presumption in favour of the racial fixity of mass-forms of skull under changing conditions; (2) that the evidence goes to prove a progressive modification of the colouring of hair and eyes in the races loosely described as fair-haired and blue-eyed, and that this may be a matter of pigmentation by items of diet as well as by climate and higher domestication; and (3) that there is no known scientific evidence connecting either temperamental or "intellectual" characters with either skull-shape (in mass) or coloration, unless it be the

[1] *Races of Europe*, App. D., p. 52.

evidence in favour of the view that intellectual power, as distinguished from executive energy, goes rather with the broad than with the long skull.

If all these things be so, the practical question is narrowed to this, whether, irrespectively of any definite anatomical or pigmental characters, there is any ground for ascribing either (*a*) the political career or (*b*) the intellectual and moral characteristics (if such there be) of any race or nation to hereditary factors as distinguished from culture-stage, cultural factors, and institutional or other conditions of national life. The problem is here posited, be it observed, without use of the confusing term "temperament," which normally means degree of vivacity or excitability, but is used by some ethnologists, as we have seen, to cover moral and intellectual qualities in general. A good deal of debate may be saved by avoiding that confusion.

If any one is concerned to insist that nations in mass vary temperamentally; that most Dutchmen are more "stolid" than most Italians, and most Scotchmen cooler than most Irishmen, let him have his way. In the microcosm of the House of Commons may be seen stolid and reticent Irishmen, excitable and voluble Lowland Scotchmen, very "Saxon" Welshmen, and very "Keltic" Saxons, as the word-values go; but we need not deny apparent national averages.

That is not the real issue. The issue is as to whether temperamental averages connote or imply character averages, and whether alleged character averages, in the natural sense of the terms, are or are not matters of racial heredity, and as such determinants in race-history.

§ 3. *Teutonism in France and Germany.*

The current generalisations as to European race-characters may be collected in five classes. First there is the popular English contrast between Teuton and Kelt, in which the Teuton in envisaged as tall, blond, blue-eyed, long-headed, and well-balanced; and the Kelt as short, dark (or rufous!) dark-eyed, or grey-eyed, broad-headed, and ill-balanced. Secondly there is the popular German contrast between the Teutonic and the "Latin" races, in which is made a similar allotment of characteristics. Thirdly, there is the Teutonic contrast between the Teutonic and the Slav races, in which, with differences of corporal specification (many Slavs being tall and blond), a not very different account is given of the respective racial qualities; though the philologists tell us that the Slav languages are nearer the Teutonic than the Keltic.

Upon these simple differentiations there have been superinduced one or two others. Partly enlightened by the destructive results of ethnological investigation, doctrinaires of the school of the Germanised Englishman Houston Stewart

Chamberlain posit a "Germanic" aggregate which embraces Kelts and Slavs, including in the former the bulk of Frenchmen, but presenting as necessary enemies of Teutonism those "Latin" races which adhere to Catholicism, notably Italy, which for Herr Chamberlain is a hopeless residue of the race-chaos wrought by imperial Rome, though of Roman empire-building he speaks with the respect that befits a "Kaiser's man." At times he seems to menace with exclusion from the Germanic fold all who have not the proper Germanic symptoms in hair and iris; at others, suddenly reminiscent of the difficulties thus set up for Teutonia itself, he seems willing to bestow the Teutonic birth-right indiscriminately enough.

And yet another refinement is set up by the German and other sectaries of the late Comte de Gobineau, a self-willed French gentleman concerned to have a Norse pedigree, and deeply convinced of the aristocratic virtue inhering in such a descent. The central idea of the various Gobineaucratic schools is that the typical dolichocephalic Teutons were *par excellence* a race of conquerors, who imposed themselves as a natural aristocracy wherever they went. Gobineau was not a Germanophile :[1]

[1] Perhaps this is why Herr Chamberlain, while recognising Gobineau as "astonishingly rich in intuitive ideas which have later been verified, and in historical knowledge," decides that

like Nietzsche, who supposed himself a Slav, he rather disdained Germany and Germans in the lump; and of course their thesis makes havoc of the claims of most Germans to be considered Teutonic, the majority being neither blond nor long-headed, and far from "aristocratic" in the common sense of that term. The notion at bottom is one of caste, seeking a biological co-efficient; and to Gobineau, and latterly to the sinking Nietzsche, the "blond beast" seemed to have the proper stamp of Superman.

In the light of ethnographic statistics, some sections of the school have latterly grown pessimistic. The long-headed blond, it is found, is decreasing in numbers relatively to the broadheads and the darks in general; and M. de Lapouge sees little hope for civilisation in consequence. The enterprising dolichos, he finds, migrate to the towns, where they die out. As Dr. Keane notes, M. Fouillée stated this as a generally admitted law of submergence of the aristocracies in the democracies; and Dr. L. Laloy, one of the school, finds that the depopulation of France has been taking place chiefly in respect of the "best," the dolichos, "the section most productive in eminent men in all

in respect of his ethnology of Shem, Ham and Japhet, his work is relegated to "the hybrid class of scientific phantasmagories" (*Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, Eng. tr., i, p. 263).

departments of learning," while "the ignorant and rude *pecus* alone increase."[1]

A fresh puzzle is raised here by the consideration that the ancient dolichocephalic Teutons were reputed highly fertile; and that the long-headed French ought to be in terms of the skull-theory as prolific as the broad-headed Germans. Dr. Keane, ignoring this crux, offers the dolichophile tribe the comfort of the view revived by Professor Macalister, that nature's path is towards brachycephaly, by reason of the effect of brain-culture; but he little knows the dolichophile temperament if he thinks that such an idea can bring it solace.

Certain Teutons, notably the Austrian Reimer, cherish the hope that the dolichocephalic *Götterdämmerung* may be averted by a vigorous system of Teutonic eugenics, worked under the hegemony of Prussia—for Herr Reimer has no faith in his own Teutonic Government. The general Gobineaucratic view is that the heaven-sent Supermen from the first made a fatal mistake in breeding with the daughters of the mere men, the wretched broad-heads; and that this deadly error will be their ultimate undoing. But the indomitable Reimer would put down the malpractice by making it taboo. Let Prussia establish a Pan-Germanic Germany, overthrowing and absorbing France—and gradually the rest

[1] *Man*, pp. 519–20.

of Europe—and the inferior races may be gently but firmly eliminated by preventing them from breeding, till only the narrow-headed blonds are left.

It all sounds like a discussion in Bedlam, but it has been carried on with perfect seriousness on both the French and the German side.[1] All the leading exponents—Gobineau, Chamberlain, Fuchs, Woltmann, de Lapouge, and Reimer—are race-maniacs, mystically convinced of their dolichocephalous aristocracy (shared with the negro and the gorilla and the Eskimo), and supernally contemptuous of the brachycephalous. One recalls Dr. J. Lionel Taylor's dictum that in the "northern primitive" type, long-limbed and long-headed, "general paralysis of the insane is frequent";[2] though the Comte de Gobineau was an able and learned gentleman, with a gift of style not shared by his German admirers. What is totally lacking in all is the spirit of science, however much they may affect the scientific manner and statistical detail. Gobineau was professedly an orthodox Catholic, while flouting every element of Catholic ethic. Woltmann and Reimer were Socialists, partly emancipated but still benevolent towards their former comrades in arms. Gobineau detested

[1] See the exposé in Mr. J. M. Hone's volume, *The German Doctrine of Conquest*, translating M. E. Seillière, with an essay of his own. Maunsel & Co., 1914.

[2] *Aspects of Social Evolution*, 1904, p. 133.

democracy: it was part of his personal pedigree-loving aristocratism. De Lapouge similarly detests Socialism, and sees in the Social Democrats the future *pecus* of the Catholic Church, which he despises, as do Reimer and Woltmann.

The sociology of the group is thus as mixed as the race of their devotion: one could hardly say more. And the gospel of Gobineau has become a specifically German cult, with a sect and an academic temple at Strasbourg. Chamberlain is an Englishman, now turned scurrilously anti-English, as he was before anti-Italian and anti-Semitic. And the Germanified Slav Nietzsche figures as a great prophet of the cult, with all his contempt of things German, and his insane latter-day enthusiasm for the type glorified by the Germaniacs as typically German; while Herr Fuchs,[1] who hails the "paranoid" Kaiser as the Race Messiah, complains that Germany is still barbarous and imitative, and exhorts the War Lord to force the backward Fatherland forward on the path of conquest. It all composes ideally with the now national German doctrine of German *Kultur*, in alliance with Turk and Bulgarian, against the "Mongolian" Kultur of the Six Nations.

The final fun of the situation consists in the fact that, as Professor Ripley puts it, "the

[1] Author of *Kaiser, Kultur, und Kunst*, 1904, cited by Mr. Hone, p. 59.

best opinion to-day holds the *Keltic* culture and language to have represented merely a *dominant aristocracy*," as was argued by another Count—de Belloguet—and a very learned Count, too, about half a century ago.[1] The dominant Teuton, on that view, was but a Teuton-speaking Kelt.

Whether Germania will survive the war even in Germany is perhaps doubtful. The first test that suggests itself to the outsider, brachycephalic or otherwise, is the question, How many distinguished Germans have conformed to the dolichocephalic type?[2] Bismarck did not, Luther did not, Goethe did not, Lessing did not, Kant did not, Beethoven did not, Hegel did not, and Helmholtz did not. Heine happened to be a Jew. Schiller would seem to have been a dolicho : he was fair ; and Rauch told George Eliot that he had a *miserable Stirne*—a wretched forehead. She writes in her diary :[3] " In his (Schiller's) bedroom we saw his skull for the first time, and were amazed at the smallness of the intellectual region. . . . All pleasure in thinking of Schiller's portraits and bust is now destroyed to us by the conviction of their untruthfulness."

Schiller is of course a " score " for the dolichocephalous type ; but it seems rather heavily

[1] *Races of Europe*, pp. 28, 127.
[2] Kant has been described as " hyperbrachycephalous."
[3] Cross's *Life*, 1-vol. ed., p. 174.

outweighed by the brachycephaly of Goethe and the rest. On the other hand, Frederick the Great had the "receding brow, by no means of Olympian height," as Carlyle notes, with the saving clause: "head, *however*, is of long form, and has superlative grey [or "azure-grey"] eyes in it"[1]—just like Carlyle's own, in fact. So that, though Napoleon is a mere brachycephal and Bismarck another, and Hindenburg yet another, there may be something in the dolicho type, considered as that of the man of action, so dear to Carlyle, who could never pack his own portmanteau.

It would seem expedient, however, to conduct the inquiry on historical lines, with an eye rather to the total record of the Teutonic-speaking races, in particular the German so-called. We could not get very far by any selection of skull-types, though what we do get is, as aforesaid, not very gratifying for the dolichophiles. It is told of poor Dr. Woltmann that he went to France to investigate the biographies of distinguished Frenchmen, with a view to establishing their Teutonicity; but that, for everyone but himself, "his results were indecisive."[2] He learned, for instance, that "Racine was fairly tall, his features were agreeable, his glance open, his physiognomy at the same time gentle and

[1] *History of Friedrich*, B. i, ch. i, 2nd par.
[2] Hone, p. 111.

animated " ; and the theorist was largely reduced to finding blond hair under wigs in old portraits. Rousseau, he had to admit, was dark and brown-skinned, and so rather " Alpine," however Germanic in mind. La Rochefoucauld he discarded as quite un-Teutonic ; which would probably not have grieved that moralist, could he have known it. Diderot, of course, has been verbally shown to be a Teutonic " Tietroh," though visibly brachycephalic in his portraits. Herr Chamberlain, too, has annexed Pascal as a genuine Lorrainer, being capable of conceiving that the *Provinciales* are a Germanic product. After that, the portraits of both Pascal and Molière may conceivably be regarded as those of typical Teutons. But the reader would probably prefer a serious discussion, to the exclusion of the thesis of the Germanhood of Voltaire.

§ 4. *Teutons and Aryans.*

The first consideration to be kept in view in our historic inquiry is that the so-called Teutonic peoples or races are for ethnology not "Aryans" or even Teutons, but simply speakers of "Aryan" languages called Teutonic, even as the Kelts are but a miscellany of peoples speaking Aryan languages called Keltic. This caveat, so unplausible to the eye of the unsophisticated reader, comes from several of the latest experts. Professor Sergi, the eminent Italian specialist, posits as aforesaid a "Eurafrican" race, of which the dolichocephalic Scandinavians and so-called Teutons were sections, driven to the north by an Aryan immigration coming from the Russian and Asiatic steppes by way of the Danube. Dr. Keane agrees that tall, fair, long-headed peoples had spread from North Africa to Scandinavia before any Aryans arrived.[1] They were thus not originally speakers of Teutonic languages, no Aryan languages having theretofore existed in Europe.

On Sergi's theory the Aryans must have

[1] *Ethnology*, p. 405.

followed and conquered them as they did most of the other European peoples; since only thereby could those peoples have acquired the Aryan languages. Nevertheless, the invading Aryans, who themselves, be it remembered, may have descended from non-Aryans Aryanised, are not to be conceived in terms of this theory as the bringers of a higher civilisation. On the contrary, they are described as savages who broke down a higher prior European civilisation by their superior brute force. And this conquering race is to be thought of as substantially brachycephalic.

> It is an error to maintain that the Germans and the Scandinavians, blond dolichocephals or long-heads . . . are Aryans; they are Eurafricans of the Nordic variety. The Aryans are of Asiatic origin, and constitute a variety of the *Eurasiatic species*; the physical characters of their skeletons are different from those of the Eurafricans. . . . The two classic civilisations, Greek and Latin, were not Aryan but Mediterranean. The Aryans were savages when they invaded Europe; they destroyed in part the superior civilisation of the Neolithic populations, and could not have created the Greco-Latin civilisation. In the course of the Aryan invasions the languages of the Eurafrican species in Europe were transformed in Italy, Greece, and elsewhere; Celtic, German, Slavonic, etc., being genuine branches of the Aryan tongue. . . .[1]
>
> If it is true, as results from the anthropological documents furnished by the most ancient graves

[1] Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, Eng. tr. 1901, pref.

> in Italy, that the Aryans who invaded Italy possessed brachycephalic heads of various shapes—spheroidal, sphenoidal, and platycephalic—the other Aryans who spoke German or Slavonic must have possessed similar physical characteristics, if they were genuine Aryans. It would then be the case also that the real Germanic Aryans were not those of the Reihengräber cephalic type, but those whose type was identical with that of the Slavs and the Celts.[1]

It needs no *parti pris* to detect difficulties in this thesis. Sergi may conceivably have his own racial bias. He carries on the doctrine first mooted in terms of racial predilection by Micali,[2] who so learnedly insisted that Italian civilisation was always autochthonous.[3] But we need apply only the tests of scientific consistency to find ground for demur. "Savages," at a relatively low level of civilisation, are represented as wrecking a superior Neolithic civilisation, and as then imposing their language or languages, differentiated by the varying forms of the conquered tongues, wherever they went. It is after the Neolithic Age that the classic civilisations arise, *with* the altered (Aryanised) languages. If the invading Aryan savages had destroyed any Greek and Italic civilisation, it was pre-classic: the classic civilisations, in the terms of the case, were made by the Aryanised mixed stocks. They are, then,

[1] Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, Eng. tr. pp. 306–7.

[2] *L'Italia avanti il dominio dei Romani*, 1810, 1821, 1852.

[3] See Lamarre, *Étude sur les peuples anciens de l'Italie*, 1899, pp. 4 *seq.*, 30 *seq.*

not purely Mediterranean, but Aryano-Mediterranean.

Clearly the new theory must be clarified before it can carry any general conviction. The conception of a race of savages who everywhere impose their (superior) languages on a higher civilisation[1] is not easily digestible. It is not supportable by the historic cases either of the imposition of forms of Latin on Gaul and Spain by the Romans, or of the acceptance of French by the conquering Norsemen; though it might be partly supported by the imposition of Anglo-Saxon on the Britons in so far as the latter were absorbed by the former, as seems to have been the case in many of the towns. The Aryans who invaded India cannot be said to have generally imposed their speech. But, on the other hand, the anthropological evidence, *as interpreted on the assumption of the racial fixity of all main skull forms*, creates such a perplexity that the theory of Aryan conquest and language-imposition from the East alone seems to offer any solution.

Thus Dr. Keane is in large part at one here with Professor Sergi. While holding that "the Aryans, as a distinct race, were perhaps at no

[1] Ripley gives countenance to the thesis so far as to say that even if the domestication of animals seemed to coincide with an immigration of broad-heads from the East, "no one is competent to affirm that the new race actually introduced the culture" (p. 28).

time very numerous," he also concludes that "the Aryan tongues everywhere, so to say, took possession of the soil, and effaced those previously current, but in so doing became themselves somewhat modified, especially in their vocabulary and phonetics."[1] Thus the language-givers, savages for Sergi, are further non-numerous for Keane. They must have been truly remarkable conquerors, on either view or on both views. Could it be that they had a decisive military advantage in respect of their domesticated animals? Von Ihering, who supports Sergi in reckoning the Aryans as lower in general civilisation than the Europeans,[2] yet sees no difficulty in supposing a wholly pastoral people to be very numerous and to have evolved a notably superior set of languages, and does not recognise any military mystery. Others are likely to remain perplexed.

Apart from the problem set up by the skull-remains, most readers would be disposed to revert either (1) to the primary Aryan theory, that the Aryans of Europe came in successive waves at long intervals, each great immigration having a specialised speech which it preserved; and that the Teutons, Kelts, and Slavs of history *are* those immigrants; or (2) to the second

[1] *Man*, p. 512.

[2] *The Evolution of the Aryan* (Eng. tr. of *Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europäer*), 1897, ch. ii.

Aryan theory, popularised in this country by Canon Taylor,[1] according to which the Aryans are indigenous to Europe; and the Iranian and Indian Aryans were emigrants thence. Brinton held in 1890 that this theory was established; but Sergi and Keane were later to be reckoned with. It seems permissible to pronounce that no decisive solution is in sight while the assumption of the fixity of skull forms remains unmodified. For Keane, the Aryan problem is a "crux"; and Ripley leaves it so.[2]

While Sergi holds that the so-called Teutons of dolicho type, whose skulls are "identical in character with the Mediterranean and Hamitic types," and therefore "of African origin,"[3] became blond and tall in the north[4] (though there are blond Berbers or Hamites in North Africa[5]), Keane tries to meet the difficulty of difference of stature by "the suggested two-fold invasion of Europe in relatively late times by tall, blond long-heads from the Eurasian steppe, and by short, dark round-heads from Armenia through Asia Minor, both being of Aryan speech."[6] And similarly Brinton opines that "the original Aryac tribe was a mixture of blonds and

[1] *The Origin of the Aryans*, 1890. Long before (1839–1848) put by the Belgian d'Omalius d'Halloy; and later by Latham (1859). See Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, 1890, p. 146.

[2] See his *Races of Europe*, p. 475 *seq.*

[3] As cited, p. 252. [4] P. 254. [5] P. 67.

[6] *Man*, p. 514.

brunettes, with a majority of the latter, and also that the form of its skulls was variable: some long, some broad."[1] So we are left with markedly divergent Aryans or Aryan-speaking invaders, even as we are faced by mixed and varying types in "all the prehistoric graves of German territory."

> Von Holder, the author of a work on Würtemberg skulls which is of fundamental importance in the study of Teutonic anthropology, has found a series of the most diverse types, Germanic, Turanian, Sarmatian, pure and mixed, in his opinion, with no predominant Germanic type; Lissauer finds a mixture of forms among ancient Prussian skulls, while Virchow, who has examined a vast number of skulls from old Germanic graves, finds the most varying shapes among the primitive populations of Germanic soil.[2]

We may thus with a perfectly clear critical conscience put aside the whole primary ethnological problem; and come to the more or less well-known history of the people speaking Teutonic and Keltic tongues, taking their history and their literature to be the real evidence for whatever racial characters they may possess. The ethnological handling of the historic problem is declared by a high authority to have yielded "a most mischievous commingling of physical anthropology and linguistics, which has been dire in its unscientific results."[3] The simple historical method thus has the field.

[1] *Races and Peoples*, p. 148, citing Fligier.
[2] Sergi, p. 17.
[3] Ripley, p. 485.

§ 5. *Kelts and Germans.*

At the very outset of the historic inquiry we find Kelts and Germans practically identified by the whole mass of the ancient Greek and Roman references. The Celtæ or Galatæ and the Germani figure alike as tall blond or red-haired peoples, the former living to the west and the latter mostly to the east, but partly also to the west, of the Rhine. If aspect counts for anything, they were of the same stock.[1] Dr. Brinton has sought to distinguish the Teutons or Germani as fair-haired, and the Celtæ as red-haired;[2] but for this there is no historical justification. Among the "purest Teutons" of Norway, red hair is more common than anywhere else in Europe, amounting in one place to about 20 per cent., or double the rate in Scotland.[3] Often the Galli or Celtæ are spoken of as *flavi*, blonds; and Tacitus expressly describes the

[1] This was shown sixty years ago by Professor Adolf Holtzmann of Heidelberg in his *Kelten und Germanen*, 1855; and the point is latterly insisted on by Professor Ridgway and other scholars.

[2] *Races and Peoples*, pp. 106–7. Dr. Taylor tries to make the same division.

[3] Ripley, p. 206.

Germani as *rutilæ*, red-haired, connecting them in this respect with the red-haired Caledonians.[1] Red-haired people there doubtless were among the blonds, then as now; and then as now red hair may have resulted from crossing between blond and dark. For there emerges from the evidence as to the general population of Gaul the probability that a dark people, the previous inhabitants—and also a previous wave of Keltic-speaking invaders—may have been subjugated by the blond Galli, who may only have been the fighting aristocracy with whom Cæsar had to deal.

Cæsar at the outset expressly divides Gaul into three polities, these of Aquitaine, the Galli proper, and the Belgæ; and the last are expressly connected with the Germani.[2] Aquitaine would seem to have been still the country of the older stock; and the Galli and the Belgæ successive waves of invaders, separate in name and polity, but not in aspect. Nor is it possible to show with certainty that they spoke different languages. Of the score or two of words accidentally preserved by the Romans as Gaulish, nearly all seem traceable as readily to Teutonic

[1] *Germania*, c. 4; *Agricola*, c. 11. Galen expressly insists (Comm. in Hippocr. *De salubri diæta*, c. 6) that the Germani are not yellow-haired but red-haired; and Motley (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, ed. 1863, p. 4) is content to give his Germans "long locks of fiery red" and his Gauls, whom he despises as Kelts, "fierce blue eyes" and "yellow hair."

[2] *De bello gallico*, ii, 4.

as to Keltic forms. The argument based on one corrupt passage in Cæsar concerning the language spoken by the German chief Ariovistus partly breaks down before the fact that of the various readings the one which alone makes the passage intelligible as a whole is that which indicates no distinction between the Gaulish and the German speech.[1]

The very name *Celtæ*, though quite plausibly reducible to Keltic forms and meanings,[2] is also referable to the old Norse *hild-r*[3] (= war, battle), as meaning "warriors," and is actually so referred by a leading Keltic scholar, who also accepts *Galli* as a Gaulish word meaning the same thing.[4] By other scholars, the name *Germani* is given up as probably Gaulish, but of quite obscure origin; no one being content to follow Holtzmann in his acceptance of the account of Tacitus which ostensibly made it a Roman epithet to indicate the Germani as "genuine" Celtæ. If it be Gaulish, the "man" again suggests Teutonicity, though here also there is a Keltic interpretation. But the first "Teutones," in turn, are held, as we have seen, to have been a tribe of Keltic Helvetii. Always we come back to an apparently close kinship

[1] Holtzmann, *Kelten und Germanen*, 1855, p. 31 *seq.*

[2] See *The Saxon and the Celt*, p. 45 *seq.*

[3] Connected with the German *Held*=hero ?

[4] Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., p. 2. There are, of course, other interpretations. See *The Saxon and the Celt*, p. 64.

between the Galli, the Celtæ, and the Germani, in personal traits and in speech. It is to previous invaders of Gaul, who may have imposed their language, that we seem led to trace the Keltic which was finally superseded in Gaul by Latin, evolving into French.

On this view the Galli of northern Italy, reduced to Roman subjection before Cæsar invaded Gaul, were also Germanic; and the laboriously insolent account of the Galli and Celtæ distilled by the Germanic prejudice of Mommsen resolves itself into an impeachment of his own stock. Turning the work of historiography into a propaganda of race, he describes the "Kelts" of antiquity as (1) lazy in their agriculture, (2) delighting in tippling and brawling, (3) ostentatious, (4) given to figurative language, (5) given to droll humour, (6) excessively inquisitive, (7) extravagantly credulous, (8) child-like in their piety, (9) subservient to their priesthood, (10) fervently nationalistic, (11) ready to revolt under any chance leader, (12) incapable of any organisation or fixed discipline, (13) in a political point of view "thoroughly useless," and therefore doomed to failure.[1]

This comprehensive aspersion is cast by Mommsen without even an attempt to face the ethnological problem, so vigorously raised before

[1] *History of Rome*, B. v, ch. 7: Eng. tr. ed. 1894, v, 98–100.

him by German scholars. For him Galli and Germani simply *must* be different races. And yet even if the ethnic problem be absolutely waived in his favour, it is obvious that nearly every characteristic he imputes to the Celtæ holds more fully of the Germani of his idolatry. For the Romans, whose agriculture was of necessity intensely laborious, Keltic husbandry was slack; but that of the so-called Germani was slacker still. Tacitus says as much.[1] Drinking and brawling were more commonly imputed to the Germans in ancient,[2] in mediæval, and in post-Reformation times, by their own writers and by others, than to any other European people. Incidentally, Tacitus describes them as the maddest of all gamblers, and reports that many so lost their freedom.[3] Ostentation, characteristic of nearly all barbarians, is Germanic to this day; and if there is a more "figurative" literature than that of the Teutonic Eddas and Sagas, and the remains of early Anglo-Saxon, it ought to be carefully specified.

When we come to "droll humour," one is at a loss whether to take the historian at his word on the score of the admittedly imperfect development of the sense of humour in the

[1] *Germania*, 26, 45. [2] *Id.* 23.

[3] Dr. Richard (*Hist. of Ger. Civ.*, p. 48) notes that "this passion for gambling seems to have been a common vice of the Indo-European nations, while *drinking was, on the whole, rather more peculiarly Germanic.*"

Fatherland; but we must not let ourselves be led by dialectic into disregard of the abundant attempts at humour in German literature, from *Till Eulenspiegel* onwards. Inquisitiveness is the special mark of the barbarian, as of most savages; and in no European country is it more in evidence in our own day than in Germany. Credulity and piety are historically in the same case; and as to priestly rule, the Catholic priesthood of Germany is to this day much more dominant than that of France or that of Italy. As to nationalistic fervour, it is truly edifying to find the German special pleader ascribing it in an especial degree to the other people. Certainly, despite much German rant about Arminius, the race has not been latterly much given to rebellion; but the phrase about "chance leaders" is one of many illustrations of the historian's lack of the judicial temper.

The crowning absurdity is the charge of lack of capacity for organisation or fixed discipline. Before the rise of Prussia, national organisation is more palpably lacking in the Germanic than in any other western population. The resistance made by Gaul to Cæsar outwent in energy and in co-ordination, despite the disintegrating forces, any made by the Germani to the later Romans; and the absolute failure of the Anglo-Saxons to combine against either Danes or Normans is the finish to six hundred years of intertribal

war. Charlemagne could organise France; he could not organise Germany. So long as Roman organisation lasted, Roman discipline could always rout any Teutonic horde; and we have the historic declaration of Athaulf, the successor of Alaric, that the utter lawlessness and hopeless indiscipline of his compatriots drove him to renounce the dream of a Germanic Empire and to strive instead to rebuild the Roman.[1]

Incapacity for organisation is the summing-up of the whole Teutonic age of southern conquest. In France, in Italy, in Spain, in North Africa, every wave in turn dies out in decadence, in physical and moral degeneration, in disintegration, defeat, and subjection. It is even doubted whether we can say "absorption"; for Virchow could find no physiological trace of Goth or Visigoth, Vandal or Frank or Lombard, in any of the populations which they had once conquered.[2]

If ever there were "politically useless" stocks in Europe, they were the tribes who invaded the moribund empire of Rome, and after an easy conquest themselves degenerated in a few centuries to the point of sheer racial dissolution. No such picture of regal ineptitude as that of the Merovingian *rois fainéants* is preserved to

[1] Paulus Orosius, vii, 43.

[2] Professor Ripley notes (p. 25) spots of survival of German *speech* in North Italy *without* type-survival, and survivals of race traits in spots *without* survival of speech.

us from antiquity; and the Frankish history, as told by Gregory of Tours, runs hard that of the worst Roman emperors. "It would not be easy, with the same historical space," remarks Gibbon, "to find more vice and less virtue."

As on the Continent, so in Britain. If the Belgæ and the Galli in general were Germanic, there were Germans in Britain before Cæsar; for he speaks of a large Belgic element there. And if the Belgæ were German-speaking—whether Aryans or Aryan-speaking "Eurafricans"—then German was spoken in Britain at least by the Belgæ; and the Britons subdued by the Romans were already a Germano-Kelto-Iberian mixture or miscellany. And whereas the ancient Venetes (in the district of Vannes) are held to have been a Teutonic stock in Brittany, ostensibly surviving to this day, other Bretons in the valley of the Ranee are held to have been "largely Teutonic" speakers of Celtic who were ousted from Cornwall by the Anglo-Saxons in the fifth century.[1]

That there was a pre-Aryan population in Britain, again, is agreed by all; and as the oldest remains are those of a largely dolichocephalic people or peoples, it *may* be Sergi's Eurafrican race, which in the Nordic variety grew generally tall and blond. That the brachycephalic invaders who followed were Aryan Kelts is simply taken for granted by our Keltic

[1] Ripley, pp. 152–3.

scholars.[1] Then the non-Aryan Picts, who did not "get on," were long-headed failures; and the conquering Goidels were successful broad-heads, destined, however, to be thrust back by the next drove of broad-headed Keltic speakers, the Brythons;[2] as these were later by Belgæ; who again were conquered and Latinised by the Romans.

If, on the other hand, the Belgæ were, as Keane supposes, already Keltic-speaking before they came to Britain,[3] they were none the less Germanic, alike by the tests of Holtzmann, Keane, and Ridgway. And if the previously invading Goidels and Brythons were Aryans, and not merely Aryan-speakers whose ancestors had been conquered by Aryans, we are left either wondering how on the ethnological assumption of the racial fixity of skull-forms Aryans could be both broad-headed and long-headed, or simply acquiescent in Dr. Keane's theory that such actually was the case, ethnology notwithstanding.

As regards the pre-Roman conquests, the process seems to have been the same, irrespective of race. The Goidels imposed themselves as an aristocracy upon the non-Aryan aborigines,[4] typified by the Picts, many of whom, however, long maintained sectional polities;[5] and the

[1] Rhys and Brymnor Jones, *The Welsh People*, ed. 1909, p. 14.
[2] *Id.* p. 11; Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., p. 216.
[3] *Man*, p. 528, *note* 4.
[4] Rhys and Brymnor Jones, p. 12.
[5] *Id.* p. 14.

later Brythons similarly imposed themselves as an aristocracy upon the mixed Goidels and aborigines.[1] And if it be suggested that the Picts went under because they lacked the Aryan institution of the family, the answer is, first, that the value of Cæsar's statements on the subject of "British" practice is highly dubious;[2] and, secondly, that Goidels gave way to Brythons, both to Belgæ, Belgæ and Galli to Romans, Romanised Britons to Anglo-Saxons, Saxons to Danes, and all to Normans, apparently irrespective of their family virtues.

If, again, the non-Aryan Picts are to be identified as those who in Cæsar's time painted themselves blue, the comment is that the practice was presumably limited to the painting of the face for battle, which happened to be practised by Saxons in the fifth century.[3] Incidentally, it should be noted that the three warring Irish races of "Firbolgs" are always spoken of in their ancient documents as largely fair-headed; and only in the seventeenth century does there arise the view that they were short and dark.[4] Physically, they seem to have been "Teutonic." Yet again, the population of the Scottish Hebrides, so often classed as Keltic failures by

[1] Rhys and Brymnor Jones, p. 120.
[2] See Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, pp. 55–56.
[3] *Id.* pp. 54–55.
[4] See *The Saxon and the Celt*, p. 60.

Teutomaniac historians,[1] are admittedly to a very large extent Norse, and therefore strictly Teutonic, though they have become Keltic speakers. So with a number of the Highland clans, concerning whom in general Brinton makes the absurd generalisation that "Some of the Scotch clans, many of the Irish, most of the Welsh and Bretons, are of moderate stature, dark eyes and hair, and brunette complexion, while *the remainder* are tall, raw-boned, red-haired, with florid, freckled skins and tawny beards."[2] As if there were not thousands of tall and dark Highlanders and Irishmen, and thousands of red-haired men of moderate stature.

It is the same authority who informs us that "the Celtic peoples of the present day form a decaying group, which in a few generations *will wholly disappear*"; that "their sole representatives now are the Highland Scotch, the Irish, the Manx, the Welsh, and the *natives of Brittany* in France"; and finally that "France is *three-fifths* of Celtic descent."[3] In the same breath we have the assurance that all alike are turbulent, boastful, courageous, but incautious; that "they never have succeeded in forming

[1] Notably by Hill Burton. See *The Saxon and the Celt*, p. 205 *seq.*

[2] *Races and Peoples*, p. 155.

[3] Compare the verdict of Professor Ripley (p. 32) that "nearly a half of France . . . is as purely Teutonic racially as the half of Germany itself."

an independent State, and are a dangerous element in the body politic of a free country. In religion they are fanatic and bigoted, ready to swear in the words of their master, rather than to exercise an independent judgment" —such as that shown, for instance, by Dr. Brinton in these passages. From his invective there would appear to emerge some ground for the view that in politics "the Irish run the United States."

§ 6. *Teutonic History.*

In the historic period which begins with the Christianisation of Anglo-Saxon England, we are able to apply to "Teutonic" pretensions a set of tests which once for all reduce to absurdity the theory of the hereditary possession by any race or race-mixture of qualities which ensure their progress or "success" under any conditions. To whatever extent the mixed Britons may have been preserved in the area of the Anglo-Saxon conquest—and the continuance of the town life in many places implies their survival there—the Anglo-Saxon race-mixture was in sufficiently complete control to establish its language and its institutions. And the result was substantial stagnation for a period of six hundred years. A historian who holds loyally to the familiar Mommsenic formula that the Teutonic races climb "slowly and painfully, it is true, but with a steady and continued progress, from stage to stage of civilisation," as contrasted with the Keltic, who "after soaring at the first flight (!) to a comparatively elevated point, are

inclined to be content with their achievements, and are . . . . passed by their more deliberate competitors,"[1] nevertheless explicitly avows at his outset that at the time of the Norman Conquest the Saxons were "a decadent nation lying on the outer fringe of European politics."[2]

The two propositions are in hopeless contradiction; and that first cited has simply no historic standing-ground. The chief peoples in which "Keltic" stocks can be supposed to have largely entered are those of Italy and France, the Latin tongues being at least closely akin to the Keltic, while Keltic invaders must at an early period have imposed their language on a large part of Gaul. In Italy, after the fall of the Roman Empire, the Teutonic invaders collectively made no progress in civilisation, made no measurable contribution to the slow revival which culminated in the Renaissance, and by the admission of German ethnologists, as aforesaid, simply disappeared as a race-type. In North Africa and in Spain they succeeded no better, politically or otherwise. All absorbed races, indeed, may be held to survive as constituents in the collective

[1] H. W. C. Davis, *England under the Normans and Angevins*, 1905, p. 223.

[2] *Id.* p. 1. Many writers have concurred in this estimate of the Anglo-Saxon polity. Cp. Stubbs, *Const. Hist. of England*, 4th ed., § 79 (vol. i, pp. 227–8); Sharon Turner, *Hist. of England during the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. i, pp. 1, 73; Pearson, *Hist. of England during the Early and Middle Ages*, 1867, i, pp. 288, 308–12, 321, 343–7; Abdy, *Lectures on Feudalism*, 1890, pp. 322, 326–7, 331.

stock; but this is not what the Teutomaniacs claim or want.

Meanwhile a new civilisation was built up in Italy and in France, with Romance languages. All the Germanic elements in Gaul were ultimately absorbed in the French-speaking mass; and it was from this Rome-founded civilisation that, first under the auspices of the Germanic Charlemagne, the elements of mediæval civilisation passed into Germany, which had been only partly Romanised. Of themselves, the Germani had made no culture-progress whatever. Charlemagne, as Theodoric before him, partly assimilated what Roman culture had been preserved by the organisation of the Church; and it was as a ruthless conqueror that he set about assimilating the Saxons. The whole history goes to establish the memorable generalisation of the German historian, Waitz, that "*The German race would never of its own qualities, and without an exterior impulsion, and a rupture of its own traditions, have arrived at a superior development.*"[1]

Before Waitz, the same truth was seen and more comprehensively put by Heeren, who, enlightened by Montesquieu, saw that there was nothing specially German in the matter. Noting how peoples have been raised in

[1] *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 1860, iii, cited by Zeller.

civilisation by a change in their environment, he remarks that

> Thus were civilised and ameliorated the German, the Arab, and the Mongol races. In their woods, their deserts, or their steppes, they would have remained eternally what they had been. But in the fertile fields of Gaul and of Italy, in the rich plains of Egypt, of Mogreb, of Spain or of Syria, in China and in Hindustan (?) these peoples became nations, in acquiring a country. On the banks of the Seine and the Ganges, the Nile and the Hoang-Ho, there grew up and flourished among them a culture of which they had previously no idea.[1]

So, too, did Alexander von Humboldt "repel the depressing assumption of superior and inferior races of men. There are nations . . . more highly civilised, more ennobled by mental cultivation, than others, but none in themselves nobler than others."[2] Thus sanely could German historians and naturalists reason before the period of Prussianisation and racial self-worship, and their sincere science must not be turned against their race in the spirit of the polemic of their successors. Even among these, indeed, the naturalist view of race evolution has not been left without a witness. Von Ihering, who in effect coincides with Sergi and Keane in ascribing a low level of civilisation to the invading Aryans, while largely crediting them with some ethical

[1] *Essai sur l'influence des Croisades*, Fr. tr. 1808, pp. 4–5.

[2] *Cosmos*, Eng. tr., i, 368. Otherwise rendered: "There are advanced and backward races, but no noble or ignoble races."

superiorities, writes in so many words that "Had the nations been interchanged in their cradles, Semites would have become Aryans, and Aryans Semites,"[1] which is rather an over-statement of the scientific view. After this, sooth to say, Von Ihering relapses into the mystical thesis that when the Aryans came to the front "the hour had struck for the Semites to retire from the history of the world. Within the limits of their powers, as conditioned by their national character, they had performed their part: they were now exhausted, worn out, decrepit with age. History had no further need of them: they might go."[2]

A method which could thus face both ways, set forth in an uncompleted work, naturally failed to convert the Teutophile school in Germany. But we have to see to it that the scientific point of view is kept without relapse into the other, and that the vauntings of the Teutophiles are not merely countered by an equally prejudiced disparagement. When M. Fustel de Coulanges, commenting Zeller, notes that German civilisation "has arisen solely from without," he is not putting, as he supposes, "a characteristic fact," but simply stating the law of all civilisation, for all races. It is certainly true that German culture, from the age

[1] *Evolution of the Aryan*, p. 73.
[2] *Id.* p. 229.

of Charlemagne, is substantially of extraneous derivation :—

> From without has come to the Germans Christianity, implanted by the puissant sword of Charlemagne ; from without came those who taught them to build cities ; from without came laws which were something else than vague customs, a justice which was something else than private law and *wergeld*, a liberty which was something more than turbulence. Germany has received from without chivalry ; from without civil liberty ; from without letters and sciences ; from without universities, copies of the ancient Parisian school ; from without Gothic art, an imitation of the French cathedrals ; from without religious tolerance, taught by France to the Catholics, and by Holland to the Protestants. . . . From Cæsar and Tacitus to Charlemagne, that is to say, during eight centuries, Germany has given the spectacle . . . of a country absolutely stationary, always barbarous, always hostile to the civilisation which flourished near it. To civilise there was needed force : the warriors of Charlemagne had to march twenty times from the banks of the Rhine, of the Seine, of the Loire, to protect in Germany the missionaries and the builders of cities. Germany did not *make* progress : she received it ; she underwent it.[1]

But the same thing holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, of all modern European races. All alike have risen from barbarism through the seminal virtue of the ancient civilisations, themselves slowly grown from far more ancient seeds, rooting in propitious physical conditions. The classic

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *L'Histoire en France et en Allemagne* (1872), rep. in *Questions Historiques*, 1893, pp. 14–15.

civilisation of Greece grew up on a soil fertilised by those of the Ægean, of Crete, of the East, of Phœnicia, of Egypt; the composite Mediterranean civilisation, including the Etruscan, was assimilated by Rome, which passed it on to Gaul and Spain and Britain; and the Italian revival, stimulated by the survivals in Byzantium, was again communicated to the nations of the North. Gaul was no less truly civilised "from without" than Germany. *This* is the scientific truth in which ethnology and history unite: this, and not any theorem of higher or lower, progressive or unprogressive races. Teutomania is to be superseded not by Keltomania or any other race-gospel, but by a sociology which sees in all races the varying products of antecedents and environments, conditions and institutions.

And so we come to modern German history as to that of a race long backward in its main seat by reason of its very lack of culture-contacts. To Tacitus it seemed notably unmixed, and almost necessarily autochthonous; for who, he asked, would go to Germany for choice?[1] German progress begins with German race-mixtures, German reception of the culture of other races. The early migrations of southern conquest counted for nothing in German civilisation until, after Charlemagne, there came the returning currents; and the mediæval period

[1] *Germania*, 2.

EASTERN GERMANY.

Showing the distribution of Slavs in the 9th Century.

REFERENCE.

- Slavs
- Teutons
- Letts
- Magyars
- Boundary between Germans and Slavs at time of Charlemagne
- Modern Germany

of Germanic intervention in the affairs of Italy wrought as much German harm by conserving German feudalism and retarding German union as it wrought of good in the civilising of German life.

Down till the Reformation, nothing was wrought for general human freedom by any German polity. All that has been rhetorically written of the primary vigour of democratic Teutonic institutions passes into vapour upon historic scrutiny. The legend, current among scholars from Montesquieu to Mommsen, runs that "our Teutonic forefathers" were in all things self-governing and liberty-loving. Tacitus indeed presents such a picture; but he is describing a state of primitive barbarism, with only the germs of institutions. As good a picture of primitive liberty could be drawn from the life of the Eskimos. An eloquent American champion of the cause of European freedom in the present war has written that

> The Angles, the Saxons, the Jutes, and the Frisians, uncontaminated by Rome, carried into England the ancient German freedom, the town moot, the hundred moot, the folk moot. . . . Although a multitude of times crushed to earth, they never forgot their republican institutions, their mass township meetings, their delegate meetings, and never lost their capacity to transact public business. War brought the king, but the king could not shake off the witenagemote, the predecessor of parliament. In their meetings the kicker kicked out his kick; there the officers,

> even the king, were called to account; there for centuries was carried on that stubborn fight of the people against oppression.[1]

It is delightful and invigorating, but inaccurate. As Maitland put it, "there lies a besetting danger for us in the barbarian's use of a language which is too good for his thought."[2] The witenagemote, the "assembly of the wise," was not a democratic institution. "It is clear that this assembly was a small aristocratic body, tending always to become more aristocratic. The bishops constitute its most permanent and at times its most powerful element."[3] By the tenth century the "king's ministers," the thegns bound to the king as officers or otherwise, were the main element. "In a witenagemote held at Luton in 931 were the two archbishops, two Welsh princes, 17 bishops, 15 ealdermen, 5 abbots, and 59 ministri. In another, that of Winchester, of A.D. 934, were present the two archbishops, four Welsh kings, 17 bishops, 4 abbots, 12 ealdermen, and 52 ministri."[4] In the developed witenagemote there was no career for the "kicker."

Popular liberties were not a large feature of Anglo-Saxon life, in which, at the coming of

[1] *Germans in America*, by Lucius B. Swift, of the Indianopolis Bar, 1915, pp. 6–7.

[2] *Domesday Book and Beyond*, 1907, p. 356.

[3] Maitland, *Const. Hist. of England*, 1909, p. 58.

[4] Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* i, p. 140.

the Normans, the mass of the population—in some districts the whole—were in varying degrees "unfree."[1] As the same state of things is found to have existed in the Teutonic Netherlands and in Denmark, it seems unlikely that serfs were not numerous in Germany, where, as elsewhere, all captives taken in war were enslaved, and enslavement for debt was normal. When serfdom began to decline under the Normans, it was not by reason of any special concern for freedom in the "Norse" stock, but by way of a political causation set up by many reacting forces—a process independent of "race character," and seen at work in France and other European countries in the same period. There is therefore a fundamental misconception behind such a statement as this :—

> One of the most remarkable features in French history is the way in which the States-General never succeeded in establishing itself as a regular and recognised means of expressing the wishes of the mass of the people. The cleavage between classes and the isolated position of the provinces were the causes of the phenomenon, *so difficult of explanation to the Teutonic mind.*[2]

By other accounts, the ruling class in France were all along Teutonic; it pleased Carlyle to think so. But, as it happened, the specifically

[1] The subject is discussed in detail in *The Evolution of States*, p. 370 *seq.*

[2] A. F. Hassall, *The French People*, 1902, p. 8.

Teutonic countries in general were the last in Western Europe to acquire democratic institutions which "expressed the wishes of the mass of the people." The Teutonic mind from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century inclusive could have been under no such perplexity as is here suggested in regard to the politics of France, because the Teutonic mind in its main habitat had produced no valid "States-General" of its own. In the eighteenth century even Swiss Government was largely a matter of small city aristocracies, and the Swiss Confederation had become "a weather-beaten ruin, ready to fall"; the Netherlands had ceased to be a Republic, being subservient to the House of Orange; Prussia was under a pure despotism; and the Scandinavian States, for centuries chronically torn by internecine strifes, monarchically ruled with slight constitutional checks from undemocratic Parliaments, had made no visible progress towards the supposed Teutonic norm. The rural population of Denmark were serfs; Sweden, after being despotically led to something near ruin by Charles XII, lost its temporarily developed constitution, and became an absolute monarchy under Gustavus III. What gave new life to the spirit of liberty in Europe at the close of the century was the French Revolution, the achievement of the reputedly "Keltic" people.

Thus the record of the primordial Teutonic

States is one that gives no shadow of support to the Teutonic gospel in any of its political forms. Piratical and aggressive so long as they could be, the Scandinavian peoples have latterly become thoroughly respectable members of the family of nations, making no pretensions to that destiny of dominion which has been so long affirmed for itself by Germany, ostensibly the least Teutonic of the Teutonic aggregates. If Teutonism is to be supposed incarnate anywhere it should be in Sweden, the alleged home of the tall blond dolichocephal who is the select type of the Teutonic race, and has never mixed himself up with the mongrel British as did Norseman and Dane, though the British are only less dolichocephalic than he. And yet not only is Sweden not exactly in the van of European science, art, and literature, but her educated classes seem to derive more and more from the brachycephalic type! "Nyström found from measurements of 500 of the Swedes, who belong to the most dolichocephalic Germanic stock, that the upper and educated classes have a much greater brachycephalic percentage than the lower and uneducated. Of 100 dolichocephals 76·5 belonged to the lower and 23·5 to the upper classes; but of as many brachycephals, only 41·6 to the uneducated, and 58·4 to the educated. High-grade brachycephaly is found by Nyström in twenty-seven of the upper and

educated class and in eight of the lower; high-grade dolichocephaly in only eight educated, as against three less educated. And Nyström is positive that the brachycephals rise from the lower to the higher orders in the greater proportion."[1] Another pang for de Lapouge.

[1] Friedrich Hertz, *Moderne Rassentheorien*, 1904, p. 51.

§ 7. *Collapse of the Physiology of Race.*

It is not surprising that, in view of the stumbling-blocks met on every path of inquiry by the worshippers of the primordial blond long-head, the most popular brand of Teutonism in Germany is latterly that supplied by Herr Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who, as we have seen, stands for a "Germanic" blend which includes Slav and Kelt. There is significance in the fact that he is an Englishman, manufacturing a gospel for the country of his adoption. In his native land he has not been an accepted prophet, despite the zealous panegyric of some disciples. His vogue in Germany is vouched by a declared sale of 60,000 copies of his work, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*; and that distribution is said to have been supplemented by a further issue of 80,000 copies at the cost of the Kaiser.

Irritated by the craniological ethnologists, who yield him nowhere any firm ground, Herr Chamberlain constructs for himself, on the broad basis of his intuitions, an idea of race to which he is resolved that history shall conform. To

the annoying wrangle about the elusive "Aryan race" he opposes the firm principle: "Though it were proved that there never was an Aryan race in the past, yet we desire that in the future there may be one. That is the decisive standpoint for men for action."[1]

It is in a chapter on "The Chaos" that he sings his dithyramb first on the "Importance of Race," and again on the sacredness of "Pure Race," leading up to the apotheosis of "The Teutonic Peoples," who brought *Ex septentrione Lux!* to "the raceless and nationless chaos[2] of the late Roman Empire."

But already, in the chaos of Herr Chamberlain's chapter on "The Chaos," we have it that

> The individual Teutonic tribes . . . are like purely brutal forces of nature, till they begin to mingle with one another: consider how Burgundy, which is rich in great men, owes its peculiar population to a thorough crossing of the Teutonic and the Romance elements . . . the Franks grow to their full strength and give the world a new type of humanity where they mingle with the Teutonic tribes who preceded them, and with Gallo-Romans; or where they, as in Franconia, form the exact point of union of the most diverse German and Slavonic elements; Swabia, the home of Mozart and Schiller, is inhabited by a half-Celtic race; Saxony, which has given Germany so many of its greatest men, contains a population quickened almost throughout by a mixture of Slavonic blood;

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, i, p. 266, *note*.

[2] "Raceless Chaos" is a phrase originally applied by Vogt to the population of Britain.

> and has not Europe seen within the last three centuries how a nation of recent origin, Prussia, in which the mixture of blood is still more thorough, has raised itself by pre-eminent power to become the leader of the whole German Empire ? [1]

At this stage Herr Chamberlain oracularly explains: "As I am advocating especially the great importance of purely-bred races, I desire particularly to emphasise the necessity, or at least the advantage, of *mixture* of blood"; and he further elucidates his ideal of the "Sacredness of Pure Race" by contemning "the mystical conception of a race pure in itself, which is an airy abstraction that retards instead of furthering." The pure race, then, must not be a pure race, because it cannot be. What is wanted, in fact, is a pure mixture. And that mixture is to be "Germanic"; wherefore it is to embrace pretty well everything northern. In 1910, Herr Chamberlain was prepared to let in England, as possessing "that race which at the present moment is unquestionably the strongest in Europe."[2] Since the war began, however, he has felt compelled to relegate his native land to the outer darkness of his hatred; and his next edition will presumably substitute for England that signally pure stock, the Turks. It may even be that the Slavs and Kelts will likewise have to be eliminated as the Italians

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, i, pp. 280–1. Cp. p. 503.
[2] *Id.* p. 272.

had been to begin with. But as late as 1910 the Kelt was " intimately related to the Germanic peoples "[1]—was, in fact, a " Germanic Kelt "; while " the Slavs were originally and still are in certain districts just as fair as the Germanic race."[2]

Besides, the Germans are not necessarily blond. " In the first place there is the fact, which naturally is ignored by Virchow and his colleagues, blinded as they are by political prejudice : I mean the prevalence of dark colour among the members of the most genuine old Germanic nobility. In England this is quite striking. Tall spare-built figures, long skulls, long countenances, the well-known Moltke type . . . . genealogies which go back to the Norman period, in short, beyond doubt genuine Teutons in physique and history—but black hair."[3] Hence the " irrefutable conclusion that fair hair cannot be arbitrarily assigned to the Teuton, as is so often done : the most genuine sons of this race may be black-haired."

As for skull-shape, it is equally a broken reed. Old German skulls are mostly long ; and " in the old Slavonic graves the proportion is still more in favour of the extremely long skulls," while the Kelts were probably similar ; but " this has changed very much, at least in many countries."

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, p. 499.
[2] *Id.* p. 498.
[3] *Id.* p. 523.

There thus arises, then, a painful probability that Prussia, ethnologically composed of a blend of primary Prussian Slavs, Wends, Lithuanians, and Poles, with a layer of mixed Teutons, is very imperfectly Germanic. Even among the old Bavarians, out of 1000 skulls examined by Johannes Ranke, "only one in a hundred possessed the old Germanic [and Slavic and Keltic] skull, while ninety-five had genuine short skulls. . . . That in this phenomenon we see the effects of the infiltration of the Un-Germanic race, a race which does not belong to the Indo-European circle, but to the raceless chaos, can scarcely be doubted."[1] And "chaos is everywhere the most dangerous enemy."[2]

Still, Herr Chamberlain in 1910 would not altogether give way to the doctrine of "that thorough Teuton, Paul de Lagarde," namely, that "Germanism does not lie in the blood, but in the mind."[3] Blood might be hard to prove, but the idea must be clung to. The Teutons and Slavs and Kelts *had* characteristics, and "whoever does not possess these physical characteristics, no matter though he were born in the very heart of Germania, speaking a Germanic tongue from childhood, cannot be regarded as genuinely Germanic." And as they did *not* include black hair, the German nobility seems

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, p. 527.
[2] *Id.* p. 529.
[3] *Id.* p. 529.

to be in a parlous state. But it is happily saved by the "clear limitation" that "*as a rule* that man only is Germanic who is descended from Germanic ancestors." There is to be no surrender to Henke, for whom Luther and the Swabians are "not genuinely Germanic." If Luther was half German and half-Slav, he *was* genuinely Germanic.[1] And if Professor Kollmann dares to say that "*All* European races, so far as we have penetrated into the secret of race, are equally gifted for every task of culture"—why, perish Professor Kollmann! "One can scarcely believe one's eyes!"[2] exclaims the scandalised creator of the future Aryan race. With difficulty does he restrain his feelings over the pronouncement of Virchow that the latter-day vogue of racialism can be explained only by "the loss of sound common sense."[3]

Finally, from the chaos of Chamberlainism there emerges the somewhat attenuated but apparently German-cheering doctrine that after all Germanism *is* a quality of the soul as well as (somehow) of the blood. The true Germanism consists in—Freedom and Loyalty! Loyalty was the mark of the retainers of the German chief of old; and in this we see, in the inspired words of Herr Lamprecht, "one of the most magnificent features of the specifically German

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, p. 522.
[2] *Id.* p. 532. [3] *Id.* p. 260.

view of life." It was "not understood by the Roman, but indispensable to the Teuton." It was " that ever-recurring German need of closest personal attachment, of complete devotion *to each other*, perfect community of hopes, efforts and destinies," . . . the primary source of Germanicism itself."[1] " The Teuton chooses his master, and his loyalty is therefore loyalty to himself: that is the morality of the man who is born free."[2] So we have the Germano-Slavo-Kelto (now become the Germano-Bulgaro-Turco) secret code—"Loyalty and Freedom." From which it would appear that the sacred Germanic character, like the much-travelled word, is " *diablement changé en route.*"

[1] *Foundations*, Eng. tr. 1911, p. 546. [2] *Id.* p. 547.

§ 8. *The Germanic Virtues.*

After contemplating the super-chaos of the race-gospel of Herr Chamberlain, one is conscious of anti-climax in any discussion of the outcome. But it may be as well to end our study of Teutomania with a few words on the residual hallucination that there is a "Germanic" character in which the virtues are specifically Germanic, and the gifts peculiar to the Germanic stock. Blondness has gone, dolichocephaly has gone, purity of race has gone, Teutonism has gone; even the non-Aryan, Un-Germanic Chaos has overflowed the sacred stock; but Germanism remains; and Herr Chamberlain, as we have seen, is resolved to breed from it.

And it is not only Cagliostros of the Chamberlain type who propound the conception of a Germanic species of virtue. A Transatlantic scholar of German descent, quite normally endowed with a sense of humour, Professor Gummere of Haverford College, set himself a quarter of a century ago to counter the pronouncements of Matthew Arnold and Grant

Allen on the preponderance of Keltic influences in English Literature. He goes about his task genially enough, but in point of fact he never comes to the issue raised by Arnold and Allen. "If," he writes, "we wish to know what elements in our literature we ought to refer to the Germanic invaders of Britain, it is of prime importance to study this Germanic invader in his habit as he lived. . . . It is to be hoped that a view of him, in different types and periods, may leave some general impressions—we may not hope for a sharp picture—of *the* Germanic character."[1] What follows is an interesting and competent study of German archæology; but as regards "*the* Germanic character," the specific existence of which is so simply taken for granted, we reach no result whatever, because there is not even an attempt to differentiate scientifically between the Germanic and any other barbarians. In view of the critical fiasco of Mommsen, it was doubtless a wise abstention.

There are, however, certain implications, to the effect that certain social features of the old German life are peculiar to that, and so constitute specific data. Professor Gummere is not so absurd as to ascribe agricultural slackness, inquisitiveness, figurative speech, drinking and brawling, ostentation and so on, to the Kelts, and to claim for the Germans immunity from

[1] *Germanic Origins: A Study in Primitive Culture*, 1892, p. 5.

such defects; but he does fall in with two of the familiar theses of the generation after Mommsen—the claim, namely, that the Germani were peculiar in antiquity in respect of their reverence for women and their institution of the *comitatus*, the chief's bodyguard, sworn to die for or with him in battle. Lamprecht, as we have seen, ecstatically presents the latter as something typically and adorably German. Both claims, as it happens, are pure delusions.

Concerning the position of the early Teutonic woman, Professor Gummere is not uncritical. He seems indeed to resent somewhat—it is not clear why[1]—the comments of the modern scholars who point out that the chastity ascribed by Tacitus to the Germani is often paralleled among modern savages.[2] As it happens, this is noted and admitted by Lamprecht;[3] and Kingsley admits it in regard to the Caribs.[4] For his own part, Professor Gummere recognises, with Poesche, that both monogamy and (comparatively) late marriages were natural results—so far as they happened—of the difficulty of feeding families in the northern environment;[5] and he

[1] Thus he demurs to comparisons between Germani and Redskins. He seems to have been unaware of the degree of "civilisation" reached by some of the Redskin nations. See below, p. 93.

[2] Guizot, *Hist. de la Civilisation en France* i, 7e leçon.

[3] *What is History?* Eng. tr. 1905, p. 213.

[4] *Roman and Teuton*, p. 8.

[5] Poesche, *Die Arier*, p. 103; Gummere, p. 160.

admits, with many other critics, that the account of the Germani by Tacitus is in large part a fancy picture, or a sermon written *at* Rome. He confesses, too, that the position of the Teutonic woman was in some respects "pitiable enough." "Women were not members of the State, but were under control of father or brother, who punished or rewarded them at pleasure."[1] But he makes much of Veleda, the "wise woman," who gave out oracles;[2] and he concludes that, "chip and cut as we will from the testimony of the ancients, this reverence for women, living or dead, stands out a stubborn fact in *the Germanic character*."

Now, we have it from Plutarch, who is at least as good a witness as the contested *Historia* of Tacitus, that the Liguri, a race never claimed as Teutonic, and held to be non-Aryan, though placed by Plutarch among the *Keltoi*,[3] carried respect for women to an extent not recorded of any Germanic tribe. His account is that, the Ligurian women having once intervened in a civil war so successfully as to restore peace both in the cities and in the families, there was established the custom of calling them into consultation in all questions of peace and war, and of submitting to their notice all disputes with

[1] Gummere, pp. 130, 131.

[2] Tacitus, *Hist.* iv, 61, 65; v, 22.

[3] Plutarch is speaking of a tribe connected with the campaign of Hannibal, who would be Ligurians, by the local indication.

allies.[1] Seeing further that Professor Gummere admits that the dignity of woman among the Germani held mainly in respect of the sibyls, that the reverence for them was "a reverence based on religious tradition, and was at the furthest possible remove from mediæval or modern chivalry," and that "the iron weight of custom and tradition, and not the feeble breath of sentiment, inclined the scale in favour of German women,"[2] there is simply no validity in his illustration, from this side, of "the Germanic character."

"It is one of those nobler elements," he writes, "which shine all the more clearly in the dark world of their ignorance and ferocity." And he goes on to aver that "Jewish traditions know only the prophet, the masculine angel, who carries God's will to a nation or to a man."[3] Yet he has actually named Deborah in his book! No more than his readers can he be unaware of the status of the sibyls of ancient Greece and Italy; of the status and functions of the Vestal Virgins; of the reverence given to priestesses alike in Rome and in Greece. Had he inquired into the life of the Redskins, instead of disposing of them by the strangely unscientific comment that they were not "destined," like the Germani, "soon to become a dominant race,"[4]

[1] *De mulierum virtutibus*, c. 6.
[2] As cited, pp. 137, 139. [3] P. 141. [4] P. 46.

he would have learned that they accorded to their women a degree of independence, and a share in their councils, political and religious, transcending anything told of the Germanic tribes.[1]

If respect for women is to be reckoned a "nobler element" in the "dark world" of Germanic ignorance and ferocity, albeit not "destined" to be maintained in later stages,[2] it is surely to be noted for science' sake, if not for sympathy, in the life of Redskins doomed to national extinction, were it only as proving that "the Germanic character" is but the general human character. The contrary course fits only the mood which we have noted all along in our study of the race gospel, the pseudo-scientific Pharisaism which says: "I am higher than thou" with all the unction ever put into the "I am holier than thou" which passes conventionally for odious folly. Nothing in regard to specifically Germanic morals is to be deduced from the status of Teutonic sibyls or the savage punishments for adultery[3]—punishments for the

[1] Cp. Lucien Carr in XVI. Report of Peabody Museum (rep. Salem, 1884), pp. 211–12, 216–19; 229–32; L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, 1878, pp. 72, 79, 82, 85. The women as "Keepers of the Faith" played a normal part with men in the religious life.

[2] Prof. Gummere expressly avows that "the last state of this *sanctum et providum* in Germanic woman was its worst." The sibyl became the witch. P. 143.

[3] Explained by Adelung and others as assertions of the right

woman, not the man. The stress laid on it shows that it was not uncommon; and in any case Germanic life in this regard was in no way superior to that of early Rome. Tacitus was contrasting it with that of his own day. All the while, by common consent, "in Scandinavia, unlimited concubinage was common enough."[1] Adam of Bremen, further, testifies that polygamy was lawful; and it lasted into the Christian period.[2] If the Germani were in general monogamous, they were only like many of the "lower" races.[3] But polygamy "was no great crime according to German ethics."[4] To what Germanic "character," then, does the investigation lead? As usual, to nothing, save the familiar Germanic phenomenon of false pretensions.

The case is exactly the same with the institution of the *comitatus*, the devoted companions of the chief. Professor Gummere sets out in this connection with the datum that bravery and warriorship constituted "the supreme Germanic virtue,"[5] as if that were not equally true of

of property in the husband, who formally bought his wife. The fugitive *bondwoman* was burned.

[1] Gummere, p. 136, citing Weinhold and Grimm. Cp. Geijer, *Hist. of Sweden*, Eng. tr., Pt. I, p. 31; Westermarck, *Hist. of Human Marriage*, 2nd ed., p. 447.

[2] Crichton and Wheaton, *Scandinavia*, 1838, i, p. 197.

[3] Westermarck, p. 438 *seq.*

[4] Gummere, p. 136.

[5] P. 226. This recalls Dr. Richard: "*Of course, space has not sufficed to point out* that traits claimed to be German may be found likewise among other nations" (p. 7).

Spartans and Romans, Kelts and Persians, Japanese and Maoris, Turks and Arabs, Redskins and Zulus. And he concludes, following the German convention, that "the *comitatus* was evidently one of the great moral factors in Germanic life and achievement . . . . Here, perhaps, is the key to Germanic success and the secret of Germanic supremacy. In war, indeed, of whatever kind, the Germanic virtue of courage came to the front; but in the *comitatus* courage was no more prominent than fidelity, loyalty, and truth. The sense of duty, the sense of standing and enduring for a principle, has always been the mainspring of Germanic success."[1] It is the dithyramb of Lamprecht, in advance.

Again, what are the historic facts? Among the Iberian Aquitainians, held to have been the pre-Keltic stock of France, not only were the generals in Cæsar's day often elected[2] as among the Germani, but the chiefs were followed by bands of sworn companions, called *soldurii*,[3] who shared all their captain's fortunes as did the German *comitatus*, and died with him to the last man when the fortune of war destroyed him.[4] There is nothing specially Germanic, nothing

[1] Gummere, pp. 261–2.

[2] Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* iii, 8; vii, 4.

[3] *Id.* iii, 22. Athenæus, citing Nicolaus of Damascus, gives the word as *siloduri* (vi, 54).

[4] "Traces" of this institution, Dr. E. Richard admits, "are found also among the Kelts" (*Hist of Ger. Civ.*, p. 57).

Aryan, in the whole matter. The institution is merely a universal feature of barbarism, being found in many tribes of South Africa,[1] and in the Sandwich Islands.[2] It is idle for Professor Gummere to retort that Lippert, who points out so many other savage parallels to Germanic institutions, "sees all things in Africa,"[3] when the things are actually there, stultifying his own heedless racial assumptions. But if he will not look at Africa he might have looked at Greece, where the Sacred Band of Epaminondas did at Leuctra what he thinks only "Germanic" tribes had thought of doing. The myrmidons of Achilles, the "companions" of Alexander, stood for the same thing; and every Highland clan in Scotland went to war on the same footing. And, be it observed, it was the typical "Kelts" of France, the Bretons and Vendéans, who to the last supported, in the alleged "Teutonic" fashion, their hereditary chiefs in the struggle against that French Revolution which certain Teutonic wiseacres tell us was wrought by the unstable "Keltic" element in France.[4]

Such, then, are the grounds on which we are invited to believe that already in the savage

[1] See Bent, *Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*, 3rd ed. p. 306; and Kropf, *Das Volk der Xosa-Kaffern in östlichen Südafrika*, Berlin, 1889, p. 118.

[2] Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 1831, iv, p. 125.

[3] Gummere, p. 162, *note*.

[4] See Hertz, *Moderne Rassentheorien*, 1904, p. 241.

state the Germanic tribes exhibited ethical qualities peculiar to themselves, and developed a "Germanic character" which has remained similarly superior through the ages. The dithyrambs of Lamprecht and Chamberlain, and the dicta of Gummere, amount to finding the height of principled ethic in the normal barbaric *sensus gregis* and the institutions of early chieftainship. They acclaim the phenomenon of "devotion to each other," the invariable attribute of every primitive people, not to say all comrades in arms, without so much as asking whether the beginning of "principle" is not to be sought in honourable conduct towards non-comrades, good faith towards strangers. Certainly *that* is not to be found credited as a racial attribute to the Germani by those who had dealings with them. It may well be that Roman estimates of barbarians, like Roman estimates of Carthaginians, are one-sided judgments; it may well be, too, that in point of bad faith the Germani were on a par with other barbarians at the same culture-stage. An all-round sense of honour, as distinguished from the code of martial honour between comrades, is not a product of low grades of civilisation. But the fact remains that all the evidence we possess concerning the ancient Germani shows them notoriously faithless to the stranger.

A German historian of the downfall of the

Mediterranean civilisation has made a collection of Greek and Roman testimonies[1] which leaves nothing to be desired in point of completeness. "German faithlessness became almost proverbial with the Romans."[2] "The habit of the Franks was with smiling mouth to break their pledged faith": they were "that shifty and treacherous barbarian people." To break the peace and break the pact; to break a treaty as soon as it was made—these are the practices of the Germanic peoples in their dealings with the Romans. For Procopius the Franks were "the most faithless people in the world"; and for Velleius Paterculus they were "a race of born liars." And even among the Germani themselves there was no valid pledge without an oath—*ohne Eid keine Verpflichtung.*[3]

It is in the face of these records that one of the latter-day chorus-leaders of Germanism tells us how "German truth and German bravery have been acclaimed in history since the time of the Cimbri and the Teutones, and in our folk-poetry since the time of the race migrations.

[1] O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, 1895, Anhang to Bd. I. p. 477. The references are to Strabo, VII. i, 4; Histor. August. Firm. [Proculus], xiii, 4; Eumen. *Paneg.* ii, 11, vi, 4; ix, 22; Ammianus, XVII, vi, 1; XXXI, x, 2; Salvianus, *De gubern. Dei*, IV, xiv, 65; VII, xv, 64; Rutil. Namat. i, 142; Procopius, *Bell. Goth.* ii, 25; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 118.

[2] Seeck, i, 189. Cp. Bradley, *The Goths*, p. 11.

[3] Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i, 181–2.

Warlike and truthful, as then, have the Germans ever remained."[1] It only needs an allegation of German modesty and good taste to complete the certificate. From German-speaking men who have not cast off sanity, however, we have the truth.

Following the minute record of Felix Dahn,[2] an able Austrian critic of the race-gospel has shown that in every section of the Teutonic invaders of the South after the fall of the Roman Empire the standard of honour of the leaders and kings was on a par with that of Dahomey, and their familiar crimes an anticipation of those of the mediæval Turks. Fratricide and parricide and filicide, murders of women as of men, are the constant notes of the regal history; and the upper class life of Franks and Longobards, Goths and Vandals, is on the same level of treachery, debauchery, and savagery. As for the racial tie, it is one of the most notorious facts of history that the different sections of the Germanic family were at all times ready to join with aliens against each other, from the day of Attila to the day of Napoleon. It is a race-proud historian of German civilisation who writes that "from 1333, when Henry of Bavaria accepted the bribe from the French king, to 1815, the

[1] Prof. D. Weise, *Unsere Muttersprache*, 3te Aufl. 1897, p. 38.
[2] *Urgeschichte der germanischen und romanischen Völker*, 4 Bde. 1881–89.

history of the German princes is a continuous account of disgraceful, treacherous venality."[1]

Had the question of racial virtues not been thrust upon us by the general Germanic chorus, such facts would have no racial significance, in German any more than in other history. They are the common phenomena of the barbaric state, and of the world of feudalism, in which the turmoil of hatreds and interests always yielded such fruits. The residual sociological fact is simply that down till the last century the German-speaking peoples were for ever divided, and lived chronically as enemies. Among the kindred Scandinavian peoples, national jealousies subsist to this day. In Germany the present-day solidarity of the race is simply the result of a union engineered by war, and inspired by the mere extension of the old tribal instinct to the national polity, with all the old indifference to the rights of other peoples.

The acclamation of the moderate merits of the early Germans, so uncritically persisted in by so many Teutophile scholars, not only invokes these rebuttals but counteracts its own aim. Long ago Sir James Stephen remarked in his Lectures on French History that in peace the Franks "were the very counterparts of the North American Indians, as depicted by the early travellers in Canada; a comparison which

[1] E. Richard, *Hist. of German Civilisation*, p. 286.

almost every commentator on Tacitus has instituted and verified." Herder had gone further, writing in 1784 that "the inhabitants of Germany a few centuries ago were Patagonians."[1] When we thus frankly regard barbarians as such, we are the more impressed when, as did Colonel Macpherson among the infanticidal and man-sacrificing Kondhs, and the missionary Chalmers among the cannibals of New Guinea, we recognise traits of naïf nobleness, and can say, "these are our kin." But when we are invited to contemplate a group of primitive Supermen, and pay homage to their superiority, only to find them in many aspects brutish and iniquitous, we are apt to be repelled from sympathy into dislike, and to distrust from the start the race-bias which thus turns anthropological science into a propaganda of racial vanity.

Our American Teutophile must needs flout history by declaiming of the Germanic warrior as always "standing for a principle," and of "the secret of German supremacy," without offering any concrete illustrations. What "principle" was held by the Scandinavian vikings, the Teutonic invaders of Italy, the Teutonic Knights of the Middle Ages, the Swiss mercenaries who for so many generations sold themselves to the highest bidder, the German princes who

[1] *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, B. vii, 1.

sold their subjects as soldiers to England for her war with her American colonies, may be left to the Teutophile school to discover. And it may be left to them to say wherein German "supremacy" was indicated by the ignominious collapse of Goths and Vandals in Spain and Africa, and of Anglo-Saxondom before the Normans, the headlong flight of the invaders of Italy themselves before the Huns, the destruction of the Cimbri by Marius, the defeat of Rodogast by Stilicho, the slaughter of Franks and Burgundians and Visigoths by Aetius, the queller of Attila's victorious Huns, and the rout of all the levy of Wittich by Belisarius. The historic Arminius, who achieved by treacherous ambuscade the "victory" over Varus for which German fatuity has raised to him a modern monument, was later defeated in open battle by Romans, and was finally murdered by his fellow patriots. Germanic supremacy was not in evidence in the wars of Teutonic Sweden with Russia; and divided Germany would assuredly never have prevailed against Napoleon without the help of the Russia which had saved her under Frederick, and the England which her masters have taught her to despise. She defeated France when, thoroughly prepared, she lured the ill-prepared Second Empire into war. It remains to see whether she can secure supremacy now that she has precipitated a World

War in the hope of securing the mastery of Europe.

If there be any validity in the results of some of the latest ethnological analyses, there is proportionately more of Germanic blood on the side of France and Belgium than on that of the Central Powers! So unbiased an ethnologist as Professor Ripley pronounces that "the north-eastern third of France and half of Belgium are to-day more Teutonic than the south of Germany."[1] Seeing then that North Germany is unquestionably in part Slavonic, it follows, as Friedrich Hertz has it, that "it was thus the Germans who were defeated in the Franco-German war."[2]

When we turn from the literary to the graphic presentation of race types,[3] and note that the highest average distribution of long-heads in Europe occurs in the British Isles, Sweden, Portugal, Sardinia, North Africa, and Spain (the north of Scotland, Portugal, North Africa, and the west of Sweden showing the highest rates of all), while North Germany shows only the third degree of the qualification, and South Germany a less degree of it than Russia and most of France,

[1] *The Races of Europe*, 1900, p. 156. Cp. p. 32. Professor H. d'Arbois de Jubainville similarly sums up that "there is probably in Germany more Gaulish blood than in France." *Les Celtes*, 1904.

[2] *Moderne Rassentheorien*, p. 71.

[3] See Professor Ripley's map, *Races of Europe*, p. 53.

we realise what an *ignis fatuus* has been the somatic clue by which racial vanity has sought to reach a scientific ground for its primitive and puerile folly. It might move the laughter of the Olympian Gods, or of Christian devils, to see race-worship setting the world on fire with a gospel belied at every step by its own texts, materialistic and idealistic alike.

§ 9. *Conclusion.*

The reader has probably had enough of the Teutonic gospel of race. At every point of investigation, in every aspect, it has proved to be a chimera of chimeras. The candour of some German scholars, raised by the spirit of science above the tribalism of their fellows, has aided to break down for the studious alien the edifice of racial myth. We have found that every assumption offered as a scientific ground for Teutonic self-sufficiency is a delusion; that the conventional somatic marks are common to races which for whole millenniums have been far apart from the Teutonic so-called; that the insolent contrasts drawn by German scholars between "Teutons" and "Kelts" are self-stultifying distinctions between sections of the same stock—perhaps even speaking the same language; that the whole lore of "Aryan" derivation and predominance is a chaos of contradiction; that the vaunted moral peculiarities of the early Germanic stocks are but the normal characteristics of all barbarians at the same culture stage—white, black, red, and

yellow; that the mystic qualification of the dolichocephalic skull, common to the most backward of existing races, is if anything a mark of imperfect cerebral development; and that the higher qualifications of the German-speaking peoples seem connected with, if anything, the contrary type of skull, which now predominates among them, and was always predominant in the South-German regions.

These facts are established by the investigations no less of German than of non-German archæologists and ethnologists. On the other hand, the journalistic ethnology which glorifies the Teuton and asperses the Kelt and the Slav has been cultivated at least as zealously in Britain and America as in Germany, alike by professed and "trained" ethnologists and by historians; though the bulk of the systematic pseudo-scientific propaganda of race has been produced in Germany, mainly upon lines laid down by the French Comte de Gobineau. Its first basis is the primitive vanity of self-esteeming persons bent on extolling their own skull-shape, their own supposed ancestry, their own supposed race, and their own supposed qualities. Of scientific temper and method alike it is devoid.

Even among the ethnologists who do pursue a scientific method, there is a highly suspicious tendency to take "national" views of the development of races and civilisations. For

many of the Teutons their own stock is the primordial "Aryan," which they hold to have built up all civilisation in Europe, and to have renewed that civilisation when, in its highest developments around the Mediterranean, it went to ruin, in despite of its Aryanic sources. For many Frenchmen the "Alpine" is the true "Aryan" race, because it is primarily present in France. For the Italians, since Micali, the races which built up Italic civilisation are autochthonous in the sense of having originated in "Eur-Africa"; and the Aryan invasion which gave them their historic languages was an irruption from the East of savages who were at a lower level of culture than those they conquered, and who conquered alike the southern peoples and the kindred "Nordic" who are latterly called Teutons. Those Frenchmen, again, who support the Teutonic view of things are generally believers in their own Teutonic descent through Galli or Franks or Norsemen.[1]

Those historians, therefore, who, taking for granted a radical difference of racial characters corresponding roughly to the present distribution of languages, set aside altogether the ethnological problem, may thus plead that the ethnologists are at sixes and sevens, and yield no final light. But there was all the more need for

[1] Jean Richepin, the French poet and novelist, makes such a boast. Cit. in Hertz, *Moderne Rassentheorien*, p. 336.

the historians to seek their light in a scientific manner; and this they have rarely done. Nothing in the whole inquiry is more startling than the sheer destitution of philosophic thought on their side of the fence. A historian, one would suppose, could hardly miss realising the tragical community of the peoples in moral failure and in social disunion, the endless variety of character and capacity in all, the extreme divergences and hostilities even of temperament within single families, the smouldering animosities between classes, sections, churches, through whole centuries. The Thirty Years' War might be supposed to reduce to absurdity the pretensions of the German people to a hereditary solidarity, a hereditary genius for freedom, a hereditary nobility of character. But it seems to teach the Germanic zealots no such lesson.

Green, various enough in his sympathies to see gifts in the so-called Kelt, yet starts with the dictum that " no spot in Britain can be so sacred to Englishmen as that which first felt the tread of English feet "—the said spot being, by his own general account, one near which the sacred race, in its work of massacre, tossed babies on pikes. Freeman, Kingsley, and Stubbs had led the way in this cult; and Carlyle had chorused with them in his thesis that the original Frank, who bridled and rode the Gallic Kelt, had " ridden him ever since "—a point for Gobineau. Every

generalisation by Green concerning the Teutonic character is countered in his text by exactly equivalent generalisations concerning the Keltic; and his own record of the "flocking and fighting of kites and crows" which to Milton's eye made up Anglo-Saxon history is the annihilation of his own race-worship. Motley, with his "dissolute Kelt" and "loyal Teuton," had to tell in his history of the Dutch Republic a tale of tribal Teutonic jealousies persisting through an eighty years' struggle for national existence, and ending in the loss of free institutions and an age of decadence,[1] from which only the new life spread by the French Revolution could arouse it.

Where really imaginative historians could thus turn the drama of history into a "Teutonic pamphlet," the more prosaic could hardly be expected to do better; and Hill Burton in his History of Scotland outgoes all his historiographic compeers in the stress and irrationality of his racial malice. Politicians, faced by the Irish problem, inevitably did worse still. It was left mainly to a few rationalists to stand for sanity and righteousness. Mill is at his sociological best in the saying:—

> Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing

[1] So Jonckbloet, *Beknopte Geschiedenis der nederl. Letterkunde*, ed. 1880, p. 282.

the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences.[1]

And Huxley is at his sociological best in a discourse in which, while irrelevantly announcing himself as a "firm believer in blood," he declared :—

If what I have to say in a matter of science weighs with any man who has political power, I ask him to believe that the arguments about the difference between Anglo-Saxons and Celts are a mere sham and a delusion.[2]

Twenty years before Huxley, ere the advent of Darwinism, Latham had keenly challenged the ethnologists of his day, who on the orthodox monogenist basis had been talking of "race" as the American polygenists might :—

If the remote ancestors of the Greeks and the remote ancestors of the Turks be referable to some common parentage, it is mere verbiage to refer the differences between them to *race* as an ultimate and primary cause. It is no cause, but itself an effect—an effect of influences immeasurably early in their actions, but still an effect. For it is evident that of *race*, as it is called, there can be but three causes—original difference of parentage, preternatural changes in the faculties or organisation of certain members of one common family, or the operation of the ordinary agencies of climate, nutrition, and ideas.

I neither deny nor assert that any one of these three causes is the true one. I only draw attention

[1] *Political Economy*, B. II, ch. ix, § 3.

[2] Lecture on *The Forefathers and Forerunners of the English People*, in the *Anthropological Review*, April 1870, p. 203.

to a remarkably common inconsistency. A very little amount of ethnological literature will satisfy anyone who makes the search that the number of writers who write about *race*, and who are nevertheless wholly unprepared for either of the first two explanations of its origin, is very great. So that they admit the third, and the third only. If so, why make so much of the distinction ? [1]

We have seen Kollmann, later, speaking to the same effect in Germany. But the men of merely literary and documentary training have rarely risen to the scientific standpoint. Mommsen's excursus on the Kelts is one of the most pitiable betrayals ever made, by a great scholar, of puerile prejudice in a matter where his function called for judicial and critical thought, inasmuch as his indictment at every point turns against his own kin on the face of the case, even if we leave the ethnological issue wholly out of account.

These follies, then, are not themselves phases of a " race character," since men of the same race have exposed and contemned them. Rather they are the special fruits of a special cultus, a specific propaganda, setting up a prevalent *state of mind* in certain countries. That conception, once realised, will be found at once to cover all that is true in the data behind the polemic about race characters, and to substitute a rational and scientific for an unscientific and irrational ex-

[1] *The Ethnology of Europe*, by R. G. Latham, M.D., 1852, p. 127.

planation of the course of the history of nations. It is edifying to foresee that it will be termed " materialistic " by the thinkers who claim to find in persistent *somatic* characters the explanation of the whole kaleidoscope of human and national conduct. Those, however, who can realise that " spirit " is just " mind " may perhaps be counted on to substitute the mental for the physical theory.

What we have now to do is to trace the process by which the Germany of Herder and Lessing and Kant and Goethe became the Germany of Treitschke and Lamprecht and Meyer and Harnack and Bernhardi, and the poet of the " Hymn of Hate." No more remarkable transformation of so-called " national character " has ever been witnessed, even in a world which has seen England beheading Charles I in the seventeenth century, to the scandal of France, and France in the eighteenth century beheading Louis XVI, to the scandal of England. In none of the cases is there any mystery: the process of causation in all is perfectly sequent and intelligible, and the thesis of " national character " merely turns it to confusion. All the transformations, in turn, are cultural results: the present investigation will show it distinctly enough, however incompletely.

PART II

THE OLD GERMANY AND THE NEW

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§ 1. *Mediæval Germany.*

At the close of the Middle Ages, Western Europe had settled down to something like its present distribution of populations as distinct from the framework of States; and there was a "German Empire" with a theoretic status. It had emerged as a result of the conflicts of the German conquerors of Gaul and Italy. When the Merovingian dynasty of kings of the Franks, sapped by vice, had sunk in imbecility, there came gradually to the front the Carlovingian, founded by Pepin, the energetic mayor of the palace, whose son Charles Martel, holding the same post, by his great victory over the Saracens made it possible for the grandson, Pepin the Short, to have himself crowned by consent of a friendly Pope, the last Merovingian king being as imbecile as his predecessors. By that arrangement was established the Pope's title to dethrone as well as to crown. Pepin's son Charles, in turn, made

himself in effect emperor of the German and Italian world by subjugating the Teutonic Longobards (774), who had held North Italy for centuries, and were the hated and dreaded enemies of the Pope.

It was by no sudden ascent that Charlemagne became emperor in title. In 781, visiting Rome during a lull in his wars with the Saxons, he had his son Carloman re-baptised Pepin (in substitution for the first-born, reduced to the status of a monk for conspiracy), and consecrated king of Italy, while his remaining son Louis was similarly made king of Aquitaine. It was not till the year 800 that Charlemagne, already ruler of North Italy as king of the Longobards, and of the bulk of Italy through his son, was crowned "Augustus" by the Pope, with the acclamation of the Roman senators, clergy, and people, thus forming anew the "Holy Roman Empire," and formally superseding for the West the surviving (Eastern) Roman Empire, which had hitherto held the nominal lordship. The transaction was to be momentous for both Italy and Germany, coupling as it did the Church and the theoretic Empire in an anomalous union. Nominally the Pope gave the title: really the Emperor held the power. Whether or not it was seriously believed that Daniel's prophecy of four kingdoms excluded the possibility of anything save a continuation of the Roman Empire,

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE OF CHARLEMAGNE.

Showing the confines of the various States that were included.

States that were included.

that was plainly enough the line of least resistance for the new Kaiser (=Cæsar), inasmuch as it gave him at once the prestige of the Roman name and the collaboration of the Church.

It is customary to assume that while the victory of Charles Martel over the Saracens was a blessing to Christendom, Charlemagne's subjugation of the Saxons in a murderous series of wars during thirty years was ultimately a blessing to them. Yet the one scientific ground for counting it a gain that the then higher civilisation of the Saracens was not imposed on Europe is the fact that variety in civilisations by free natural evolution makes for total progress. The case for Charlemagne has thus very little in it. No peaceful continuance of Saxon barbarism (a thing largely Slavonic, as regards the population) could have yielded less than Charlemagne's methods of massacre left. While it is clearly true that no barbaric race in the European environment could reach a high civilisation save by intercourse with the more civilised, it does not follow that conquest is the only way to such intercourse. The persistence of independent heathenism in Teutonic Scandinavia actually meant a very considerable development of native literature, interesting to this day, and potentially fruitful for further culture progress. Charlemagne "made a desert and called it"—Christendom.

Seeing further that the maintenance of his dominion was possible only through re-incarnations of his special energy, which were not forthcoming, his empire-building left only, after the disruption of his realm, the legacy of a titular emperorship which meant the pretension of the elective northern emperor to meddle chronically in the affairs of Italy. That this intervention constantly retarded the natural evolution of German political life is now admitted by most Teutophiles. That it was ever a "blessing" to Italy, as they compensate themselves by claiming, in respect of the orderly aims of the better emperors, is pure assumption. It is taken for granted that Italy, left to herself, could never have reached order. It would be just as sound to assert that Germany never could. Left to herself, Italy would certainly have evolved differently; and the evolution might have meant an attainment of unity.

As it was, any culture progress that was made in Germany came through the Italian and the ecclesiastical connections. From that direction, by the admission of the most flamboyant patriots of our day, had taken place the first modifications of German barbarism. "To Rhine and Danube had in early ages come Roman merchants and soldiers with bales of foreign wares, and also precious gifts, imponderable spiritual goods, which contributed to bring it about that in those regions

more quickly than elsewhere in German lands there grew up a finer culture of the spirit and the heart."[1] It is the saying of Emerson: "The greatest ameliorator of civilisation has been selfish, huckstering trade." "And with the cloisters," says the same German of the Germans, "science and poetry made their entrance into Germany."[2] This is indeed to make little account either of the elements of science introduced by the Romans, or of the elements of folk-poetry in the life of barbarism. Ecclesiastical prejudice would seem at times to overrule even race-pride. Even for the savage, his poetry is an art, and the *barditus* of the warring Germans in Tacitus's day must have had some words to it.

But it is the historic fact that German civilisation, properly so-called, derives directly or mediately, through France, from Italy, and that upon ecclesiastical lines.[3] It was of these culture-forces alone, apart from his feudal system, that Charlemagne could avail himself. The educationist Alcuin he brought from England. John the "Scot," otherwise Erigena, who lived at the court of Charles's son, and who was certainly an Irishman,[4] and the one great philosopher of

[1] Prof. D. Weise, *Unsere Muttersprache*, 1897, pp. 5–6.

[2] Weise, p. 6.

[3] For the details see Raoul Chélard, *La civilisation française dans le developpement de l'Allemagne*, vol. i, 1900.

[4] See the author's *Short History of Freethought*, 3rd ed., i, pp. 283–4.

the Dark Ages, is hardily claimed by a German culture-historian as an "Anglo-Saxon,"[1] on the score of the absurd identification of the philosopher with the John who, according to Asser, was assassinated by his Anglo-Saxon pupils at Athelney in the reign of Alfred. Boniface, the "apostle of the Germans," did actually come from England. Nowhere is the Germanic stock found counting as a new civilising factor in itself. It is only fair to say that it was never allowed to develop freely. From the standpoint of the ruler, it had itself to be civilised, as aforesaid; and slow indeed was the process. How much Christianity as such counted in the evolution may be partly estimated from the results latterly obtained in the South Sea Islands.

Faced by the fact that the ecclesiastical civilisation meant the gradual extinction of all that stood for native culture, even the Teutophile bemoans the process. Classical culture was excluded by clerical fanaticism, and the native germs were denied growth. The old songs were lost. "More than ever, the German of to-day misses those testimonies of the true character of his ancestors, the beginnings of his national literature."[2] The half-Gothic Ulfilas, by his translation of the Bible (4th c.), preserved a memorial of the Gothic language. But "when, five centuries after Ulfilas, the spirit of intolerance

[1] Richard, p. 240. [2] *Id.*, p. 131.

had gained supremacy, the national language was contemptuously called the language of the mob. Whatever there was of secular poetry was ruthlessly destroyed, so that only scant fragments escaped. Literature became Latinised. . . The poetry consisted principally of hymns in endless repetition of the same thought."[1] Things could hardly have gone worse under Saracenism. And had Saxony been left alone by Charlemagne, it might well have had something to show for itself in native literature. The time has perhaps come for Christians to realise that even for them brute conquest is not a really successful mode of promoting civilisation.

Finally, we have a Christianised Germany, long cut off from its native culture roots, and quasi-civilised mainly by a mere top-dressing of ecclesiastical discipline and doctrine, with an upper-class cultivation of French speech, poetry, and fashions. The institution of Chivalry, whatever were its social value, admittedly came in from France; and it is interesting to find the patriotic sociologist avowing that " On the whole, when we consider that the qualities which we comprise under the word *chivalrousness*, *Ritterlichkeit*, have entered into the composition of every respectable German to-day; that the conception of honour plays such an important part in German life; that the veneration of the gentler

[1] Richard, p. 132.

sex has freed itself from that artificial conventionality; and that the relation of the man to the girl he woos has taken the nobler form of which Master Walter[1] sings, the German has every reason to think gratefully of the age that produced these ideals."[2] The cognate inference that the same process took place in French life is of course not obtruded, since "space has not sufficed to point out" that Germanic civilisation is part of that of Western Europe in general.

The feverish racial vanity which regards as a humiliation any avowal of gain from a higher neighbouring civilisation takes explicit form, again, in the denial that the poetry of the mediæval Minnesingers was really a development from that of the Troubadours, whose song stands for the Romance culture evolved by the peoples of France and Italy. The fact of the culture-contacts is perfectly certain; nevertheless it must be made out that "these flowers are no foreign growth on German soil." We must "avoid the mistake of assuming that the German lyrics of this time, as far as their contents are concerned, are derived from a foreign model or are *even throughout* (!) dependent. . . . The derivations are essentially confined to the form and to the conventional expression of the poems.

[1] Walther von der Vogelweide, the *Minnesinger*, fl. 1200.
[2] Richard, p. 149.

And likewise here the foreign influence has really ONLY A PURIFYING EFFECT on a native development, as, perhaps, classical art led to the simplification of many forms of German ornament in the era of the Karlings."[1]

Here we have, in the modern German survey, the usual revelation of the resolve never to admit that anything really counts in civilisation save what is Germanic. For the modern Chosen People there is to be no Good Samaritan. You borrow a seed to plant in your garden; and when it prospers you demonstrate that it is your garden that has done all the work. You graft an alien slip on your fruit tree, and when you fruit improves you explain that the slip has had "really *only* a *purifying* effect." At every step in our survey we find the modern German spirit —the predominating spirit, that is—thus bent on conveying, not a scientific knowledge of culture-evolution, but a race gospel, an auto-intoxication of conceit and self-assertion, to the end of exhibiting all other peoples not as potential collaborators in civilisation and equal neighbours in political life, but as the born subordinates of the Dominant Race. That phrase, evolved by English imperialists as a puerile boast of the

[1] Richard, pp. 153–4; citing "one of the greatest German historians." Compare the analysis of Chélard, *La civilisation française*, i, ch. xiv, and Wackernagel, as cited by him, pp. 317–8.

relation of the more advanced European people to the less advanced non-European over whom it rules, has become for the bulk of the German culture-class a catchword to signify the destiny of their people in regard to all others, European and non-European alike.

All the while, there was basis enough for a claim of original German faculty in the epic literature of the early mediæval period, when the old " barding " instinct blossomed afresh notably enough. The *Nibelungen Lied* (perhaps written in the ninth century, and remodelled in the twelfth) belongs to the old Germanic world, not to the Christian, and it tells abundantly of native gift. But there was no further development on native lines ; and the proved fact of the similar loss of the ancient folk-song of Russia[1] should suffice to suggest that there, too, there had been a native faculty at work. At bottom the causation is economic. When bishops and nobles ceased to maintain minstrels who sang of heathen Gods and heroes, culture had to proceed, if at all, by other paths. Wolfram von Eschenbach (twelfth and thirteenth centuries), whose *Parzival* and *Willehalm* are largely renderings of French originals, stands for Christian inspiration, with economic support from a feudal prince, such as had been given to the older singers of heathen

[1] Cp. Prince Serge Wolkonsky, *Lowell Lectures on Russian Literature*, 1897, p. 49.

mythic lore; and here too the result is notable enough, for Wolfram was a true if an obscure poet, however indebted to French leading. But that evolution too was discontinued. The clerical influence was against the Minnesingers, of whom Walther von der Vogelweide and Freidank showed a free-thinking bias which the Church could not abide.

The historic residuum is that all these culture-movements, the epic and the lyric alike, came to nothing. After the extravagant claim that in Wolfram von Eschenbach, the translator of Chrétien de Troyes and of the Provençal Kiot (= Guyot ?), we have "the first great individuality of the world's literature since the days of classical antiquity," comes the confession that "with the decay of chivalry, of the minnesongs, and the higher epic, the stream of poetry is again lost in the broad mass of the people from among whom it had risen."[1] In veridical language, German mediæval literature dwindled for lack of culture-life and of renewed stimulus from the outside. And not till many centuries later, after a long period of turmoil, material progress, religious strife, and monstrous civil war, levelling all things in ruin, does German literature again become a notable thing, as a result of a renewal

[1] Richard, p. 154.

of the same natural processes of borrowing seeds and grafts from lands in which civilisation had chanced to go forward.

The central malady was the simple barbaric *pruritus* which had wrought the "migrations" and conquests of earlier ages. Germany was never unified. "German greatness and splendour sank with the Hohenstaufen in the grave."[1] Frederick II, "the wonder of the world," had grasped at the mastery of civilised Europe, seeking to unite the culture of half-Saracen Sicily with the inheritance of the German Kaiserhood; and his dynasty, overpowered by the Papacy, soon passed away. The Austrian House of Hapsburg is the next pre-eminent Germanic power on the scene; and that equally failed to achieve unity. The power of the Kaiser waned while that of the princes waxed; and the forces of strife and sunderance were irreducible. Sectional wars fill the annals of Germany as of the other mediæval nations; and they made the imperial power an almost empty form. The Kaiser, "a king without a people, land, or treasure," had to wage national wars against Czechs, Hungarians, Turks, Burgundians, French, and rebellious German princes, by help of the other princes among whom Germany was divided;

[1] G. F. Souchay, *Geschichte der deutschen Monarchie*, 1862 iv, p. 3.

GERMANY
IN THE 14th CENTURY.

REFERENCE.

I *Luxemburg* Territories	IV *Ecclesiastical* Territories
II *Wittelsbach* „	V *Other Lay* „
III *Habsburg* „	*Free Towns* UNDERLINED

and over whose independence he had no real check save this. Save at the will of the princes, his title was a simulacrum.[1]

And this very title, all the while, stood for the most fatal factor in the problem. It is a staunch English Teutophile who writes that

> For Germany, the fatal alliance (*sic*) with Italy was the beginning of unnumbered woes, and hardly less so for Italy herself. . . . As for the counter-balancing gains, it is difficult to see what they were beyond the semi-divine title of Cæsar and Augustus. Italy was a constant drain of blood and treasure upon Germany from the year 962 to the year 1866; nine hundred years of wasted men and money. . . . Never anything but harm resulted to Germany from the Italian dominion. . . . Never since the time of Charles the Great, and, of course, never before, had there been sufficient union and consistency in the mass of the kindred nations of Germany to make it safe for a moment to withdraw the ordering governing hand, or to distract the ruling head with foreign cares. The annexation (*sic*) of Italy meant the disruption of Germany; but the fact that Germany could be so easily and so generally broken up, shows that the annexation (*sic*) of Italy was not the cause but the occasion of the disruption.[2]

The incompatible terms "alliance" and "annexation," here used, are alike misleading. Italy was never "annexed" till Spain assumed control, on an imperialistic basis, in the sixteenth

[1] G. F. Souchay, *Geschichte der deutschen Monarchie*, 1862, iv, pp. 4–6.

[2] Bishop Stubbs, *Germany in the Early Middle Ages*, 1908, pp. 105–6.

century; and "alliance" is excluded by the historic facts no less than by the other term. But the final recognition that the persistent attempt at "empire" over Italy was not "the" cause of German disruption, is just. It would not be far from the truth to say that the institution of the "empire" was maintained partly by way of counteracting the German proclivity to internecine strife. As kings count on checking sedition at home by invasion abroad, so the emperor could hope to unite the German princes from time to time in an expedition against Italy. In point of fact, the Italian problem multiplied the occasions of strife. And so, century after century, instability and disunion were continuous, by reason of the sheer multiplicity of the factors. Some gains there were from the free play of self-interest. The German cities, in particular, modelled themselves on the Italian, and were moved to trade and industry by emulation. They had grown up in substantially the same fashion as did the cities of mediæval Italy, becoming centres of relatively free and useful life by force of struggle against the pressures of feudalism and invading barbarism. For the most part they were first set on foot by the Emperor Henry I in the tenth century, by way of defensive provision against the marauding Hungarians; and the beginning made for purposes of defence was continued to the ends of

civilisation.[1] Municipal life meant self-governing institutions; and in a Germany which consisted mainly of the two classes of lords and serfs[2] there grew up a new class of freemen, the law in effect providing that citizenship established a man's freedom.

Thus, in comparison with the serfdom of the peasantry, the life of the cities was what mainly stood for civilisation in Germany. Among themselves they had unions, for commercial purposes: notably the Rhenish League of seventy South German cities, formed in 1254, and later the Cities' Union of Swabia, both created for purposes of offence and defence. Most notable of all was the historic Hansa of the north, founded in 1241, which in 1300 already included sixty cities, and in the middle of the fourteenth century more than a hundred. Here again there was no special "racial genius" at work, but simply the normal process of commercial enterprise. The Hansa was a non-national combination, including Wendish, Dutch, French, and Spanish cities, even as the "Hansa of London" united for trade purposes cities of Flanders and Italy. And this very individualism put it out of the question that the free cities should set up any movement of national unity in Germany. Commerce itself was conditioned and

[1] Cp. Souchay, *Geschichte der deutschen Monarchie*, i, p. 386.
[2] Kohlrausch, *Hist. of Germany*, Eng. trans., p. 162.

ruled by the "law of strife" which prevailed; and the cities, enabled by industry to purchase their freedom from the feudal princes, had their wars with each other, after the Italian fashion, as well as with the robber barons who plundered their trade. Within themselves they exhibited real progress. "The power of Germany," wrote Machiavelli early in the sixteenth century, "consists much more in its cities than in its princes," the latter being divided into two orders, temporal and spiritual, of which the first was reduced to weakness by its very numbers, and by having joined with the cities in weakening the emperor; while the latter were divided by their own inherited strifes. But the cities "are the nerves of the provinces, having both wealth and order."[1]

On the other hand, they had their full share in maintaining the all-pervading disunion of Germany. To the eye of Machiavelli, the Swiss were the enemies of Germany in general, the cities the enemies of the princes, and the princes the enemies of the emperor,[2] thus making the entire nation weak as such. Even within the cities the trade guilds fought the municipalities, and the records of many of them, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, "are filled with the

[1] *Ritratti delle cose dell' Alamayna*: in *Opere*, 1-vol. ed. 1868, p. 418.

[2] *Rapporto di cose della Magna*, ed. cited, p. 422. Cp. the *Ritratti*, p. 417.

most sanguinary scenes of discord and civil war."[1] Machiavelli, who was never nearer Germany than Switzerland and the Tyrol, had, like Tacitus, painted a fancy picture.[2] Outside the city walls the discord was continuous. Enlightened men like Berthold, the Elector of Maintz, strove to promote a reign of law; and in 1495 the diet of the empire at Worms, under Maximilian I, enacted a *Landfriede* or edict of "Peace of the Land," with a new tribunal, nominally ending the prevailing *Faustrecht* or "fist law." But there was no "mailed fist" able to keep the peace; and the emperor personally was indisposed to help a tribunal independent of himself.[3] The new tribunal was accordingly despised and ignored; whereupon the emperor set it up anew under his own control, thus generating new hostilities.

Thus the state of the nominal empire as late as the end of the fifteenth century was one of what would have been chronic civil war were the empire a reality. There were as many feuds of the States among themselves as there were collective wars against outsiders. "The countship of Hoya was in 1511 invaded by Brunswick, Lüneburg, Bremen, and Minden; whilst the remaining body of free Frisians were in 1514

[1] Kohlrausch, p. 344.

[2] Cp. Villari, *Life of Machiavelli*, Eng. tr. 2-vol. ed., i, pp. 441–3.

[3] Kohlrausch, p. 340. On the previous page, Kohlrausch had spoken of the edict as epoch-marking.

also attacked by Brunswick, Lüneburg, Calenberg, Oldenburg, and George, Duke of Saxony. . . . The whole body of knights in every quarter, feeling themselves penned in by the princes, formed a close alliance and declared open war. The depredations of the freebooter knights on the high roads . . . were again resumed, and continual scenes of murder and robbery, by day and night, occurred throughout the land."[1] And behind such strifes of the upper and middle orders there grew up the smouldering insurrection of the ever-oppressed peasants against their tyrants, the nobility and the clergy.

If there had not been so much false trumpeting of German racial solidarity and innate gift for organisation, no question of racial imputation could arise over such a spectacle. In that age, the German political problem was insoluble. To begin with, there were under the mediæval constitution six archbishopries and thirty-seven bishopries, besides seventy prelates, abbots and abbesses, and three religious orders, making in all over a hundred ecclesiastical "States." These the Church might conceivably co-ordinate for purely ecclesiastical purposes; but how should they be co-ordinated for political purposes by an emperor often at war or debate with the Papacy?

Still harder was the problem of unifying the

[1] Kohlrausch, p. 343.

secular "States." There were four electors, including the king of Bohemia (a king, a duke, a count palatine, and a margrave); six grand dukes (of Bavaria, Austria, Carinthia, Brunswick, Lorraine, and Brabant-Linburg); about thirty counts, entitled princes, of whom some had the title of duke, others those of margrave, landgrave, or burgrave; and about sixty "imperial" cities, most of them privileged. Thus there were about a hundred temporal "States," making in all more than two hundred "members of the empire." Among these the emperor elect for the time being was but *primus inter pares*, and jealously regarded by the rest as such. There were always some ready to cabal and unite against him; and the Pope could always play off one set against another. He did so with Henry IV, whom he first put to humiliation at Canossa (1076), and afterwards combated in Germany by ecclesiastically detaching from him Saxony and Swabia and their many minor adherents, with the result of a generation of chronic wars, sometimes lasting for years at a time. Henry fought sixty-five battles. His son, after opposing his father, followed his policy, and had a hardly less stormy career; and with him ended the Salian line, its possessions going to the kindred Swabian House of Hohenstaufen, which finally disappeared likewise.

No dynasty could gain power enough to main-

tain itself for more than a few generations together: the princes naturally saw to that. Meanwhile the German world as a whole expanded and contracted as tides of invasion rolled this way and that. "Our country," says one historian, "which before these two great kings, Henry and Otho (919–973), was rapidly approaching its own ruin, being rent by internal anarchy and surrounded by enemies who . . . . laid it desolate wherever they could, now rose again suddenly and became as it were a new-born empire. Not only were the enemies struck to the ground, but even new countries were acquired, and all other nations which had previously mocked now bent low before us."[1] But these new-births alternated with still-births. Quiet emigration at times wrought more than conquest, as when in the time of the Emperor Frederick II (thirteenth century) the Mongols desolated Silesia and Hungary, and many German peasants settled in the land left vacant; or when they peacefully populated the coasts of the Baltic, Prussia, Livonia, Esthland, and Courland. Where the Church supervised, as when heathen Livonia was crusaded under Pope Celestin III (end of twelfth century) by a "spiritual knighthood," the process was one of massacre, and the survivors were reduced to slavery.

"In Prussia also (thirteenth century) the sword

[1] Kohlrausch, p. 165.

established at the same time with Christianity the German dominion and superiority,"[1] the Knights of the Teutonic Order being the instruments. Theirs was no mere missionary enterprise. Christian Poland was doing more work of that kind, in the murderous fashion of the time; and the task of the Teutonic Knights was to keep Poland out. The slow subjection and enslavement of pagan Wends—a process of centuries—laid the basis of one part of the future Prussia, Frederick of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremberg, becoming Margarve and Kurfürst (Elector) of Brandenburg. Prussia proper, "the home of a pagan Slavonic tribe—the Prussians," was bloodily conquered by the Teutonic Knights for "German Christianity," as distinguished from Polish, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with the addition of Pomerellen and Danzig early in the fourteenth. "In the course of these revolting wars . . . the land was well nigh spoiled of its inhabitants. A broken remnant, shielded in some measure by the intervention of the Pope," accepted Christianity and the Teutonic rule.[2] Thus out of a mass of specifically non-Teutonic elements was laid the foundation of the Prussian State, with plentiful cement of blood. It might well mean an ultimate race-hatred between Slav and Teuton, for it was the German conquerors

[1] Kohlrausch, p. 244.
[2] Hardwick, *Church History: Middle Ages*, p. 232.

who made the name Slav mean "slave" for Europe.[1]

Elsewhere in Germany rose another power in less sanguinary fashion. Rudolph of Hapsburg, who laid the foundations of the Austrian empire, was when elected emperor in 1273 a count in a small way in Switzerland. When, going in a highly capable fashion about his chosen task of promoting law and order in the empire, he was defied by King Ottocar of Bohemia, who then held the Austrian estates, he defeated him with Swabian and Alsatian help, and forced him to resign Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. Rudolph was wise enough to see that Italy was "the lion's den, with many steps of emperors leading to it, and few coming back"; and he left the Papacy carefully alone. But, seventeen years after his death, his son, Albert of Austria, then emperor, was murdered in Switzerland (1308) by conspirators led by his nephew; and it was by Albert's tyranny that Switzerland was alienated from the German empire and moved to form the Confederation which has become the compound Swiss Republic, embracing populations speaking four languages.

Bohemia, never a natural part of the Germanic empire, inevitably went the same way. In the fifteenth century, when the Czechs were convulsed by their Hussite Reformation as the

[1] Gibbon, ch. lv. Ed. Bury, 1898, vi, pp. 131–2 and notes.

Germans were later to be by theirs, German combinations, always bitterly hostile to the Bohemian Reform, again and again strove to crush the nation, and were always defeated, thus completing the alienation naturally set up by differences of language. George, the popular Hussite King of Bohemia, seeing how an elective kingship, like an elective emperorship, meant instability, planned to found a dynasty, but was turned from his purpose, and arranged to pass on his succession to the king of Poland, who duly reigned. Later, by way of election, there came in Hapsburgs, and the kingdom in time became an appanage to Austria, which thus made, with Hungary, a composite quasi-Germanic State that was never to be unified in speech or spirit as France assimilated Burgundy, and later Alsace and Lorraine.

In the north, the tyranny of the Knights of the Teutonic Order soon went far towards ending German rule in Prussia itself. The Order in due course became as corrupt and luxurious as any other; and in 1410 they were heavily defeated by the king of Poland at Tannenberg. Their misgovernment continuing after peace, the nobles and cities in general made a league against the Knights, and in 1454 chose Casimir III of Poland as their Protector. After a war of twelve years the Order had to surrender to Poland a large part of their territory and a

number of towns; and to acknowledge the feudal supremacy of Poland over the rest. By this time, of 21,000 Prussian villages only 3,000 were left. Had Poland possessed and kept a stable form of constitution, hers might have been the future which came to Prussia, in virtue of more skilful management. But Poland, like Bohemia, was to be torn by a Reformation and stranded by a Reaction; and the end—for an age—was decadence and dismemberment. Germany escaped general overthrow because the German States were too multitudinous to be conquered by any existing power; but among themselves they were normally and hopelessly at strife.

Only in 1618 did East Prussia, first inherited from the dissolved Teutonic Order by a Hohenzollern in 1525, become, unwillingly enough, part of the Electorate of Brandenburg, thus preparing one strong kingdom for the future.

If we consider the normal political situation in Germany in the age before Luther, we see no reason to credit the German people with any gift for stable self-government. "There existed numberless contests and feuds. Each party considered only his personal quarrels, or pursued his own private interest; and when a diet was resolved upon and assembled for determining an expedition against the Turks, they were for some months discussing how much money and

how many troops each was to contribute, ultimately postponing the whole affair until the next year. Generally, at the German diets, little was done of any importance. The emperor and princes were seldom personally present, but sent their ambassadors, whose chief concern was not to forgo anything for the interest of their masters."[1] It was not any racial gift for self-management that saved Germany from the fate which in the eighteenth century befel Poland.

Into this infinitely divided people there entered, in 1517, a new and tremendous factor of strife. Religion had hitherto wrought little enough for unity: even the immense menace of the advance of the Turks, as we have seen, could not elicit synergy; and it had been left to the King of Hungary to repel the enemy of the common faith. A people that could not be united by such a danger could still less be united by a religious schism within itself; and the Reformation introduced by Luther came not to bring peace but a sword.

[1] Kohlrausch, p. 324.

§ 2. *Germany and the Reformation.*

It is with the Reformation, admittedly, that Germany becomes a prominent culture-factor in European life. In regard to it, accordingly, we have a special outbreak of the doctrine of race gifts and race-tendencies. We read of "the great revolt of the Teutonic spirit against the Latin, which we call the Reformation."[1] It must needs be that Germany brought about the Reformation because of a specifically German faculty and predilection for independence in religion, a "Teutonic conscience," a special depth of religious sincerity, a concern for spiritual reality as against formalism, and so forth. On the same lines, we have the thesis of the bias of the "Keltic" mind to Catholicism,[2] as indicated by the adhesion of Italy and Spain and France and Austria (all close to the Roman centre) and the secession of "Germany," Holland, Scandinavia, and Britain (all remote from its

[1] Hillebrand, *Lectures on German Thought*, 1880, p. 214.

[2] In *Letters on Reasoning* (2nd ed., pp. 20-23) I have examined the theorem as put by so able a thinker as the late Professor Minto.

GERMANY
at the time of
the Reformation.
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
DENMARK
Bornholm
HOLSTEIN
Lubeck
Hamburg
MECKLENBURG
POMERANIA
DUCHY OF PRUSSIA
Vistula
Bug
WARSAW
POLAND
Bremen
BRUNSWICK
LUNEBERG
BRANDENBURG
BERLIN
Oder
UNITED NETHERLANDS
MUNSTER
Goslar
Calais
Antwerp
Dortmund
Cassel
Nordhausen
Mulhausen
SAXONY
SILESIA
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Cologne
Aix-la-Chapelle
Wetzlar
HESSE
Frankfurt
Königsburg
WURZBURG
Worms
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
FRANCE
PARIS
Verdun
Metz
Landau
Speyer
Bethenbg
Nuremberg
Hagenau
Toul
Strasburg
Edsling
Gmünd
Nördlingen
Regensburg
WURTEMBURG
Donauwörth
BAVARIA
Schlettstadt
Rentlingen
Hottweil
Ulm
Biberach
Memmingen
Kaufbeuren
Kempten
Danube
VIENNA
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
Besançon
FRANCE COMTE
Constance
Bingen
CONFEDERATION OF SWITZERLAND
TYROL
CARINTHIA
STRYIA
CARNIOLA
VENICE
REFERENCE.
I Habsburg Territories
II Hohenzollern „
III Wettin „
IV Wittelsbach „
V Ecclesiastical „
VI Other Lay „
VII Oldenburg
Free Towns UNDERLINED.

power). To this end is stressed the Catholicism of Ireland, without any attempt to account for the Protestantism of Wales, Cornwall, and the Scottish Highlands.

As little elucidation have we, on the racial principle, of the unfailing persistence of Catholicism in Germany at large down to the present day; of the same phenomenon in Holland; of the primary energy of Calvinism in France, and its persistence in French Switzerland; or of the persistence of Catholicism in the oldest German-speaking cantons; or, for that matter, of the success of Protestantism in Switzerland in general, in a race labelled *Homo Alpinus*, and declared to be at bottom non-Aryan, and Aryanised only in speech.

As against the untenable tradition, let us briefly set the historic facts. Before the Reformation, the culture movement which prepared the ground for that variously represented by Reuchlin and Ulrich von Hutten came directly from the Italian Renaissance. A political opposition to the Papacy had indeed existed in Germany long before Luther;[1] even as it had existed in France, in England, nay, in Spain, where, heresy apart, the Catholic monarchy was chronically in dispute with the Papal chair; and even in Italy, where Savonarola incarnated

[1] Souchay, *Geschichte der deutschen Monarchie*, iii, pp. 230-31; Richard, *Hist. of Ger. Civ.*, p. 238.

the spirit of Puritanism before the advent of Luther. The "Reformers before the Reformation" were many, all over Europe. But the specific seed of Protestantism came from English Wiclif to the Czech Huss[1] a century before Luther; and it was from Huss that the seed reached him. "Wiclif, Huss, and others had been much more radical."[2] Further, the special explosion of the Reformation in Germany was wrought by way of reaction against the financial drain set up by a specially abundant sale of indulgences to recruit the Papal treasury;[3] which abundant sale, again, took place by reason of the special grossness of the average Teutonic conscience. In "German" Switzerland the case thus far was not greatly different;[4] though in the primitive canton of Uri, with a mainly "non-Aryan" population, there was as little indulgence-buying as heresy. All this is no disparagement of either the religious sincerity or the courage of Luther (the "half-Slav"); the question for the moment is as to the function of the so-called Teutonic conscience and the alleged Germanic race-genius in the historic process.

[1] Who at first read Wiclif with horror. [2] Richard, p. 248.

[3] Ranke, *Hist. of the Reformation*, Eng. tr. ed. 1905, pp. 123–6; Strauss, *Gespräche von Ulrich von Hutten*, ed. 1860, pp. xiv, 159, 363. Cp. Henderson, *Short Hist. of Germany*, i, p. 241.

[4] Cp. Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Cap. 417; Dändliker, *Geschichte der Schweiz*, ii, pp. 623–26; Zschokke, *Des Schweizerlands Geschichte*, Cap. 30, ed. 1853, p. 148; Vieusseux, *Hist. of Switzerland*, Eng. tr. 1840, p. 118.

Three factors determined the political success of the Lutheran movement as compared with all those which preceded it: (1) the existence of the printing-press; (2) the zealous support by Luther of the nobles against the insurgent peasants who first supported him; and (3) the discovery of the German princes and nobles that they might successfully plunder the Church, as had formerly been done in Bohemia and Hungary—a thing not possible in England in Wiclif's day, or in France in that of Francis I, and made possible in England after Luther only by the specially interested action of Henry VIII, bent on the divorce which the Pope dared not give him. Of religious sincerity there was as much in Calvin as in Luther; and there was more in the general Huguenot movement than in the Lutheran. And the Teutophile Motley is bound to admit that the Reformation entered Holland from the French side, not from the German.[1] Politically the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua had prepared the way of the Reformation long before.

The aid of the printing press was more far-reaching if less instantly decisive than that of a needy nobility with its eye on Church lands.[2]

[1] *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, ed. 1863, p. 162.

[2] Ranke protests (*Hist. of the Ref.*, bk. IV, ch. iv: Eng. tr. ed. 1905, pp. 466–7), as did Luther, that papist nobles began the land-grabbing. But that only clinches the lesson. Luther's position was all the safer, as was that of the Protestant nobles

Printers were naturally on the side of the movements which supported printing, as against the monks satirised by Ulrich von Hutten, who were hostile to all learning; and Luther's movement had every advantage that printing could give it.[1] Had he arisen in Germany when Huss did in Bohemia, he could no more have succeeded or survived than did Huss: the printing press would have been lacking to him; and he would then have had no such general backing from princes and nobles as he actually received.

If we are to speak of the courage of Luther, what shall we say of the courage of Huss? And if it was the sensitiveness of the Teutonic conscience that wrought the Reformation, what must be the meed of the Czech conscience, which essayed the task a hundred years before, in the teeth of a bitter German resistance? Luther at least had the manhood to praise it;[2] and historic criticism might, on such a basis, attain to the standpoint at which the traditional pæan to the Teutonic conscience in this connection is

who took up the scent. Naturally the worst hypocrites followed it first. But such phenomena might induce partisans to spare us theses about the "Teutonic conscience."

[1] See Jakob Marx, *Die Ursachen der schnellen Verbreitung der Reformation*, 1847, § 12. The Catholics, according to Marx, got the services only of the worst printers.

[2] After his debate with Eck, which forced him to his foundations. Before, "it was a part of the gospel of every Saxon to believe in Huss as the incarnation of sedition and heresy" (Henderson, *Short Hist.*, i, p. 263).

seen to be but a part of the customary Teutonic *barditus*.

Yet we have had from a distinguished English culture-historian of the last generation the unmeaning assertion that "Germany achieved the labour of the Reformation almost single-handed"[1]—as if the movement of Luther could seriously have helped the movement in France, or, for that matter, in England, where every main position in the moral and the doctrinal revolt against Catholicism had been taken up by obscure folk, always at the risk and often at the cost of their lives, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A long polemic against Catholic abuses had been penned by "Walter Brute, a Briton," in the days of Richard II.[2] Against the dictum of Symonds may be set the much more justifiable claim of Guizot, that "the main effort of learning and of doctrine against the Catholic Church was sustained by the French Reformers; it was in France and Holland, and always in French, that there were produced the mass of philosophical, historical, and polemical works in support of the cause."[3]

But the broad historic fact which it concerns us to realise is that the Reformation, which in most countries (Switzerland and Holland are the

[1] Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy*, 2nd ed., i, p. 28.
[2] Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*, ed. Cattley, iii, p. 136 *seq.*
[3] *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, ed. 1874, i, p. 18.

chief exceptions) proceeded by way of unscrupulous confiscations in the interest of kings or aristocracies,[1] and involved many moral evils as against the evils which it eliminated, wrought in Germany the maximum of social and political ruin. We need not perhaps take as strictly and widely true the avowals made not only by Luther but by Calvin and by English Reformers, to the effect that the political triumph of their cause was attended by much new demoralisation.[2] What seems true is that habits formerly secret became open. What most chagrined the leading Reformers everywhere was the rarity, among the mass, of a religious exaltation equal to their own. But it had never been there; and it is not readily credible that, despite an admitted increase of sexual licence, there was much more vice of any kind after the Reformation than there had been before. The Reformers were now brought in much closer contact with life than they had before experienced, and they got a new knowledge of it. Their own standing charge against Rome had been that it was a hotbed of vice under the Papacy; and antinomianism had

[1] In Sweden, Gustavus Vasa commented mordantly on the readiness of nobles to become Protestant when it was a matter of plunder (Geijer, *Hist. of Sweden*, Eng. tr. p. 126). King and nobles ultimately divided the spoil between them.

[2] Cp. Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, 2nd ed. p. 497; Hallam, *Lit. of Europe*, ed. 1872, ii, p, 377; Luther in Walch's ed. v, p. 114; Henry, *Life of Calvin*, Eng. tr. ii, p. 45; Latimer's Sermons, Dent's rep. pp. 114, 170, 211, 223.

been rampant in the Teutonic world before, in the movement of Tanquelin in Flanders. Men were very much what they had always been, before Luther left his cell. Certainly the France of the Huguenot period was not morally worse than the France of the previous age, apart from the decivilisation that always accompanies a protracted civil war; and the Germany of Luther's day was not, save for the same reasons, worse than the Germany of the time of Huss, when the whole Germanic influence was cast against reform in Bohemia. The really valid charge against the Lutheran Reformation is that it was steeped in malice; and that its due outcome was the stupendous ruin of the Thirty Years' War.

This, again, is not a condemnation of Luther as a man. He has indeed enough to answer for in that capacity on the score of his desertion and brutal denunciation of the cause of the peasants, which has brought upon him at the hands of modern German Protestant historians charges that outweigh anything said in the name of Catholicism.[1] On the subject of the enormous strifes which followed on his movement, however, it is idle to echo the criticism of Erasmus, beyond

[1] Baur, *Kirchengeschichte*, iv, pp. 73–76; Kautsky, *Communism in Central Europe*, Eng. tr. 1897, pp. 117–28; Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Capp. 391, 492. Compare A. F. Pollard in *Camb. Mod. Hist.* ii, pp. 192–5; Henderson, *Short Hist. of Germany*, i, pp. 321–3; Beard, Hibbert Lectures on the Reformation, p. 200.

noting that the fury to which it moved Luther[1] is evidence of a troubled conscience. A sincere Reformer is not justly to be saddled with the evil wrought through the sheer lack of goodness in his opponents: by that method, all the evils of the French Revolution would lie at the door of everybody save the rabid opponents of reform who made the Revolution inevitable. But when we are reckoning up the Lutheran contribution to European progress, and appraising the dithyrambs sung to his memory and to the glory of the Teutonic conscience, we are bound to note the historic facts which moved Goethe,[2] long afterwards, to endorse in effect the judgment of Erasmus.

One thing Luther did for the German people: by his translation of the Bible, which he made soundly and variously vernacular, he established the norm of a national language where before every section had its cherished idiom. His own was primarily that of the Chancellery of the Saxon court; but he claimed[3] that it was followed by all the kings and princes of Germany, and that it was thus familiar in both north and south. However that might be, it was ultimately accepted as what he claimed it was, "the commonest

[1] See the *Table Talk*, ch. xliii; 1840 ed. of Bell's version, ii, pp. 191–2. Bohn ed., p. 283. The Reclam ed., pp. 238–243, gives a fuller selection.

[2] *Xenien*, 93.

[3] *Table Talk*, c. lxviii, ed. cited, ii, p. 307. The passage is omitted from the Reclam ed. and the Bohn trans.

German speech." His own gift of vernacular utterance made him responsive to all the capacities of the "High German," and gradually that gained the upper hand. In Stettin, the Bible was printed in "Low German" for the last time in 1604, in Lübeck in 1615, in Hamburg in 1620, and lastly in Goslar in 1621.[1] After the middle of the eighteenth century, Luther's diction was accepted even in the Catholic regions. But its acceptance in Switzerland did not mean the return of the Swiss to German allegiance; and Luther's literary success availed nothing to soften the bitterness of schism in the Fatherland.

If, putting aside the issue of Luther's responsibility for civil strife (with which must always be bracketed the question of what his movement indirectly wrought for the break-up of the paralysing tyranny of the Church), we turn simply to the merits of Lutheranism as a social influence upon its own adherents, our verdict is bound to be that it was a hotbed of bigotry, insensate dogmatism, and ill-will among men.[2] This was the implicit verdict of the better religious spirit in Germany itself, as voiced by the dying Melanchthon; and the explicit verdict of the religious spirit in Germany as embodied in the movement of Pietism generations afterwards. Melanchthon died avowing his

[1] Weise, *Unsere Muttersprache*, 3te Aufl. p. 23.
[2] Admitted by Richard, *Hist. of Ger. Civ.*, p. 250.

joy at escape from the *rabies* of theologians.[1] The spectacle of their hatreds moves a retrospective Protestant historian to something like despair.[2] It is hardly possible conscientiously to deny that many of the best spirits in Germany turned back in that mood to Catholicism before the Thirty Years' War,[3] even as the Pietists of the next age were moved to take up another religious attitude.

Die Welt-Geschichte ist das Welt-Gericht, said Schiller: the world's history is its trial. The zealots of race declaim to us about a racial faculty for progress and for self-government, in the face of a century of chronic politico-religious strife, culminating in a catastrophe which came near annihilating the whole Germanic civilisation. From Herr Chamberlain we have the marvellous theorem that the Germanic mind differs vitally from the Semitic in its capacity for tolerance[4]—a proposition which calls up an edifying memory of the average German attitude to Spinoza in the days of Leibnitz.[5] Fustel de Coulanges was well within his right when he summed up that

[1] Cox, *Life of Melanchthon*, 1815, pp. 528–9, 544.

[2] Beard, Hibbert Lectures on the Reformation, p. 296.

[3] Many strong opponents of indulgences always remained devout Catholics. Cp. Bishop Schuster, *Johann Kepler*, 1888, pp. 191 *seq.*, 202 *seq.*

[4] *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, i, pp. 352, 404; ii, pp. 172, 193, 409, etc.

[5] It is fair to remember that the Elector Palatine offered Spinoza a professorship at Heidelberg in 1673.

tolerance was taught by Holland to Protestants and by Richelieu to Catholics.[1] But the strict scientific truth would be that, after the fixation of orthodoxy, tolerance was nowhere learned by Christian States till they had been sickened of intolerance by an immensity of bloodshed and destruction; that they learned it first in the self-governing countries; and that Richelieu had his lesson not only in the past wars of religion in France but in the spectacle of the Thirty Years' War itself.

Truly, the kind of toleration achieved at the Peace of Westphalia offers a sorry ground for panegyric of German genius in that direction. An age-long war which had begun in quarrels about the authority of princes over the ecclesiastical property in their dominions was ended by a settlement which left the official religion of every State concerned to be determined by that of its ruler. *Cujus regio, ejus religio.* It would be difficult to make less account of "conscience" in the sphere of politics.

For the rest, the Reformation in Germany meant no mental emancipation save in so far as the seat of authority was transferred from Papalism to Scripturalism. The universities,

[1] "It was the Ostrogoth Theodoric the Great who first exercised tolerance," says Dr. Richard (p. 239). After him, the virtue was lost. It was the same Theodoric who put to death Boethius and Symmachus. His tolerance came of his Arianism: to protect his creed he left the other alone.

which had for the most part been bitter opponents of "the New Learning" that partly paved the way for Luther, went from bad to worse under Protestantism after his death.[1] "The number of students in Erfurt dropped from 311 in 1520 to 120 in 1521, and to 34 in 1524; in Rostock, from about 300 to 15 in 1525. In the same year Heidelberg had more professors than students; Vienna came down from 7000 to a few dozen; and the rest fared similarly."[2] The Lutheran regimen was only a new popery: the clerical resistance to new science was more bitter in the Protestant sphere than in the Catholic. Luther and Calvin had alike reviled and rejected the doctrine of Copernicus; and the Protestant Universities, Wittemberg in particular, fought it fiercely.[3] We are told by a German writer on the history of German culture that "the melancholy lot of Kepler, G. Bruno, and Galileo" would have befallen the English thinkers from Hobbes to Hume "if they had not lived on Protestant ground."[4] The historic fact is that Protestant persecution drove Kepler back to Catholicism; and Hume had to leave his deepest thoughts for posthumous publication after men

[1] K. von. Raumer, *Contrib. to the Hist. of the German Universities*, New York, 1859, pp. 32–37, 42–52.

[2] Richard, p. 289.

[3] White, *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*, i, pp. 129, 147, 212, 213.

[4] Karl Hillebrand, *Six Lectures on the History of German Thought*, 1880, p. 19.

"on Catholic ground," in France, had gone further. The plain truth, as avowed by another culture-historian, is that "free reasoning found a home and development first with the French, the Dutch, and the English, and was not to attain its great triumphs in Germany until two hundred years later."[1]

And it was not only in respect of the higher thought that the Reformation worked an arrest in German life. In 1521, Luther, reckoning up the new discoveries following on Columbus, could write of his time as one of unprecedented progress: at his death there was already a "beginning of decay." This was in part commercial, the diversion of commerce to the main sea routes and its deflection from the old inland trade-ways having an inevitable effect on prosperity.[2] But the ever-deepening sunderance between Protestants and Catholics was accompanied by that separation between the educated and uneducated classes which has endured down to modern times, the very institution of universities tending to that result.[3] The murderous repression of the Peasants' Rising, involving the slaughter of a hundred thousand men and the deepened degradation of many more, left rural life in an evil state. "Serfdom was legally recognised for the whole

[1] Richard, p. 252.

[2] Holland further closed the Rhine trade by ever-increasing tolls.

[3] Richard, pp. 227, 274, 277.

Empire in 1555."[1] The race-theorists, with their usual felicity, explain that " in the middle of the sixteenth century there appears to be a retrogression of the Germanic type, and a visible increase of the dark and round-headed type."[2]

In a nation which was still, in respect of its manufacturing cities, the most advanced in handicrafts in Europe,[3] there were abundant possibilities of intellectual recovery; but all progress was to be violently disrupted exactly a century after Luther's advent by a moral catastrophe which might be set down to " race character " if anything reasonably could. If there was a hereditary Germanic genius for anything, it was now to be seen, it was a genius for senseless and all-destroying strife.

[1] Richard, p. 297.

[2] *Id.* p. 285. Dr. Richard for once blenches at " these rather speculative assertions of the race-theorists."

[3] The opinion of the French publicist Bodin.

§ 3. *Germany after the Thirty Years' War.*

Before the Reformation, the later progress of Germany had consisted mainly in the culture movement set up by the Italian Renaissance, which so strongly influenced Ulrich von Hutten, and the commercial and industrial life—also largely modelled on Italy—which flourished mainly in the free cities. The peasantry were for the most part in a state of serfdom and cruel oppression; the baronage were largely occupied in plundering the traders and in private war—which was chronic even between cities; but even in the fifteenth century the burghers of a trading and manufacturing city like Nuremberg lived in greater material well-being than a king of Scotland of the same period.[1] To such a development the strifes set up by the Reformation were naturally not propitious; and the arrest of the Rhine trade probably hastened the decay of bookselling; [2] but the general material level of town civilisation at the beginning of the seventeenth century was still quite abreast of that of England and France; and the universities were perhaps equally so.

[1] So Æneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II). [2] Richard, p. 290.

What is seen on retrospect to be signally lacking is the higher intellectual life represented by secular literature. In this aspect, the Germany of the year 1618, a century after the Reformation, is astonishingly backward, in comparison with France and England. Religious strife had visibly excluded every other form of energetic mentality, save in the way of legal and quasi-scientific learning. Where France had produced Marot and Ronsard, Des Periers and Rabelais, Bodin and Amyot, Montaigne and Charron; where England had had her More, Elyot, North, Lilly, Sidney, Spenser, Raleigh, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Daniel, Drayton, Jonson, Hooker, Bacon, and a multitude of minor poets, dramatists, and thinkers, Germany has hardly a remembered name to show, after Ulrich von Hutten, save those of Hans Sachs and of Fischart, the adapter of Rabelais. The nation which boasts of having invented printing had thus far incomparably the poorest of the vernacular literatures of civilised Europe, apart from the other "Teutonic" States so called. In the face of such facts, the claim that Germany was "intellectually" abreast of the other chief nations is untenable. If literature counts for anything, she was signally backward.[1] And the common

[1] Luther, in complaining of the multitude of new books in his day, proceeds to show that they were mostly Biblical commentaries. *Table Talk*, as cited, i, p. 46.

resort of upper-class Germans to France and to French civilisation, already noted in the sixteenth century,[1] indicates some recognition of the fact.

But the material civilisation nevertheless subsisted. I have before me a book published at Nuremberg in 1615, the *Theologia Naturalis* of J. H. Alsted, dedicated to the Senate or Municipal Council of that prosperous "imperial city." In point of typography and paper it seems to me to represent a rather higher level of resources and production than are indicated by any books published in England at the same period. Such a level of technical production was hardly recovered in Germany till the nineteenth century. The German books of the eighteenth are in comparison stamped with material penury, revealed in cheap and coarse paper and crude typography.

The explanation is the ruin wrought by the Thirty Years' War. In that vast catastrophe, all German life was broken down to something like the level of two centuries before.[2] "All the national forces, material as well as intellectual and moral, were destroyed when peace was concluded in 1648. . . . Hundreds of flourishing cities were reduced to ashes; there were

[1] Freytag, *Pictures of German Life*, Eng. tr. 2nd ser. i, p. 81. The proposition holds good of the later Middle Ages likewise.

[2] "It threw her [Germany] back full two hundred years, materially and intellectually, and extinguished all remembrance of the past." Hillebrand, as cited, p. 38.

towns of 18,000 inhabitants which counted but 324 at the peace; ground which had been tilled and ploughed for ten centuries had become a wilderness; thousands of villages had disappeared. Trees grew in the abandoned houses. At Wiesbaden the market had grown into a brushwood full of deer. The whole Palatinate had but 200 freeholders; Würtemberg had but 48,000 inhabitants at the end of the war instead of the 400,000 which it had mustered at the beginning. We are told that a messenger going from Dresden to Berlin through a once flourishing country walked thirty miles without finding a house to rest in. The war had devoured, on an average, three-quarters of the population, two-thirds of the houses, nine-tenths of the cattle of all sorts: nearly three-quarters of the soil had been turned to heath. . . . It is a proved fact, indeed, that Germany recovered only towards 1850 the actual amount of capital and the material well-being with which she entered the great war in 1618. Thus, so far as the number of homesteads, the heads of cattle, the returns of crops can be statistically ascertained, the amount in 1850 was, not relatively but absolutely, the same as in 1618; in some respects even inferior."[1] It is asserted that at the end of

[1] Hillebrand, pp. 41–42, following Biedermann. For more hideous details, see Richard, p. 302, and Gardiner, *Thirty Years' War*, pp. 183–4, 213.

the war sheep had entirely disappeared from Germany.[1]

It should be remembered that the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV in 1674, and the destruction wrought by the Seven Years' War, the work of Frederick the Great, to say nothing of the Napoleonic wars, had immensely retarded recuperation in the interval; but there can be no dispute as to the ruin brought by the war of thirty years. Our German summarist pronounces that "the social and moral state corresponded with the material. . . . The highly cultivated language of Luther was utterly forgotten, together with the whole literature of his time. The most vulgar vices had taken root in people who had been reared from their infancy in the horrors of war. . . . Not a vestige of a national tradition remained. There was no middle class nor gentry left. . . . Suicides became so frequent after the war that an imperial law ordered self-murderers to be buried under the gallows. . . . The peasants' dwellings differed little from those of their animals. . . . All habits of self-government, even in the cities, had gone. . . . An unprecedented coarseness of manners had invaded not only courts and cities, but also the universities and the clergy. There was servility everywhere. . . . Cowardice had

[1] Richard, p. 304. Gardiner (*Thirty Years' War*, 1889, p. 214) says this of *one district*.

become the common vice of the lower people. . . . Everybody wanted a title—for it was then that the great title-mania set in, of which Germany is not yet entirely cured."[1]

Here there are perhaps some exaggerations;[2] but there is plenty of detail evidence for every generalisation, however it may have been stretched. Grossness of manners, be it noted, had existed before the war. Menzel notes that in the latter part of the sixteenth century the normal drunkenness of princes and the upper classes gave rise to the foreign phrase, "A German swine."[3] Montaigne says as much a generation before the war broke out. But all life was now profoundly worsened. Everywhere government was "despotism of the meanest as well as the pettiest kind. . . . Justice was as venal as administration was rapacious. The old Parliaments had disappeared long ago, together with the jury, the *Landesgemeinde*, and all that recalled the old Teutonic uses and customs. . . . Religion itself, which had been the pretext of the war, had well-nigh vanished."[4]

To the ruin of moral and material life was added

[1] Hillebrand, pp. 42–44.

[2] Compare, however, Richard, pp. 302–3.

[3] *Gesch. der Deutschen*, Cap. 417. The same reproach had been cast by Ulrich von Hutten, before the Reformation. Cp. Richard: "The national German weakness, drunkenness, became more common than ever" (in the sixteenth century). P. 289.

[4] Hillebrand, pp. 47–48.

a further barbarisation on the side of provincial animosities. Well-nigh all Germany had been embroiled in new hatreds and new alliances. Sweden, whose armies under Gustavus Adolphus had devastated the Catholic lands, was the Protestant ally, and Gustavus the Protestant hero; but France was no less the friend inasmuch as she aided against the Catholic German Emperor and the Catholic German States. Religious hatred had cast out the latterly vaunted solidarity of race, which, for that matter, had never risen higher than a vague collective animosity to aliens. Less than ever were the Germans a nation. After a time Protestant Saxony turned against the aggressive Swedes, and joined the Imperialists; and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, in French pay, enabled France to take firm hold of Alsace and Lorraine, which she finally held. The Peace of Westphalia, making Germany a mere congeries of independent States, mostly very small, practically ended the Empire as a political entity; and the ensuing life was more than ever fragmentary, separatist, tribal. Germany, in the name of religion, had wrought the shattering of her own civilisation as no outside enemy could ever have done.

In the deep ensuing depression of mental life, it is noteworthy that mechanical invention and even science continued to show some signs of progress during the century of intellectual

and material penury which followed the war. The one sort of "supremacy" that Germany had hitherto possessed was in manufactures. Many allusions in French and English and Italian[1] books of the period before the war show that, though not without distinction in learning and in such science as then existed, Germany was commonly regarded as the chief European producer of things manufactured, such as clocks, watches, armour, weapons and metal-work in general. They came mostly from the free cities, as did the woollen manufactures. The extermination of sheep, over and above the general ruin of trade by the war, made an end of the latter as an export industry; and manufactures of every kind had to begin anew. Hamburg had all along held to her sea trade, even when the commercial league of the Hansa cities fell into decay; but the inland towns incurred the general ruin. Before the war, Augsburg had 70,000 inhabitants: at the end of its siege by the Imperialists in 1635, there were left only 10,000, near death from disease and famine.[2]

The material civilisation of the previous century was thus well-nigh annihilated; and the intellectual, already so backward, as measured by

[1] Compare Machiavelli's *Ritratti*, as before cited, p. 417; Villari, p. 443.

[2] Gardiner, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 183.

secular literature, fared all the worse in consequence. France and England, so far in advance on that side before 1618, increased their lead throughout the century. France had her Corneille, Racine and Molière, her Pascal and Malebranche and Bossuet, La Bruyère and La Rochefoucauld and Boileau and Lafontaine; and England her Milton and Browne and Dryden and Marvell, her Hobbes and her Locke, her Butler and Bunyan, to say nothing of the Restoration drama; Germany produced a few feeble literary lights, of which the chief is Opitz, who was an adult when the war began. It chanced that in Hamburg, which maintained its sea-trade, the first opera produced in Germany was given thirty years after the war, in 1678; but there was to be no sequence.

It is noteworthy that as the men of Italy, in their age of depression, held on to physical science, doing the bulk of the world's work in anatomy even after France had entered the field, so in Germany the depressed and impoverished race showed more faculty in physical science than in literature. The astronomers and physicists—Bayer and Guericke and Sturm and Hevel; the botanists—Kaempfer and Vesling; the chemists—Becker, Brandt, Glauber, Hoffman and Kunkel, albeit with small encouragement from their countrymen, maintained the line of names that had begun with Copernicus and

Kepler. The air-pump and the electrical machine of Guericke are not salient discoveries, but they tell of a continuance of scientific effort; and it is on a line of progression from physical science that Leibnitz, with his mathematics and his calculating machine, reaches his philosophic originality, with the help of Hobbes,[1] Descartes, and Spinoza; even as Kant, starting from the high ground of Newton, travelled by way of manifold scientific inquiry and luminous speculation to *his* philosophic goal. The non-German notes, what the patriotic German prefers to ignore, that Copernicus was by parentage a Pole on his father's side; and that Leibnitz came of a Bohemian stock. In a history in which genius, as distinguished from industry, has always been rare, such details obtrude themselves as against the pæan to race-genius.

Meanwhile, the general intellectual and æsthetic life of Germany had sunk pitiably. The three hundred and odd principalities into which the land was divided at the Peace of Westphalia became for the most part humble imitators of the court of France. French was the language of the courtiers and of those who sought to figure as "elegant" writers; while the depressed and struggling scholarly and scientific

[1] Cp. Dr. Latta's *Leibnitz: The Monadology, etc.*, 1898, p. 7. Biedermann (*Deutschland im 18ten Jahrhundert*, ii, p. 194) puts it that "Leibnitz was indebted for his strongest impulses towards philosophical speculation to Bacon, Descartes, Campanella."

class did its work in Latin. The *Acta Eruditorum*, a scientific journal, was founded at Leipzig in 1682. In the latter half of the seventeenth century the German tongue seemed to be on the way to disappear from the higher levels of European culture: Leibnitz said as much. That it recovered its status was due, of course, neither to any innate value it possessed as an instrument of thought nor to any new attraction set up by literary genius—that was very slow to arise—but to the simple return of the spirit of collective self-assertion in a people which had been battered almost to destruction by the madness of its own strifes.

That a literature does not make a nation, but that a nation, once sufficiently cultured, makes a literature, might have been supposed to be specially perceptible to race-worshippers. Yet German race-pride has been satisfied with sketches in which a band of literary men about 1760 are represented as putting new heart into a German people that had hitherto lain prostrate before an acknowledged French supremacy. Obviously things could not so happen. These men grew up in a society already well on the way to recovery of its racial self-esteem. Leibnitz could complain that in his day "among all nations Germany alone is so stupid as not to recognise and support her own great men, and that she first learns to esteem them when she

had had her attention drawn to their worth by the voices of other nations."[1] German inventors had to starve or emigrate; and Leibnitz's own schemes of amelioration were contemned at spendthrift Dresden, baffled at Vienna by the Jesuits, and only slowly and sparely supported at Berlin. But there was not to arise a new Germany meekly recognisant of the superiority of other peoples. With recovering population and trade, there came a recovery of national self-esteem.

Not a little of the prolongation of French intellectual prestige was due to the actual influx of cultured French Protestants before and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). While German States were still chronically fighting Louis XIV, in alliance with Austria or with the Dutch, the insensate policy of the French king drove from his territory into those of his enemies scores of thousands of its most energetic inhabitants. Already in 1685 French refugee physicians joined with the Elector to found at Berlin the Superior College of Medicine; and it was French refugees who established at Berlin, in 1696, the *Nouveau Journal des Sciences*, in their own tongue. All this was not done without exciting native jealousy; though Leibnitz, while deploring the occultation of German, so fully recognised the supremacy of French culture as to write

[1] *Opp. omn.*, v, p. 349, cited by Biedermann.

in French[1] two of his chief philosophic works. The French immigration was too valuable not to be influential. Richelieu's astute policy of promoting only Catholics without persecuting Protestants had brought it about that those of the middle and upper classes who remained Protestants in France were of the most sterling character; and gravity and sobriety of temper marked the thousands of exiled French workmen whom the Elector of Brandenburg welcomed into his dominions. They gave a new life to ruined Magdeburg; and the whole immigration constituted the greatest advance in recuperation made by Prussia in the half-century after the Thirty Years' War.[2]

It is alongside of this influx of new intellectual life that we find the first outburst of new energy in the native mind. As Leibnitz was stirred by French and English thought and science, so Christian Thomasius was roused by Bayle to do battle with traditionalism in academic, legal, and social life. It seems to have been under the same influences that Gottfried Arnold reached the broad views of the ecclesiastical past set forth in his *Impartial History of Churches and Heretics* (1699–1700); at least

[1] A French "full of Latinisms," according to Schlosser, who justifies Bolingbroke's account of the style as barbarous and unintelligible (i, p. 180).

[2] Weiss, *History of the French Protestant Refugees*, Eng. tr. 1854, p. 122 *seq.*

there had been no German preparation for it. Few men of that day gave it the welcome it was later to find with Goethe and with Tolstoy; but Thomasius at once joined hands with its author, recognising a kindred spirit. Had Arnold been a good writer his influence might have gone further: the influence of Thomasius was won by forty years of intellectual battle. Pufendorf had cautiously introduced ideas of Hobbes into jurisprudence, scandalising the theologians; and Thomasius carried the process further, becoming the chief German reformer of his time.[1] To him was due the abolition of trials for sorcery; and the orthodox Mosheim reluctantly admits that he was the founder of academic freedom in Germany. And it was he who, besides introducing the use of German in university lectures, against bitter opposition, ran the first vernacular German journal (1688–90).

The academic resistance to Thomasius was much fiercer than the resistance to the French refugees; and these had the abundant support of the Prussian Court. At Berlin were founded, on their behalf, the French College and the Academy of Nobles; at Halle, the French Institute or Academy of Chevaliers, which grew into a University,[2] widely influential in the new Germany; and it was under the French influence

[1] Schlosser has a fairly good account of him, i, p. 184 *seq.*

[2] Where for a time Thomasius found refuge.

that the Elector founded in 1700 the Academy of Sciences and Literature at Berlin, though the jealousy of the German ecclesiastics admitted at first only one French cleric.[1] Sixty years later, Goldsmith was astonished to find the Academy still carrying on its proceedings in French.[2]

Meanwhile, the native jealousy of French culture had never ceased. The voluminous Schlosser exaggerates when he asserts that at the beginning of the eighteenth century "the German people of rank read either no books or only French ones," and the common people only the Bible, sermons, or popular tales.[3] The highest rate of production of French books ever reached in Germany was thirteen per cent.; and as early as 1700 more books in German prose were published than in Latin.[4] But German *belles lettres* at this stage was in the main a bad imitation of French and Italian models, and only in the writings of the Pietists was a sound German style to be seen.[5] It was in fact impossible that a literature which had been relatively backward in the sixteenth century, and before the Thirty Years' War, should have attained vigorous life in 1700. The literary history of

[1] Weiss, p. 141.
[2] *Present State of Polite Learning*, 1759, ch. iv.
[3] *Hist. of the Eighteenth Century*, Eng. tr., i, p. 177.
[4] Richard, p. 333.
[5] Schlosser, p. 178.

the first half of the eighteenth century is largely a record of the labours and the strifes of the rival schools of Gottsched (French taste) and of the Swiss Bodmer and Breitinger (English taste); and the latter stood rather for jealousy of the other than for a wide knowledge of English literature. "Those who sustained the Swiss party at Berlin had read many more French books than English."[1]

It was a case of two sets of industrious pedants endeavouring to establish a code of literary taste and a tasteful native literature, without any adequate native production. Men were copiously taught the principles of literary æsthetics before they had seen in their own language any fine artistic work. Genius was lacking; German industry alone was available. As late as 1759, Goldsmith wrote that "If criticism could have improved the taste of a people, the Germans would have been the most polite nation alive. We shall nowhere behold the learned wear a more important aspect than here. . . . Their assiduity is unparalleled; and did they employ half those hours on study which they bestow on reading, we might be induced to pity as well as praise their painful pre-eminence. But, guilty of a fault too common to great readers, they write through volumes, while they do not think

[1] Abbé Denina, *La Prusse littéraire sous Frederic II*, 1790 i, p. 84.

through a page." This flippancy comes fairly near the mark. The Gottsched school was as anxious as the Bodmer school to establish a native literature; but neither could produce the requisite great writers. Gottsched and the poet Klopstock alike "wanted to make a German national drama; they attained only to a dull copy of the French theatre."[1] Industry as distinct from genius remained the mark of German work; and Nicolai, discussing the literary results, commented unanswerably on the notion of strenuous penmen that they could produce nine epic poems in a year and have time left over.[2]

All the while, French literature had maintained its lead. Marivaux had followed on Molière; Prévost had brought a new force of simplicity into fiction; Montesquieu had founded a new science of history; Voltaire and Diderot had arisen. German publicists might turn to England for models and stimuli that would enable them at some points to flout the French; but open-minded German readers had to face the plain fact that the French literature remained far in advance of their own; and that to

[1] Biedermann, *Deutschlands Zustände im 18ten Jahrhundert*, iii, p. 227.

[2] *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand der schönen Wissenschaften in Deutschland*, 1755, p. 78.

turn to England was not to alter the situation.

Thus far, the upshot of the evolution was simply that French influence had re-developed German civilisation, English aiding; and the panegyrical historian, making the best of the matter, pronounces that, "seen across the distance of many generations, the influence of French culture must on the whole be considered beneficial, in spite of all declamations of German Chauvinists to the contrary. Germany might conceivably have overcome the consequences of the period of decay by her own strength (!), but it would have taken much longer. [It certainly would !] The French, *besides*, had something to give. . . . It was undoubtedly true that the period of French discipline has been of great advantage to the progress of German civilisation."[1] Thus can patriotism, calling itself sociology, balance the admission of national gain from a neighbouring civilisation by the thesis that, given only time, the backward nation could without any culture-contact have made up for two hundred years of retrogradation. Always we find this note sounded by latter-day German scholarship in the act of professing to treat history philosophically. It is a modern development alien to all the best historical

[1] Richard, pp. 333–4.

work of the past. And always we thus realise that so far as can be gathered from the bulk of the current teaching, that measure of life-philosophy which is attainable by ordinary minds in terms of a rational view of history is nowhere less common than in the Germany which has forced on the world the World War.

§ 4. *The Eighteenth-Century Renascence.*

The new birth—or, indeed, the birth—of German literature is commonly held to set in with Lessing. In 1755 he produced his tragedy *Miss Sara Sampson*, in the then reigning English taste, and his essay on *Pope, ein Metaphysiker*, neither of which seems to have attracted any English attention at the time. In 1766 came his *Laokoon*; in 1767 his comedy *Minna von Barnhelm*; and in 1769 his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, in which, we are assured by a biographical dictionary, he "overthrew finally the dictatorship of the French drama." After that, the "death blows" to the French influence abound in German culture-history. Soon afterwards, Goethe repeated the overthrow. *Goetz von Berlichingen* came out in 1772, and "with this one piece the French taste was victoriously overthrown."[1] Strange to say, Lessing was at that very time proceeding under another French influence—Diderot's. As in his earlier comedies he had formed himself on Molière, and in *Minna von Barnhelm* (1767) profited by Marivaux, so

[1] Goedeke, *Einleitung* to *Götz von Berlichingen*, Cotta ed.

both in that and in *Emilia Galotti* (1771) he obeyed suggestions of Diderot.

We have his own word for it. In the preface to the second edition of his translation of Diderot's plays, written when he had given up playwriting, he avows that "without Diderot's example and doctrines" his own taste "would have taken a quite different direction." Lessing's reaction against the French classic drama, in short, was not original on his part; and had been begun long before in the French sphere. As is remarked by M. Bossert, "it would be difficult to find, in the whole series of his articles on Corneille, on Racine, on Voltaire, an important criticism which has not been formulated before or after him by a French critic."[1] One German historian of literature puts it that he "made common cause"[2] with Diderot: Schlosser avows that he fought the French conventions with Diderot's weapons.[3] Hillebrand alleges that "when Lessing attacked the French poetical laws and rules they were still universally acknowledged."[4] This is simply untrue. Fénelon before Diderot, and Rousseau after him, had powerfully impugned them. Further, we may note the verdict of Lowell, that Lessing "certainly learned to write prose of Diderot; and whatever Herr

[1] *Goethe, ses précurseurs et ses contemporains*, 1872, p. 71.
[2] Thimm, *Hist. of Ger. Lit.*, p. 33.
[3] *Hist. of the Eighteenth Century*, Eng. tr., ii, p. 50.
[4] Lectures cited, p. 84.

Stahr may think of it, his share in the *Letters on German Literature* got its chief inspirations from France."[1] Finally, as Lord Morley has noted, " It has been replied to the absurd taunt about the French inventing nothing, that at least Diderot invented German philosophy. Still more true is it that Diderot invented German criticism."[2]

The German eagerness to obliterate the history of Germany's intellectual debt to France, though only in recent times general, has been continuous since the day of Lessing,who was always swinging between his admiration for the great Frenchmen and his exasperation at the vogue and status of French work in Germany. When the Hamburg " National Theatre " had to close in its second year because of the indifference of the Hamburg public, he wrote bitterly, in the last article of his *Dramaturgie*, of the folly of the idea of creating for the Germans a national theatre, " while we Germans are still not a nation. I do not speak of the political constitution, but solely of the moral character. One might almost say it consists in the will to have no character of our own. We are still the sworn imitators of everything foreign, especially still the humble admirers of the never-enough admired French." Thus could he write at the time when he is

[1] Essay on *Lessing*, Camelot ed. of *Essays*, p. 303.
[2] *Diderot*, ed. 1884, p. 205.

supposed to have "overthrown" the French influence. Whatever overthrowing he achieved followed the publication of the critiques in book form; and it is far from clear that any general change for the better took place on the German stage in his day. All the while, the French had given a generous reception to his *Miss Sara Sampson*, a sufficiently faulty play; and the French critic who dealt with it in the *Journal Étranger*, by Lessing's avowal, handled it impartially enough.

There is a certain querulous pettiness in Lessing's whole treatment of the matter of French influence, which is nowadays faithfully copied by his countrymen in their retrospect. It was in the natural way of things that the question of the laws of dramatic construction should be re-opened and re-discussed; and Lessing was plainly within his rights in re-opening it. It had been many times discussed in France; and the doctrine of Corneille was merely that which had most adherents. To turn the dispute into a question of race jealousy, when most Germans still held with Corneille, and many intelligent Frenchmen with Diderot and Lessing, was not the tactic for a great critic or a great man. And yet Lessing was not a small critic or a small man: he was simply a German yielding to the *pruritus* of racial antagonism as so many Germans have done since. In reality he no

more solved the problem than did Corneille: in claiming to give the true exposition of Aristotle's meaning he was only putting one authoritarian view in place of another; and in his own dramatic practice he made no really great contribution to the art, whatever his countrymen may claim. *Nathan the Wise* is not a great drama. Writing with his larger judgment, as he generally did when he had to weigh his own merits, he avowed, in closing the *Dramaturgie*, that he was neither a poet nor a dramatist, while justly claiming that he was a critic. It was as a critic that he did his most important work, in his *Laokoon* and his many scattered discussions, though in his haste he committed errors enough. And in that work, too, he had abundant inspiration from France.

What holds good is that with Lessing German literature had entered on a new progressive period, exhibiting for the first time, outside of the sphere of dogmatics, work which alike in form and content, style and substance, challenged comparison with anything put forth in other countries. Leibnitz, writing mostly in French, had carried similar weight in science and philosophy; but he does not count in literature as a writer of German; and Christian Wolff, who carefully conventionalised his philosophy and taught in German, and was driven from his chair at Halle in consequence of his

general liberalism, is in turn not a man of genius but a typical diligent German. Lessing was something more. With simple sincerity he avowed that he had thought there might be an element of genius in a critic, and he was perfectly right. Genius, philosophically considered, is marked superiority and originality of faculty in any direction; and his genius came clearly within the field of literature, in any sense of the term. The idiomatic quality of his style, which recalls Luther's, moved Herder to declare that no one had ever written German as Lessing did. English translations, putting periphrasis for terseness, mostly give no idea of its force. And it is always to be remembered that, with all his irritation at French "supremacy," it was he who put on record the avowal, "Patriotism is a noble weakness, which I am glad to be without." Germanhood in his day had not yet come to mean Teutomania.

For a generation after his death the sane temper lasted. The poet Klopstock, who won temporary renown by his quasi-epic, *The Messiah* (1748–1773), inducing most of his compatriots to believe that they had produced one of the great world-poets, sounded the Teutonic note in tumid verses on the remote Arminius, the destroyer of Varus by ambuscade. Lessing wrote of Klopstock's poetry that in much of it "there is so much feeling [*Empfinding*] that one can

there feel [*empfinde*] nothing" : the play of "sensibility" being such as to exclude real expression and impression. Thus distasting the poet's Christian sentimentalism, Lessing probably did not think it worth while to attack his paganism, which did not then avail to generate much Chauvinism. Lessing himself had beaten the loyal drum in odic poems written at Frederick in 1752, 1753, and 1754.[1] But Lessing was incapable of a temper of systematised national vainglory. He wrote a laudatory preface in 1758 to the "Grenadier Songs" of Gleim, which had the merit of actuality ; but when that poet proceeded to develop the spirit of national hatred over a war which was the due sequel of that wantonly begun by Prussia herself, the critic wrote to his friend :—

> Suppose that peace is sooner or later concluded : suppose that the Powers which now so detest each other make up their quarrels (which must inevitably happen), what do you think cooler readers, and perhaps the Grenadier himself, will say to many exaggerations that in the heat of passion you now take for undoubted truths ? The patriot overcries the poet too much ; and a military patriot, too, who supports himself by pretexts which are anything but proved ! Perhaps in me also the patriot is not quite stifled, although the praise of a zealous patriot is the last which, according to my way of thinking, I should desire to win : a patriot, that is, who should teach

[1] *Oden*, i, vi, vii, ix. Mr. Sime does not discuss these in his able *Life of Lessing*.

me to forget that I ought to be a citizen of the world.[1]

This remained on the whole the attitude of educated Germany for that age. The mere spectacle, indeed, of a Prussian king who, after all his victories over the French, continued contemptuously to ignore all German literature, and to consort above all with French men of letters, was steadily damping to the temper of Gallophobia. Even Klopstock reverted from the *barditus* to another mood. The Germanising Muse had been a birth of the wars of Frederick, which had long before elicited a number of poems like his *Hermannschlacht* [2] (1769), all long since as dead as Hermann. And in apotheosising Hermann the better poets, like Klopstock, were moved by something higher than mere racial or national pride [3]—a new ideal of human liberty which they found in nowise fulfilled by the despotic rule of Frederick. Both early and late, accordingly, Klopstock was as much a humanitarian and cosmopolitan as a patriot.[4]

There was indeed a natural progression in pride. Frederick's first Silesian war (1740) had been widely disliked even in Prussia as a work of personal ambition, unjustified by national in-

[1] *Sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. Maltzahn, xii, p. 150; Sime, i, pp. 167–8.

[2] Biedermann, iii, pp. 227–8, *note*. Cp. pp. 97, 103, 110, etc.

[3] Though that was present in all. *Id.* p. 109.

[4] *Id.* p. 110.

terests.[1] Only gradually did the inevitable vainglory following upon Frederick's successful emergence from the Seven Years' War affect the whole national consciousness ; and it reached the larger minds last. In Goethe's autobiography we learn how the polite airs of superiority of French people among the Germans after the war tried the temper of the latter, even in the legitimate form of correction of their French.[2] As early as 1755, just before the great war, we find Nicolai snapping in a genuinely Prussian fashion at the sense of cultural superiority which he angrily divined behind the most courteous French allusions to " foreign " literature.[3] After the war matters would not mend. Goethe was far too genuinely cosmopolitan to be seriously deflected by the *barditus*, in which he never joined ; but in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* he smilingly shows how the æsthetic movement which he himself had led in his youth with *Goetz von Berlichingen* had turned into a cultus of the Teutonic forefather :—

> Everyone [of the theatrical company] was inflamed with the fire of the noblest national spirit. How it gratified this German company to let themselves go poetically, according to their own character, on their own ground! In particular the vaults and cellars, the ruined castles, the moss and the hollow trees,

[1] Biedermann, iii, p. 230.
[2] *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, B. xi ; *Werke*, ed. 1866, xii, p. 31 *seq.*
[3] *Briefe*, as cited, pp. 33, 171.

but above all the nocturnal gipsy-scenes and the Secret Tribunal, produced quite an incredible effect. Every actor saw now how he, ere long, in helm and harness; every actress how she, with a great standing ruff, would exhibit their Germanhood before the public. Each would at once appropriate a name out of the piece or out of German history; and Madame Melina averred that the son or daughter she was expecting should not be christened otherwise than as Adalbert or Mathilde.[1]

This appeared in 1795. Already there was on foot, in Germany as in England, that reaction against the French Revolution which so deeply affected political life; and it could not but minister to the spirit of Germanhood. Still that spirit did not triumph. August von Schlegel, the romanticist and critic, delivering at Vienna in 1808 his Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, wound up with an appeal to the coming and much-required dramatist to

enable us to see, while we take deep shame to ourselves for what we are, what the Germans were in former times, and what they again must be. Let him impress it strongly on our hearts that, if we do not consider the lessons of history better than we have hitherto done, we Germans—we, formerly the greatest and most illustrious nation of Europe, whose freely elected prince was willingly acknowledged the head of all Christendom—are in danger of disappearing altogether from the list of independent nations. . . . May all who have an opportunity of influencing the public mind exert themselves to extinguish at last

[1] *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, B. II, C. 10.

the old misunderstandings and to rally, as round a consecrated banner, all the well-disposed objects of reverence, which, unfortunately, have been too long deserted, but by faithful attachment to which our forefathers acquired so much happiness and renown, to let them feel their indestructible unity as Germans !

A page or two before he had been justly animadverting on the fact that "The more profound study of æsthetics has among the Germans, by nature a speculative rather than a practical people, led to this consequence, that works of art, and tragedies more especially, have been executed on *abstract theories* more or less misunderstood. It was natural that these tragedies should produce no effect on the theatre ; nay, they are in general unsuited for representation, and wholly devoid of any inner principle of life." He was now proposing another abstract theory, as barren of artistic value as any of the others. By his own account, the flood of chivalry plays which followed Goethe's *Goetz* had been utterly worthless, with "nothing historical but the names and other external circumstances; nothing chivalrous but the helmets, bucklers, and swords ; and nothing of old German honesty but the supposed rudeness : the sentiments were as modern as they were vulgar. From chivalry pieces they became true cavalry pieces, which certainly deserved to be acted by horses rather than men."[1] So that the purpose of stimulating

[1] *Lectures*, Bohn trans., p. 523.

national sentiment by quasi-historical plays, like the earlier mode of epic poems about Arminius, had been proved to be alien to the spirit of true art. Still, it was to be inculcated anew. The appeal was duly fruitless. True art no less than true science transcends the plane of vainglorious nationalism, and, when invoked to inspire it, lends but formulas and trappings. What the German theatre achieved in the age of renascence was the fruit of humanism, not of Germanism; even as all the great work of Shakespeare was done when he had left the chronicle play behind. *Faust* carried no national or racial message: *Wilhelm Tell*, which passes for Schiller's best play, celebrates Swiss and not German nationalism. And it may be left to the *siegestrunken* Germany of the past half-century to say whether she claims in that period to have surpassed even Schiller, to say nothing of Goethe.

§ 5. *The Cosmopolitan Age.*

If we take the literary life of Goethe as "an age," and think of him as representing it, we shall conceive, not untruly however vaguely, of a Germany heading on a different path from that which her people have since trodden. The humanist forces were too various and too strong to be soon swallowed up by tribalism, especially as tribalism made small political progress. Viennese applause of Schlegel's apostrophe to the German race in 1808 meant no approximation between South and North after the fall of Napoleon. On the other hand, the very multiplicity of intellectual movement throughout North Germany in the age of Frederick, and in the next, was incompatible with a narrow nationalism. Simultaneously in *belles lettres*, in the human and the natural sciences, in philosophy, in the critical study of religion, men were rolling back the old boundaries of thought, and widening rather than narrowing their souls. The German discovery of Shakespeare did but promote the process, without making the Germans less

intimate with the French. Chased out of the window as "stage convention," the French influence entered by every door as new criticism of life, which already in France had become a much more important thing than questions of dramatic form. Lessing's blows at Voltaire the tragedian never touched Voltaire the humanist: Montesquieu was not on Lessing's path; and Rousseau had as numerous a school in Germany as in France, escaping there the reactions set up at home by his ill-strung personality.

This continuance of the French influence on German life must be kept in view as against the chronic tendency to hide it. No doubt the spectacle of the French culture of Frederick the Great, who all his life read and wrote French prose and verse and entertained French men of letters, treating German literature as (what it really was) something still inchoate, is trying to the average patriotic sense, in a land where kings must be reverenced. But to treat Frederick as "a German classic, who wrote in French," and to dwell on his sufficiently anti-French State-policy, does not dispose of the wider French influence. Frederick would pay small heed to Rousseau; but Rousseau influenced more or less profoundly almost every leading German thinker from Lessing to Hegel. His whole criticism of life quadrated with Diderot's demand for a return to nature on the stage, and so

GERMANY IN 1803.

I *Prussia*
II *Habsburg Territories*
III *Saxony*
IV *Bavaria*
V *Wurtemberg*
VI *Hanover*
VII *Baden*
VIII *Mecklenburg*
IX *Hesse Cassel*
X *Hesse Darmstadt*
XI *Hesse Nassau*
XII *Salzburg*
XIII *Other Lay Territories*
Free Towns UNDERLINED

urged Lessing on the way he could best go. And Herder and Kant and Goethe were all seized and stimulated by the same influence.

This again is no impeachment of German faculty. Every live people is thus influenced from without, else it falls behind, as Germany had fallen heavily behind for two centuries. The German humanists were not mere echoes or copyists of the French, as the German playmakers had been before Lessing: they criticised and reacted, as did the English and Scotch sociologists who were set a-thinking by Montesquieu and Voltaire. But this normal result does not confer any quality of common sense upon the German vaunt:—

> Rühmend darf's der Deutsche sagen,
> Höher darf das Herz ihm schlagen,
> Selbst erschuf er sich den Werth

—"the German is entitled to boast of it, his heart may beat higher: he made his riches for himself." Hillebrand, who was hardly a Chauvinist, courageously applies this claim [1] to the whole literary revival of the eighteenth century, which at every step was by way of adaptation of or development from foreign culture factors, and which could not possibly have taken place otherwise. How equitably the racialist mind works in these matters is

[1] *Lectures*, p. 67.

revealed by the change of key when it is a question of German influence on other peoples :—

> What else were Burke and Coleridge, B. Constant and A. Thierry, Guizot and A. de Tocqueville—what are Renan and Taine, Carlyle and Darwin doing, each in his own branch, but applying and developing Herder's two fundamental principles, that of organic evolution and that of the entireness of the individual ? [1]

German development from unquestionable foreign stimuli is thus again made out to be a case of pure German creation : a German generalisation of the eighteenth century, of which the origin and the dissemination would be rather difficult to trace, is on the other hand to be credited with the intellectual output of half Europe for a century after. Heads, Germany wins ; tails, everybody else loses. But even Germans must lose as against Herder. Goethe, whom Herder certainly influenced, struck out laws in animal and plant morphology such as Herder never glimpsed ; but inasmuch as they are applications of the universalist conception of Nature they will have to be credited to Herder. The thesis disposes of itself. It is hardly necessary to point out that Burke knew nothing whatever of Herder ; that Darwin approached the problem of species not a priori, as did Herder, but a posteriori ; that the poetico-pantheistic way of looking at Nature, which is the essence

[1] *Lectures*, p. 171.

of Herder's thought, was quite independently cultivated by Wordsworth; and that Herder's philosophy, on this side, came to him from Spinoza, modified through Leibnitz and Wolff.

If English culture-historians had been half as anxious as the latter-day German to push the claims of their own writers, they would have made their countrymen aware that, before German scholarship had been so commonly chained to the racial car, Herder was recognised in Germany as owing inspiration to England. It is Hettner who, in his *Litteraturgeschichte des 18ten Jahrhunderts* (Vol. I, 1856, written before Germany had learned to worship Germany at all moments) traces it to the work of Lowth on Hebrew poetry (1753) and the *Essay on Homer* of Robert Wood (1769). "With Lowth begins a new epoch in the elucidation and appreciation of the Old Testament writings: the cold rationalistic Michaelis at Göttingen, and the fine-nerved Herder and all who stand on their shoulders, have in him their common origin."[1] Robert Wood is absolutely unknown to the *Cambridge History of English Literature* and to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; but his work aroused the enthusiasm of the young Goethe; and for Hettner it underlies, equally with Lowth's essay, the Herderian way of looking at all primeval literature. But that kind of appreciation was

[1] *Litteraturgeschichte*, 3te Aufl., i, p. 453.

already in the air when Wood wrote. Gray's *Bard* and Norse Odes; Collins' Odes *To Simplicity*, on *The Passions*, and on the Superstitions of the Highlands; Percy's *Reliques*; and Macpherson's *Fingal* and *Temora*, all furthered a "return to Nature" independently of Rousseau, whose influence on Herder and on Germans generally was the most immediate and stimulating of all.

It was, however, not merely through Rousseau, whose influence is admitted by all German writers, that Herder was reached by French thought. It would be a shortsighted survey that failed to note how Buffon and Montesquieu, and even Fontenelle, had been leading men to think cosmically. Buffon's large survey of the life of the planet, his *Théorie de la Terre* and his *Époques de la Nature*, laid the lines for Herder's general view; and Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois* gave the initiative for his panorama of the races of men, as it did for Kant's political generalisations. And it was not Herder but Rousseau who turned Kant from a purely scientific *Akademiker* into a humanist. "There was a time," wrote Kant, "when I thought all this [knowledge and progress] could form the glory of mankind, and I despised the rabble who knew nothing. *Rousseau has brought me to the right view.* This blinding superiority vanished: *I learned to honour men*; and I would regard myself as much more useless

than the common labourers did I not believe that this way of thinking could communicate a value to all others in establishing the Rights of Mankind."[1] Kant corrected Rousseau, as so many readers did for themselves, but none the less acclaimed him.

If Herder is to be credited with the evolutionism of the nineteenth century, Herder's own enthusiasm for the spontaneous and the natural, and his effort to unify Nature in thought, is equally to be credited to Rousseau, who "stirred him profoundly and lastingly,"[2] and to the great French schematists, who influenced all Europe. And if his share in the ordinary reaction against Rousseau's exorbitance frees him of debt, equally the independent courses of the later evolutionists free them of debt to him. But it might have been supposed that Goethe's avowal of manifold debt to many literatures had delivered us all from the pedantry of claiming or denying merit on the score of dependence or independence of external stimuli. When all is said, Herder's value, which is very real, consists in suggestiveness rather than in achievement. Even Hillebrand avows that "Herder himself remained always a youth, ever unable to give a definite and artistically measured form to his thought. . . . His works are more

[1] Cited by Hastie, *Kant's Principles of Politics* (trans.), 1891, p. xxi, *note*.

[2] Hettner, IV, i, p. 27 *seq.*; 2te Aufl.

remarkable for the variety than for the profundity of the learning they contain, as he himself was endowed with more imagination than good sense, with more ardour than thoroughness."[1]

Thus the consistent application of Herder's thesis to life and action, which is the vitally important matter, was never really attained by him, though he did much to make men look with sympathetic comprehension at the primitive life of peoples as the germ of the higher. Wolff, for emphasising the moral value of the teaching of Confucius, was driven into exile as an atheist, under penalty of the gallows. Herder, who as a pantheist and a quite heterodox Christian had no business to be a priest, began his clerical career in the spirit of the rationalistic *Aufklärung*, then in the ascendant, using his position as a means of educative influence, and remained an ecclesiastic to the end. Wolff's influence in rationalising German thought, with all his philosophic inadequacy, was perhaps greater than that of Herder, whose philosophic inadequacy was such that he finally could not understand the position of Kant when he attacked it.[2]

In a world, however, in which the most various currents of thought are always influencing each other, it would be no less unphilosophic than

[1] *Lectures*, pp. 113–4.

[2] Cp. Pünjer, *Hist. of the Christian Philos. of Hist.*, Eng. tr., i, p. 587; Kronenberg, *Herder's Philosophie*, 1889, p. 115.

ungenerous to dispute that Herder, whose *Ideas for a History of Mankind* was the first comprehensive presentment, going into anthropological detail, of an evolutionary conception of life, influenced European thought in many ways. A scientific conception he could not establish because, as Kant pointed out, his basis was metaphysical and dogmatic, despite his repudiation of systematic metaphysics and dogmatics; but his eloquence and his measure of anthropological and literary knowledge made for scientific method in other hands. Above all, his catholic attitude to the primitive literature of all peoples made for cosmopolitanism; and it is as a promoter of cosmopolitan thinking that Herder figures in his age. Loving his own country and seeking its good as every sane man does, he cared fraternally for others. As he put it :—

> National pride is absurd, ridiculous, and dangerous; but it is everybody's duty to love his country, and it cannot be loved if it is not honoured, or if it is allowed to be disparaged. It must be defended, and each of us must contribute the utmost in his power to its honour and welfare.

His methodistic notion that all good literature must be primarily emotional, because early literature was so, set him upon prescribing national motives in the now classic German manner; but "his demand was that nations should exercise a mutual influence by means of their

moral and intellectual qualities only; and he saw in a 'free competition of activity among the different nationalities the fundamental condition of the civilisation of mankind.' "[1]

And this note, sounded alike by Lessing and by Herder, is emphatically the note of Kant. Drawing like them his intellectual stimuli from English and from French writers,[2] the philospher of Königsberg was not to be Prussianised in the later fashion of Hegel. To begin with, his "deficiency in the historical interest was remarkable;"[3] and he was thus entirely aloof alike from Teutomania and Gallophobia. His short essay, *Idea for a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan*, which appeared in the same year with the *Ideas* of Herder, is no more than that treatise a definitive scientific work; but it is far more profound in its psychology, and far riper in its application to the practical problem of government. At the present moment, its conclusions have a signally prophetic ring. Transmuting the common falsism of the "purifying and stimulative" effect of war into the semblance of a philosophic truth, he writes that "all the culture and art which adorn humanity, the most perfect social order, are fruits of the *unsociability* which is compelled by its own

[1] Hillebrand, p. 145.

[2] Stuckenberg, *Life of Kant*, p. 147.

[3] Adamson, Shaw Lectures *On the Philosophy of Kant*, p. 25. Cp. Stuckenberg, *Life of Kant*, p. 339.

existence to discipline itself, and so, by a compelled art, to evolve Nature's germ."[1] "Man," he says again, "desires comity; but Nature knows better what is good for his species: she ordains enmity."[2] Here we have the teleological method, from which neither Kant nor Herder could deliver himself.

But the upshot for Kant is that "the great problem for mankind, to the solution of which it is driven by Nature, is the attainment of a universal civil society enforcing justice"; and that this problem "depends on that of a law-abiding international system of State-relations, and cannot be solved without that." Since every State in turn tends to exercise a lawless liberty against others, there must be a peace-enforcing Confederation of States, a *Fœdus Amphictyonum*. Nature drives men to peace through the intensifying costliness of armaments and destructiveness of war, which will whelm civilisation in a "hell of evils," followed by a return to barbarism, unless blind instinct can be controlled by reason.[3] Thus, despite the previous teleology, we are to conclude that

[1] *Kant's Kleine Schriften*, ed. 1833, i, p. 8. Kant seems to have reached this conception by way of a moral analogue to the fact that trees growing close together are compelled to be tall and straight in the effort for light and air, while those which have free space grow, as he put it, "crooked and cripple." Thus he moots the modern problem of "struggle" or "aid."

[2] *Id.* p. 8.

[3] *Id.* pp. 11–12.

Nature's ultimate "purpose" was peace, and only in a peaceful polity can that purpose be realised. For half a century past, Kant's countrymen have been assimilating the first half of his paradox. They are now perhaps on the way to assimilating the second.

Goethe, with his essentially concrete and "typically" un-German sanity (that is, from "typical" German standpoints) of relation to life in the mass, lived the cosmopolitanism which the others proclaimed. In him it was the co-efficient of his versatility, his need for ever-new experience in all things intellectual. As in his literary life he attempted all forms within his scope, so in his intellectual outlook he was for ever open to all points of the compass. Long after he was alleged to have "overthrown" French taste in drama, he would scandalise his compatriots by translating and adapting French plays,[1] as he translated Diderot's *Neveu de Rameau*; and as he scandalised the patriots in particular by writing the *West-Oestlicher Divan* when Germany was perturbed by political discussion. But the young poets and book-lovers went with Goethe,[2] and were thus saved from the *rabies* of race-hatred and race-pride, at the cost of maintaining that political backwardness which can now be seen to be the determinant in

[1] Cp. Düntzer, *Life of Goethe*, Eng. tr., ii, p. 284.
[2] Lewes, *Life of Goethe*, 3rd ed., p. 529.

the later downward course of German humanism and collective life.

Nowhere in human history, perhaps, is there a more monumental example of the paradox of the "eternal halfness" of Man than in the life of one of the most signal incarnations of many-sidedness. Goethe the poet, the novelist, the literary artist, the experimenter in all forms, the Protean lover, the brooding student of Nature, the world-sage, might be termed truly "typical" of old Germany in one aspect: he stood wholly aloof from the Great Experiment—the collective aspiration of men to govern themselves. Eye-witness of the French Revolution, with which at the outset he sympathised as did all the leading men of letters in Germany, declaring on the night of Valmy that there had opened a new era in history, he later found it substantially a *Walpurgis Nacht*, a saturnalia to be coolly contemplated, and there an end. Kant, with all his detachment from past history, was more vitally related to the "general deed of man." Alive as he was to the dangers of all revolution—alive to the extent of vitiating his main philosophic work by a pragmatic compromise—he yet remained faithful to his sympathy with the cosmic instinct for freedom, perhaps because it was for him, like his morality, an irreducible instinct. Welcoming as he did the North-American Revolution, he could yet

write in 1785 that "a revolution might bring about the downfall of personal despotism and avaricious oppression, but never a true reform, . . . for new prejudices would serve as well as the old for leading-strings for the thoughtless mass."[1] But even as in his *Idea for a Universal History* he salves his pessimism over the spectacle of human perversity with his scientific prescription for the peace of nations, so before the tide of human struggle he hails the proclamation of the French Republic with tears in his eyes: "Now I can say, like Simeon, Lord, now lettest Thou Thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen Thy salvation." And although the execution of Louis XIV had revived his old fear of revolution, even at the end, under the Directory, "when everybody turned away in disgust, he remained faithful to his belief that the French Revolution was the dawn of a new day for mankind, the first great attempt to found a State on reason alone."[2]

What Kant could thus compass in virtue of his moral sympathy and power of comprehensive thought was to the concrete-minded Goethe something wholly alien and repellent. In the utterly unconstitutional and unpolitical Germany of the eighteenth century, his manifold education had included not an atom of experience of democratic life. England he had never visited: his own

[1] Hillebrand, p. 209. [2] *Id.* p. 209.

public life had been lived as a ducal Minister of the little principality of Weimar, where any prospect of the intrusion of popular demand or aspiration was as monstrous as the irruption of the French mob at the Tuileries. When Napoleon was overthrown in 1814, his first reflection was: "What a measureless demand for freedom would now be made by the Friends of the People which had hurled itself into the war with such enthusiasm."[1] As Düntzer puts it in his gritty way, "Goethe was no friend of freedom of the Press, nor of constitutional popular rights, which seemed to him to be hindrances to vigorous government."[2] And so, when in 1816 the Grand Duke gave his people a new Constitution, more liberal than that given seven years before, Goethe was the least sympathetic Minister present at the ceremony.

Thus Goethe left to Germany the legacy of his genius, his large culture, his scientific zeal and initiative, his individual sanity, and also that of his fundamentally retrograde attitude to the political education of mankind, the only process by which civilisation can ultimately be broad-based upon the will of the peoples, and freed from the menace of the hurricanes of brute egoism and brute passion which had so fatally ended in the systems of brute autocracy that wrecked in turn all the civilisations of the past. So far as his influence

[1] Düntzer, ii, p. 306. [2] *Id.* p. 331.

made for political retrogradation in Germany, it has fatally countervailed all his true ideals. It is the German system of subordination, entailing a law of specialism, that has frustrated German realisation of his great maxim for the inner life : "Everything that man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsover way, ought to spring from the union of all his faculties. All that is isolated is condemnable."

Nowhere in Europe, perhaps, has that precept been less generally fulfilled than in latter-day Germany. Halfness ; failure to live the full civic life, to think the civic problem ; the reduction of the living individual to the status of an atom in the non-moral State ; the culture of the race, the nation, as against total humanity ; the sequent substitution of vainglory for self-criticism and of arrogance for national neighbourliness—these are the due fruits of the persistence on the mediæval path of "vigorous government," the repression of the instinct of democracy, which is as vital to the average man as any of the instincts of self-expression and self-culture that made Goethe what he was, and which points to the one way whereby the average man can become a politically rational soul. The fatality might have been made a theme for a tragedy by Hebbel, if Hebbel could have applied to his own time the formula in which he presented historic tragedies of the past. The democrats

of Goethe's day wrought according to their lights; Goethe and his political school according to theirs; and sincere antagonism prepared a tragical evolution. As George Eliot has it, the responsibility of tolerance lies with those who have the larger horizon; and tolerance should here be redefined as sympathetic comprehension. But Goethe's political horizon was really small; and to the tumultuous aspiration of the immature populace he opposed merely the spontaneous aversion of the intellectual aristocrat. Thus he failed to help his people where perhaps his help was most needed.

But when all is said, a nation cannot lay its sins upon the shortcomings of its leaders. We collectively shape our collective destiny; and the verdict in the *Welt-Gericht* is collectively incurred. What stands, so far, is the historic fact that the great generation from Lessing to Goethe did build and bequeath an ideal of cosmopolitanism, of national neighbourliness; and no country of the time presents a fairer polity on the side of humansim, considered apart from that of political life. Schiller, who like Goethe aspired with a sane patriotism to see Germany rise ever higher as a land of light and leading, declared that mere love of country "is generally of importance only to unlearned nations—to the youth of the world. . . . It is a pitiful, a miserable ideal to write only for

one nation: such limits are insupportable to a philosophical mind. . . . What is the greatest nation but a fraction?"[1] So Goethe exclaimed: "From the patriotism of the Romans, God deliver us!"[2] Their mental Fatherland was that of men of letters as such; and with all its imperfections there is something in it, on retrospect, infinitely more satisfying and inspiring than any other vista in the landscape of the German past; something incomparably nearer civilisation than either the hate-storm of the Reformation and its sequel or the theatrically falsified life of the feudal age, the worship of which became the cult of the Romanticists who helped so powerfully to deflect and retard German political thought in the period of Napoleonic strife. Where Goethe was negatively and passively, they were positively and actively resisting progress. By contrast with their smoky torches, his star shines the more serenely. Of them there remains for us no lifting memory. Of him and of his predecessors the memory is as that of a refined company of lovers of wisdom in a fair old garden, seeking light and beauty, peace on earth and the good will of men towards the cultivation of the human heritage. And

[1] Letter to Koerner, Oct. 13, 1789: Corr. with Koerner, Eng. tr., ii, p. 59.

[2] Critique of Sonnenfels *Ueber das Liebe des Vaterlandes*, 1771; *Werke*, ed. 1866–68, xxviii, p. 66. Goethe here derides "the eternal blundering complaint: 'We have no Fatherland, no patriotism.'"

to-day we see projected against the vision of them and their ideals the satyr-shape of Bernhardi, whose sole part in their heritage is the culling from their works of phrases which he defiles by his brutal miscomprehension, and turns to blasphemies against their faith.

§ 6. *Political Retardation.*

The broad political outcome of German national life down to the eighteenth century is the elimination of the principle of self-government, and the establishment of the ideal of the State as represented by the ruler. In the un-coördinated Empire political strifes were strifes of State with State, of city with city, of princes with the Emperor, of nobles with cities and burghers, of blindly struggling serfs with their lords lay and clerical. Loyalties were loyalties to the local ruler, to the Church, to the caste, to the city, to the class, to the guild, never to a German commonwealth. This state of things was intensified by the Reformation, of which the leaders voiced their gratitude to the princes who had helped them, in the formula "Be submissive to authority," clinched by the Sacred Books.[1] With the Peace of Westphalia came the maxim, *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, the charter of the princes, at the moment before the execution of the King of England in the Great Rebellion. Where the British people were collectively

[1] Biedermann, i, p. 161.

launched, tempestuously enough, on the voyage to collective self-government, broken Germany, after her hideous tempest, was moored to the principle of authority.

Thus it could be said by Karl Friedrich von Moser [1] (1725–1798) that "every nation has its great motive-principle: in Germany it is Obedience, in England Freedom, in Holland Trade, in France the Honour of the King." The formula is truer than most of such attempts. When Moser wrote, France was ripening with disastrous haste for Freedom; Holland had her memories of it and was to renew them; Germany was to remain politically in arrear of them all, and of the Scandinavian States, ultimately in arrear even of Italy and Greece. The Prussia of Frederick the Great was the world's crowning case of a capable despotism, in which even Ministers were but the king's clerks. Lessing noted in Berlin the complete negation of political freedom alongside of nearly complete freedom in religion—the Jews being the only victims. And the very competence of Frederick vetoed the thought of democratic innovation, had the people been capable of harbouring it. Where the king, supremely efficient, spent his whole strength in the kingdom's service, there was no such motive to democracy as operated in France. And nowhere else in Germany, down

[1] In his esssay *Vom National-geist*, cited by Biedermann, i, p. 160.

to the period of the French Revolution, did the spirit of democracy notably stir.

During the " age of reason " the smaller German courts had exhibited a real improvement, moral and political, some princes ranking as highly enlightened rulers ; and Moser, who indicted the rest for their arbitrary egoism,[1] came too soon to influence appreciably a people accustomed for ages to personal rule. It was noteworthy that even in Berlin a distinguished jurist and Counsellor of State, E. F. Klein, should before the French Revolution argue against even a benevolent despotism on the score that " men cannot be treated as children."[2] But there was no popular movement, no propaganda ; so soon after Frederick it was impossible. The highest flight of " sedition " imaginable was the appeal of a Berlin journalist to the princes in general to set about educating their people to fitness for republicanism, and ultimately to descend from their thrones amid universal benedictions.[3] That was not worth punishing.

With the outbreak of the Revolution, the situation rapidly changed. Kant, Herder, Schiller, Klopstock, Fichte, the young Hegel, even Goethe, and very many more, had hailed the fall of the Bastille, as did enlightened men in the

[1] See his *Der Herr und der Diener*, 1761. Citations in Lévy-Bruhl, *L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz*, 1890, pp. 220–2.

[2] Lévy-Bruhl, p. 223.

[3] *Id.* p. 220.

rest of Europe; and the German Governments were correspondingly alarmed. In Austria and Prussia alike, the press was rigorously controlled. In Silesia there was even a tumult of peasants, demanding relief from feudal exactions. But soon the Governments could breathe freely. The first Prussian movement in support of the French monarchy, so soon and so ignominiously ended, had much less general German sympathy than was given to the Revolution itself. In 1793 Fichte published anonymously a *Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes of Europe;* and in 1794, over his name, a *Rectification of the Public Judgment on the French Revolution*, wherein, on the lines of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, he did not hesitate to argue that a dissatisfied minority have the right to withdraw from the "social contract" and form a new State of their own by revolution.[1] When in 1798 he was driven by persecution from his chair at Jena, his "Jacobinical" reputation was in his opinion the cause.

By that time, however, the fears of the German Governments from the Revolution were at rest. After the execution of Louis XVI, and after the Revolution had passed from violence to massacre, the disillusionment was as general, and the revulsion of feeling as strong, in Germany as in England. The miscarriage of another people

[1] Adamson, *Fichte*, pp. 33-40; Lévy-Bruhl, p. 236.

untrained for democracy was there doubly terrifying. Some elements of democratic feeling remained, and Fichte never became a Prussian absolutist; though the State Socialism of his scheme of a "Closed Industrial State" is absolutist in its own way. But when, after the rise of Napoleon, the cause of France became that of Prussia's national enemy, while Saxony, Bavaria, and Würtemberg became the allies of Napoleon, all the Liberalism of Prussia was turned into the channels of simple patriotism.

In 1804–5 Fichte was delivering at Berlin his lectures on *The Characteristics of the Present Age*, wherein he philosophically demonstrates that the true Fatherland of a European Christian is either Europe in general or that country which is for the time at the head of civilisation.[1] But in 1806 came the crushing defeat of Jena; and in 1808 Fichte was delivering in Berlin his stirring *Addresses to the German Nation.* For the rest, the school of the "Romanticists," giving a lead where Goethe gave none, wrought for general political reaction by cultivating the feudal spirit instead of the democratic.

It was they, and the bureaucratic monarchy, that reaped the political fruit of the War of Liberation. Goethe and Schiller, who had never

[1] *Die Grundzüge des Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, 1806, pp. 468–9—end of fourteenth Lect.

carried romanticism beyond the historico-poetic, could not avert the past-worship and the Teutomania that the zealots promoted. In the years of Prussia's dismemberment and humiliation, Stein from his Liberal standpoint, when called to supreme office after Jena, collaborated with the democrats, who threw themselves enthusiastically into the national struggle; and his *Städteordnung*, restoring a measure of self-government to the Prussian towns, with his bold abolition of serfdom among the peasantry, promised further progress if he should remain in power. Hardenberg, in 1811, carried yet further his land reforms, securing the peasantry against relapse into subjection. All this not only strengthened Prussia for the final effort, but raised the level of national life for the future. But with the restoration of territory in 1814 and 1815 the movement of liberation ceased. Stein could not prevail against Metternich at Vienna; and the restored State was as reactionary against all forms of political progress as any of the other Powers which had fought the French Revolution. Democrats who had striven with heart and soul for the war of Liberation, men like the poet Arndt, author of the song *What is the German's Fatherland?* were exiled; while we are told of the reactionary Romanticists, with their cult of feudalism and obscurantism, that "almost all of them became instruments of

the despotic governments of the Restoration after 1815."[1]

Thus the chief moral gain from the humiliation inflicted on Prussia by Napoleon was in large part lost as soon as Napoleon had been overthrown. The impulse to the War of Liberation in itself, abundantly as it has been boasted of in Germany, was nothing out of the way. The great example came from benighted Spain, where a people regarded as hopelessly decadent and subservient to tyranny made a national effort of stubborn and determined resistance to the conqueror which roused the sympathy and admiration of all Europe. Stein had it constantly before his eyes; and it is even doubtful whether it was not his most effective inspiration. In the retrospect of St. Helena, Napoleon saw that his interference in Spain, and the resistance it provoked, were the beginnings of his downfall. Russia had been no less virile in its resistance, which marked the beginning of the end. What was special to Prussia was the movement of intellectual and political reform that sprang up in the day of prostration; and save in so far as the first political reforms subsisted and the educational movement was maintained, the new ideal sank as quickly as it had risen. The State evolved a Zollverein, to good purpose, but no Parliament.

[1] Hillebrand, p. 257.

It is with the fall of Napoleon that the political history of Germany, in the modern force of the term, may be said to begin. Hitherto all the German States had subsisted by sheer inherited governmental habit, by the mediæval tradition. Henceforth, in a very slowly rising progression, there was to be an official manufacture of opinion on behalf of the existing system, by way of resistance to or regulation of the insuppressible play of opinion in the population. This was the legacy of the French Revolution, even as the collective German State is the legacy of Napoleon. Always it is the French influence, good or bad, that determines the process. Within twenty years of the Revolution, Stein, faced by a shattered Prussia, was all for a constitutional system that should put a true spirit of comity and synergy in the people : faced by the terrible power of Napoleon, he equally craved a Pan-German union of force that should make alien domination impossible. And he could secure neither. The German Governments would not build up democracies ; and neither the Governments nor the peoples desired a Pan-Germanic polity. Why should they ? Steeped in particularism through their whole historic existence, they were " Germans " only linguistically. Even against Napoleon they would not combine. Saxons, Bavarians, Würtembergers, Badians, had all fought in Napoleon's armies, and were proud

of victories won under his flag. None of them had shared in Waterloo, though some had deserted him at Leipzig. Austria and Prussia had combined perforce; but not a century had passed since Prussia had been aggrandised by gross aggression upon Austria. For the Tory Metternich, Stein was but a "Jacobin" with a difference, a zealot who sought to turn the world upside down for yet another "ideal." And in point of fact Stein had desperately planned, finally, to reduce Germany to at most two hegemonies, Prussia and Austria, dividing between them the smaller States, which were to be assimilated by brute force. Metternich, in his absolute Austrian conservatism, had a fuller sense of the realities of the situation than had Stein, set upon idealising primarily by the portent of Napoleon.

Under the influence of Metternich, which at the Vienna Congress easily outweighed Stein's, there was decreed the Federal Act, which set up a German Bund or Confederation, warranted not to operate save restrictively, and not to mean any approach to union between Austria and Prussia. Only in respect of small portions of their now enlarged territories were they to be in the Bund at all, though the Austrian and the Prussian sovereigns were to constitute its "Directory" or Supreme Chamber; a second being constituted of Governors of Circles, and

a third of Princes of Estates. Into this system entered thirty-five Sovereign States and the four ancient Imperial Free Cities of Lübeck, Bremen, Frankfurt, and Hamburg; and among the States were included Britain in respect of Hanover, Denmark for Holstein, and Holland for Limburg and Luxemburg. Its one utility was as a check upon war among its members, and as a formal reduction of the old multitude of separate States from three hundred to thirty: its structural machinery and its mandarin Diet at Frankfort were otherwise but a semblance of a real political institution. Prussia sought through it to establish a federal army; and when this was resolutely resisted by the smaller States she in turn resisted a proposal to establish either a common German citizenship or a system of arbitration.

Thus the newly "organised" German world was left to grow up substantially on its old roots. One of the stipulations of the Federal Act—a formal concession to Stein—was that each State should give its people a Constitution. All that there was of that nature hitherto was in the shape, here and there, of ancient Provincial Estates, *Landtage*, with very limited powers; and these were duly set on foot, the Romanticists approving. But only a minority of the States set up national constitutions; and the proposal of Frederick William III of Prussia to give

his people a national assembly came to nothing. Turbulent students and journalists, and the assassination of the dramatist Kotzebue (1819), enabled Metternich to convince the Prussian king that there was a terrible danger of another Revolution; prominent Liberals were exiled; Stein and Gneisenau, two of the chief rebuilders of the Prussian State and army, were actually put under police supervision; and there was no Parliament. Democratism was stifled for another generation.

Meanwhile, progress on other lines was certainly being made in Germany in general and in Prussia in particular. The Zollverein, set on foot in its first form by Prussia, and gradually developed down to the age of Bismarckism, meant a rapid advance in industrial and commercial activity. Compared with the stupid feudalism of the fisc under Frederick, it stood for science, as propounded by Adam Smith. But no less momentous was the progress in education. A new sense of the vital military value of popular education was one of the results of Jena; and the new University of Berlin opened a new era of systematic science and scholarship. In all forms of education save the vital political kind, Germany soon substantially surpassed other countries. Schooling was a governmental instrument, always turned to governmental account; certainly a signal improvement on the state of

things under Frederick, whose schoolmasters were about as well paid as his scavengers; and were latterly as a rule invalided soldiers, thus pensioned.[1] By that policy, which expressed his final cynicism as to human capacity in general, Frederick had contrived to deepen the sunderance admitted by all historians[2] to have been wrought between the German educated and uneducated classes since the Reformation. And the new education policy did not alter the relative positions, because "scientific" culture was proportionally advanced in point of esoteric technicality, if not of sanity. Had Goethe lived a half-century later, he would have been regarded by scholars in Germany as a charlatan for presuming to think and write on biology and optics as well as to be a poet, critic, and novelist.

All German culture became progressively specialised, with the result that, in a world of universities and a still modest standard of comfort, there was a multiplicity of men deeply versed in one branch of study, and lacking in the true culture which comes of looking on

[1] Biedermann, iii, p. 1149; Mahon, *Histor. Essays*, p. 226. Earlier in his reign, Frederick had shown some concern for the common schools. Biedermann, iii, p. 1144 *seq.* Still the schoolmasters were generally handicraftsmen, as they had been in his father's reign. *Id.* ii, p. 507.

[2] Cp. Buckle, 1-vol. ed., pp. 136–8; Richard, *Hist. of Ger. Civ.*, pp. 227, 277, 363, 385; Schlosser, *Hist. of Eighteenth Cent.*, Eng. tr., i, p. 177; Biedermann, i, p. 3; Hillebrand, p. 45.

life and knowledge from various sides. The outcome was a maximum of political unwisdom. Nothing is more noteworthy in modern German history than the theoretic character of the current political science. Fichte, destitute of practical political experience, proclaimed the conviction that Germany, equally destitute, and accustomed for ages to worship authority, was "the only nation that has shown itself fit to realise the ideal of a republican constitution."[1] Other professors were equally sure of their a priori politics in the generation after him. Living politically on the plane of the High Tory Church of England, while intellectually carrying on a fruitful strife analogous to that of British politics, German doctrinaires were none the less certain that they had the highest light for all the purposes of life. "It is written," groans Hillebrand, "that our political ideas should be framed by professors, as professors had framed our literary and artistic, our religious and philosophical ideas."[2]

This being so, the universities could be made the instrument of the Government, like the common schools. Hegel, outliving Fichte, became the Prussian "State Philosopher." It was the natural thing for a German philosopher to do. Under Napoleon, Hegel, as a Würtemberger, was a zealous Napoleonist, writing up the French Emperor in the regular journalistic

[1] Adamson, *Fichte*, p. 86, *note*. [2] *Lectures*, p. 276.

way. Called to Berlin, he in all good faith philosophised the Prussian ideal. On the one hand he demonstrated that men were moral entities only in respect of their membership of the State; on the other, that this must not mean their sharing in the conduct of the State. Theoretically, they must be faithful to the State; practically, they were not fit to run it. Hegel, who was quite practical in his own way, stipulated that the reports of discussions in the Provincial Estates should be regularly published, by way of "educating" the people politically; and perhaps he surmised that by long contemplation of the theoretic motions of swimming they might learn to swim; but he did not say so.

Professorial leads there were, of course, in the other direction; and their value was seen when, in 1848, under fear of Revolution, the German Governments consented to the establishment of a German Parliament at Frankfort. Again, as had happened in 1830, the decisive impulse had come from the Revolution in France: and this time many Germans felt themselves fit to follow the lead. In 1830, when there were riots in Dresden and Leipzig, and the South German States had begged Prussia to put herself at their head in a military league, the old king was scared by Metternich, as before, into co-operating rather with Austria; and the Diet,

in their hands, was set to suppressing the liberty of the press. In 1837, when the crown of Hanover passed at the death of our king William IV to Ernest, Duke of Cumberland, Queen Victoria being disqualified by her sex under Hanoverian law, that prince saw fit to suppress the parliamentary constitution (the third since 1814) under which Hanover had lived since 1833, when it, under British influence, had been put on a substantially "British" basis. Resenting the undemocratic substitute given by Ernest, the Liberals of Hanover appealed to the German Diet to protect their rights, but of course in vain. Thus on all sides discontent grew; and Frederick William IV, who came to the Prussian throne in 1840, did what in him lay to inflame it.

Appealed to by the Estates of East Prussia to give them the Constitution promised by his father in 1815, he formally "reorganised" them, but gave them no new powers, though he granted the Hegelian freedom of debate and of public report, restored exiles, and released prisoners. Obliged to convoke the Provincial Estates collectively in 1847 to provide funds for railway construction, he informed them that no power on earth could induce him to set up a constitutional principle in place of that of Divine Right. The United Diet would not, on this basis, do what was desired of it, and was

duly dissolved. When the explosion came in 1848, the Berlin rioters were naturally among the least vigorous; while Saxony and Würtemberg got reforms, and Hanover, *pro tempore*, its 1833 constitution back again. In spite of Austria and Prussia, unauthorised elections were held, by universal suffrage, for a General German Parliament, which in due course met at Frankfort. And then began the democratic collapse.

Suddenly elected representatives of a nation devoid of political training, still divided into some two score separate States, undertook to control the relations of all without an authorised administration, without an Executive, and without the slightest power to give effect to their decisions. An offer of a "German crown" to Prussia could not be made unanimous, and was consequently declined. Professors predominated in the assembly; and professors like Dahlmann and Gervinus, patriotically conservative and poetically liberal, propounded their ideas as they had been doing in their writings. Gervinus's *History of German Poetry*, in five large volumes, has been justly described as a magnified political pamphlet. The German people had not read it. The Frankfort Parliament, in short, "had the Governments against it, and had not the people with it." It inevitably came to nothing, leaving Liberals disillusioned, and the school

of Bismarck triumphant. All the manifold German political readjustments which followed represented but partial compromises; Vienna, from whose revolt Metternich had fled in terror to England, was ultimately "regularised" by the old authority; and after 1861, under King William, Prussia settled down under the hand of Bismarck. He had cordially despised the political professors; and to the Prussian eye he was abundantly justified. Political progress was not to be made by parliamentary agreement, by propaganda and persuasion, but by force, in the good old Prussian way.

Even as the Prussian Diet has remained an illusory semblance of a constitutional government, in which class interests are supreme, so has the German Reichstag, the fruit of 1870, remained an "unconstitutional" Parliament, in which the Kaiser's ministers are responsible to him, not to the representatives of the people. There was no political energy in Germany adequate to avert such a settlement: the system had never been democratised. Liberalism, after 1848, was largely a propaganda of Liberal Jews, following on Heine, who had "loved the people —at a distance"; "popular" democracy became Socialism, also the creation of Jews, and avowedly carried on by the school of Marx on the nakedly theoretic principle of building up a majority year by year, making no adaptations, no com-

promises, no transition, till a decisive majority shall make possible the substitution of a new heaven and a new earth for the old. Even by Socialism the Prussian tradition, the principle of force, has thus been duly preserved, in the very ideal which proposes to transform German society. Never trained by the give-and-take of progressive and responsible self-government, the aggregate of the German people has reached State power without political education. The German sword is finally in the hands of a politically uneducated giant, with the results we see.

As to the fact, we have the authoritative avowal of Prince von Bülow: "The history of our home policy, with the exception of a few bright spots, is a history of political mistakes. Despite the abundance of merits and great qualities with which the German nation is endowed, political talent has been denied it."[1] The last phrase, meant as a figure of speech, is literally true; and is only thus significant. The Germans lack political intelligence because they have never been allowed to use it. In any other sense, we get the old empty thesis of race-qualities. The British people have developed some political intelligence because for at least three centuries they have been in the way of using it. After all that apprenticeship they

[1] *Imperial Germany*, Eng. tr. 1914, p. 103.

are not exactly passed masters in the art of self-government; but for Germany the apprenticeship has hardly yet begun. "Not," writes the Prince,—

> "not that we ever lacked penetration and understanding for the sequence of political things, or for the essence and association of the religious, moral, social, legal and industrial forces which condition politics. We have *always* possessed this political knowledge to the same extent as our contemporaries, and even to a greater. We did not either fail to realise our own peculiar political shortcomings. But what we did lack, and what we still often lack, is the art of proceeding from insight to practical application."

Exactly. You cannot really swim till you do it, however conscious you may be of your supreme gifts; as you cannot paint a picture on a simple book-study of æsthetics. The Prince quotes the late Ministerial Director Althoff as arguing that the Germans, being the most learned nation and "the best soldiers, philosophers, poets (!) and musicians, must fail in some thing. How can you wonder that we are political asses? There must be a weak point somewhere." There certainly is; and the Prussian rule has made it. We have another light on the subject from the Prince's reminiscences:—

> Herr von Miquel once said to me in his caustic way, as the result of forty years of parliamentary experience: "German Parliaments, in a comparatively short space of time, mostly sink to the level

> of a district council, interested in nothing but local questions and personal squabbles. In our Parliament a debate rarely maintains a high level for more than one day. . . ."

How should it, when the debate cannot affect imperial policy, and the Chancellor remains the master ? This is Hegel's conception of political education : we now know what it is worth. The Germans, complains the Prince, are really interested only in their " Associations." Naturally, because they control their Associations !

Parties, we are told again, are hopelessly separatist in Germany. It is for the same reason ; and here we come to the root of the matter. Germany having been again and again shattered by internal strife, all parties must be kept politically impotent. " If we want to advance along the paths that the founding of our Empire has opened anew to us, we must insist on the suppression of such forces as might again endanger the unity of our national life."[1] Later we have the whole truth, in the section headed : " A Vigorous National Policy the True Remedy against the Social Democratic Movement."[2] We need not analyse the policy here : we can reach for ourselves the conclusion. Hegel gave the hint eighty years ago : " Nations which are involved in civil quarrels win repose at home

[1] *Imperial Germany*, Eng. tr. 1914, p. 113.
[2] *Id.* p. 198.

by means of war abroad."[1] We are in the straight line of the Prussian tradition. The World War is at once a means to German aggrandisement and a counterstroke to the menace of Socialism. Thus does the governing class manipulate the rest.

[1] *Philosophy of Right*, § 324, add.

§ 7. *The Prussian Tradition.*

In our own day British politicians striving for international peace have had the sobering experience of finding their overtures to Germans met from time to time with an explosive protest that there is no trusting Britain, whose national egoism and unscrupulousness have been chronically manifested in the past. The commonsense answer is that, whatever may have been the real merits of any one impeached policy or episode, no thoughtful man in these days will answer for the ethics or the acts of his ancestors all round, and that the very object of international politics is to put the world on a sounder and safer basis. But the most surprising aspect of the discussion is the fact that the reproach against Britain should come from Prussians.

Every European State, without exception, is liable to the charge of evil policy in the past. What is plain on the face of history is only too clear in ethical philosophy, the moment we realise that international morals, the problem of the play of the self-interest of the group, is

inevitably in arrear of domestic or civic morals, the problem of the play of self-interest as between individuals and classes. The law of duty, which is just the law of reciprocity, is first brought home to men in the individual, next in the class relation, and lastly in the tribal or national relation ; and as the pace of the charge in battle —or at least in drill—is that of the slowest horse, the rule of primitive egoism and instinct is longest maintained in the last-named. Communities, precisely because they are not as such under a system of enforceable law, whether of penalty or of ostracism, are the last human entities to abolish or control the primitive play of "fist law," which as we have seen was still normal *within* Germany some three hundred years ago.

That very fact is the broad explanation of the further fact that Germany is in our own day the nation furthest from a rational law of international reciprocity. Charges of national unscrupulousness brought by Prussians against any other State have a quality of farce. Obviously the more completely a State is controlled by the will of a single ruler, the more likely is it to be lawless in its policy, though individual rulers may chance to be scrupulous above the average. But when the individual ruler has a traditional code by which the assertion and promotion of the collective interest of his State is made his first and last rule of action, *without*

any controlling sense of reciprocity towards other States, his very sense of duty will tend to be, as it were, a code of international sin. And that is exactly the case with the Prussian tradition. In our day we have reached something like a rational understanding with the people of France, who once upon a time labelled Britain *la perfide Albion*, and were reciprocally labelled in the same temper. Simple common sense, priming common honesty, has dictated the avowal by rational men that the honours are substantially even, that folly and sin played their part in both polities, and that the sane course is for the self-governing communities of to-day to live a better life, whatever their forefathers may have done. It is from Prussianised Germany that we still get the proclamation of the historic paramountcy of "Deutsche Treue," along with the practical demonstration of the German will that that will should be a law unto itself.

No State in the modern world has more obviously grown up by a calculating policy of aggrandisement than Prussia, simply because no State has been more continuously controlled by aggressive wills incarnating or dominating the will of the nation. Other States in the autocratic stage have of course grown up in a similar fashion ; and our first and third Edwards and Henry the Fifth were on all fours with Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Louis XIV, who

GERMAN EMPIRE
Showing the growth of Prussia,
1812—1871.
NORTH SEA
Heligoland
DENMARK
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
Bornholm
Memel
Königsberg
Danzig
Lübeck
Hamburg
MECKLENBERG
Bremen
OLDENB.
BERLIN
Amsterdam
HOLLAND
Vistula
Bug
POLAND
Warta
BRUNSWICK
LIPPE
WALDECK
THURINGIA
SAXONY
BELGIUM
HESSEN
Frankfurt
LUX.
PALATINATE to Bavaria
LORRAINE
PARIS
BAVARIA
WURTEMBERG
ALSACE
FRANCE
Danube
VIENNA
SWITZERLAND
REFERENCE.
Prussia, 1812.
Territory acquired by Prussia in 1813
Territory acquired by Prussia to 1866.
Acquired 1871 by German Empire.

were all sublimated in Napoleon. The main difference has been that the progressively constitutional State has come gradually nearer political civilisation as regards its relations with others, while the barbaric principle of autocracy has inevitably meant a more barbaric national egoism, which is political "amoralism." Eighty years ago Hegel could say, even of the eighteenth century, that in England "no unpopular war can be waged." He exaggerated somewhat; but no semblance of such a statement could then be made by any man concerning Prussia. Her wars, apart from the War of Liberation, had all been unquestionably King's wars, in which the nation functioned, to begin with, as the mere instrument of the King's will, aiming at aggrandising his State. For practical purposes we need not go farther back than Frederick the Great. His first Silesian war was the most naked aggression of the eighteenth century; the second was for the maintenance of the results of the first; and the Seven Years' War was the process of the retaliation of Austria, adopting his own tactics of alliances with much less than his unscrupulousness. The very "sense of duty" for which Frederick has been laurelled by his compatriots was one of simple duty to the barbaric (or "classic") ideal of the political aggregate, in utter negation of any duty of inter-State reciprocity.

We may, if we like, call Prussian convention in these matters hypocrisy, with much better right than Prussians have ever had as against Britain. In the ordinary application of the term, Frederick was the supreme hypocrite of his day, and his nation has since become the supreme hypocrite among the nations. The psychological fact is of course that he had no moral sense as distinct from the passion for national aggrandisement, which shaped his *ad hoc* ethic of "efficiency." A man exceptional among kings for hardness of heart was not likely to develop an extra-national sympathy for the peoples of other kings. But, whether or not his nature had been warped by the cruelties of his brutal father, Frederick played the rôle of hypocrite more completely than ever did any other prince in history. He began by writing his *Anti-Machiavel*, a lofty repudiation of the ethic of *The Prince*; and his whole regal life was the most brutal possible extension to actual affairs of the alternately naïf and subtle exposition of Renaissance statecraft by the essentially idealistic and genial Machiavelli. If this be not hypocrisy—and that is really not the best word—the term is not plausibly to be applied to any other statesmen. Metternich and Talleyrand were in comparison decently consistent.

In the course of his first Silesian war, Frederick three times over betrayed his allies. When,

in 1762, Bute saw fit to withdraw England from the costly Prussian alliance, after having expensively subsidised Prussia for years and carefully secured essential Prussian interests,[1] Frederick broke into violent objurgation, which his country's chroniclers have duly echoed, Treitschke's bellow being the loudest. And not only had Frederick deliberately tricked his own allies again and again, he laid it down as a prime maxim of statecraft that when a breach of treaty conduced to the interest of any State, it was the bounden duty of the king concerned to break it. That is the kernel of the Prussian tradition, outwardly draped in the formula of "Deutsche Treue"; even as the Partition of Poland remains of the essence of Prussian international ethic, whether the German press be vilifying Britain for the Boer War or vilifying Belgians because they resent an invasion made without semblance of pretext.

The persistence of the barbaric ideal and ethic is the co-efficient of the arrest of political growth. If the primeval egoism of the Frederician policy was to be purified, it could only have been through the growth of a higher ethic at the hands of German thinkers and its realisation in statecraft through the admission of the people to responsibility. But ethics in Germany has never been

[1] Cp. *The Evolution of Prussia*, by J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, 1915, pp. 139–40.

brought in effective touch with public policy. English pupils in the past have liberally credited German thinkers with a " fundamental brain work " which they have never truly done. Kant's ethical inquiry, culminating in the Categorical Imperative, is merely, as Schopenhauer insisted, an artificial substitute for the theological ethic from which it is borrowed; an affirmation of " oughtness " which leaves wholly undetermined not only the What-ought-to-be but the Why; and Fichte, as Schopenhauer put it, merely " went one better " on the same path, " outbidding " Kant by affirming the Oughtness of the Ought in terms of a hyperposed All-Ought. If Schopenhauer could only have sat down, without shouting or stamping, gibing or jeering, to work out the logic of ethics like a game of chess, he would have achieved much more than he ever did for his cherished aim, his fame, and would perhaps have saved the Danish Royal Society of Sciences the memorably shameful shuffle by which it saw fit to refuse its prize to his powerful essay when there was no other competitor.

Kant was too perceptive to miss seeing how the life of nations was being perpetually shattered and jeopardised by war, and lamed by the immense burden of militarism, which in the day of Frederick's father meant a cost of nearly six million thalers out of a revenue of little

more than seven millions, and in Frederick's old age a cost of thirteen millions out of a revenue of twenty-two. Kant could not but see, further, the vanity of his ideal of individual "freedom" in the absence of any civic system of participation in law-making; and in his essay on *The Principles of Political Right* (1793) he tacitly assumes as obvious a right to "vote" which in Prussia did not exist. But at a time when he was himself being officially censured with severity for his rationalising treatment of religion, and when he had already been alarmed by the violences of the French Revolution, he could go no farther; and the most outstanding doctrines in the essay are (1) the veto on every form of agitation tending to generate rebellion and (2) the absolute supremacy of the Head of the State—with the stipulation for freedom of the press, which by implication would have to be rigidly curtailed. The essay on *Perpetual Peace* (1795) by implication vetoes the Partition of Poland; but that in turn is admittedly a rather "ironic eirenicon." Thus for the generality of cultured German readers, the main ethical impression conveyed by Kant was that made by his philosophico-ethical doctrine of the Categorical Imperative.

The Categorical Imperative of Kant is in fact the philosophic equivalent of the *Gehorsam* of Moser, the formula of the Prussian State.

Kant, with all his moral earnestness, played his part in evolving "the art of enveloping the German people in philosophic fog,"[1] practised with such power by his successors. If Schopenhauer, instead of remaining a highly Teutonic practitioner of critical *Faustrecht*, could have attained to viewing Kant and Fichte as themselves ethical phenomena, rather than as alien tribesmen to be chastened or scalped, he would have greatly elucidated his own exposition, by deepening his realisation of his own thesis. But this, like all other philosophic and logical issues, has been academically kept vague by treatment *in abstracto*. Kant's maxim, "Act so that the maxim of thy will can be a principle of universal law," is, as Schopenhauer argued,[2] only a roundabout way of saying "Do as you would be done by." And, that being always the practical outcome of ethical research, the important thing comes to be the process of acting on the principle.[3]

That men's morality is primarily dependent on their individual bias is seen alike by Hume and Kant, by Shaftesbury, Smith, and Schopenhauer. At this conclusion, or at some other which takes its place, ethical philosophy commonly stops, disclaiming that criticism of action

[1] Schopenhauer, *The Basis of Morality*, Eng. tr. 1903, p. 129.
[2] *Id.* p. 95.
[3] Compare Hegel's criticism, *Introd. to Philos. of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's trans., p. 100 *seq.*

which aims at its rectification. Schopenhauer is quite explicit in his refusal, insisting that "character is unchangeable."[1] But moral bias is really only a case of bias of judgment in general, and is only in less degree alterable by new knowledge and influence than are judgments of any kind. While only a deeply disturbing experience can "soften a hard heart"; while only fear of censure can control a dominant selfishness; while hardly anything is likely to alter a strongly criminal bias, half of men's moral judgments are simply cultural products, echoes of tribal and other customary lore. The "Categorical Imperative" attaches in consciousness as readily to social conventions as to any other form of moral judgment; and the plain business of moralists, as distinguished from psychologists, is to lead men to discriminate by rational tests among their inherited collection of "imperatives." In Prussia the philosophers have never come, save incidentally, to this task of application—Schopenhauer no more than the rest. And what the philosophers have not done, the tradition-ruled statesmen and the undeveloped people have of course failed to do.

Long before Kant, the English Bishop Cumberland, seeking a non-theological basis for ethics (1672), reached the conception of "benevolence

[1] Compare Hegel's criticism, *Introd. to Philos. of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's trans., pp. 137, 237.

towards all rationals."[1] The Prussian political tradition negated that conception. Long before Schopenhauer, Adam Smith had seen and shown that sympathy is the essence of ethical progress. Kant feared to come to the concrete standpoint. His preoccupation was to make and keep people moral, law-abiding; and his curious reversals of tactics are to be explained by that concern. When bent on getting people into a thoroughly moral attitude, he stressed his Imperative, the "Ought," to the exclusion of all consideration of actual conduct, the How of right action. He feared to have men speculate for themselves on right and wrong. When bent on influencing conduct, he would freely counsel clerics to take orders and use the Bible and the pulpit as means of moral influence, though they did not believe in the Bible and Christianity as their flocks did. Yet again, he would deny men the right to lie to a would-be murderer to save a life, because that would be an infraction of the Imperative. And it is to keep the people in the attitude of obedience that the preachers are to be licensed to prevaricate. We are looking at the ethic of a world where life is only half-ethical, and the philosopher is lamed even as are the people.

In the case of Hegel the same fatality operates. As Kant variously manipulated his doctrine

[1] Which Jonathan Edwards put later as "benevolence towards all being."

through fear of upsetting the idea of absolute obedience, so Hegel, called upon to frame a philosophy for the re-constructed Prussian State, produces an ethic in which the Frederician ideal is simply sublimated, the abstract State being put for the King. Always the tradition excludes the aims alike of individual liberty and of international comity and reciprocity. Kant planned for the elimination of war, after positing strife as a law of Nature: the first law was to be transmuted into another ("Nature" being just "what we want") because the law of strife promised to wreck civilisation. Hegel posited the law of strife with a positive proviso against the elimination of war, which he regarded as medicinal.[1] Like Kant, he adjusted his philosophy to the social State. He had seen Prussia crushed by the Napoleon of his admiration; and the Prussia that had been thus humiliated was as it were forced back in consciousness to the original barbaric ideal. The hand had gone back on the dial. Prussia had once grown great by aggression and by the dread discipline of war: she must look to recover greatness by the old methods. She had grown strong by the personal action of great rulers; and had fallen when one was lacking. By a great captain she had been overthrown. Then she must eschew the ideals of democracy, cherish her

[1] See the author's *War and Civilisation*, 1916, p. 90 *seq.*

kings, and always enlarge her army. Thus and thus was the ground prepared for Bismarck.

He in turn immensely strengthened the tradition. The idea of promoting the general good of mankind never crossed his brain. Rather he would deliberately lure the rival Powers into compromising courses. The Kaiserhood so long aspired to, so often discussed, so often dangled before the Prussian king by enthusiasts unable to confer it, must be won by a building-up of Prussian power to the point of triumph. Hegel had said that Germany could be unified only by conquest; and he had desired a German conqueror before Napoleon took up the function. Bismarck meant Prussia to fulfil it, albeit by utilising the racial hate of the alien which alone could draw Germans together. And so Denmark had to be felled, and Austria humiliated—but not plundered, for prudential reasons; and France provoked to a war in which she would be defeated and plundered. With that consummation the barbaric ideal, as it turns out, was solidly re-established. Everything concurred to demoralise the nation *qua* nation. The race-gospel, romantic and amateurish in its earlier forms, began to take form as a cult of the "Christo-Teutonic State"[1] even in the age of scholarly and scientific evolution which intervened between 1815 and 1848; it takes on scholarly guise with Mommsen

[1] Hillebrand, p. 258.

in the next decade; and since 1870 it has rapidly become a national obsession, the scholars' hands being in the main subdued to what they work in.

Militarism colours all consciousness, having become an active inspiration of all kinds of propaganda, historical, theological, ethnological, ethical, political, economic. The thesis that men exist for the State and not the State for men, the maxim of Obedience, the fixed habit of thinking in terms of nationality and not of humanity—all this seems to have been rather accentuated than modified by the Socialist agitation, which had seemed to put Internationalism as its first postulate. Hostility to Socialism as a whole would involve hostility to its first standing-ground. And latterly we find the Socialists themselves in large part permeated by the racial and national ideal, and, when not adopting it, visibly constrained to bow before it.

But Socialism itself is part of the final motive to a new Imperialism. Long ago some of us, noting the temper of the present (then young) Kaiser towards the Social Democrats, mooted the surmise that one day, in his fear of their continuous increase, he would make war by way of giving the nation something else to do. It is traditionally the course commended by the English Henry IV to his son, who followed it.

Such maxims have always been dear to the militarist mind; and in Germany they chime with all the conditions—the continual increase in the Socialist party; the cultus of *Weltmacht*, offering to the commercial class new possibilities of trade, and to the general sentiment, drunk with national self-glorification, more of the alcohol of victory; finally the brute demand of the vast military machine to be employed. It would be rash to say that without Socialism Prussianism might have refrained from precipitating war; but Socialism has been part of the inspiration of Armageddon.

If there could be any doubt of the truth of our conclusion, Prince von Bülow's exposition would remove it. Thus does he intone the national litany, First Lesson :—

> Of all the nations of the world, the Germans are the people that have *most rarely set out to attack and conquer*. If we except the expeditions against Rome . . . we shall seek in vain in our past for wars of conquest that may be compared with those of France in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, those of Spain under the Habsburgs, of Sweden in her best days, or those of the Russian and British Empires. . . . For centuries we Germans have aimed at nothing but the defence and security of our country. Just as the Great King did not lead his unvanquished battalions on adventurous expeditions *after* (!) the conquest of Silesia . . . so the Emperor William and Bismarck, *after* (!) the unparalleled successes of two great wars, did not dream of attempting further military exploits. . . . We have always set a limit

> to our successes ourselves. . . . The Germans have practically no tinge of that restlessness which in other nations urges men to find in success the spur to further bold effort. Our political character is less that of the rash, speculative merchant than that of the plodding peasant who, after sowing carefully, patiently awaits the harvest."[1]

Only the German cry, *Kolossal!* can do justice to that deliverance. Prince von Bülow transcends mere hypocrisy: his is that "bold piratical dishonesty which it were libellous to term deceit." The vindication of Frederick, who when he had stolen all he dared, proposed to steal no more—until he could partition Poland—is worthy of Frederick's self. The vindication of William and Bismarck, who deliberately planned two bloody wars to "build up" the new Germany, is Bismarck's own. There is not the least need to debate them: we get our resting-point from the Prince himself. Discussing the common German desire for a German attack on Britain during the Boer War, he candidly explains that Germany could not rely upon France's neutrality, even after Fashoda; while "even in the event of defeat in the South African War, it was possible for England to stifle our sea power in the embryo. Our neutral attitude during the Boer War *had its origins in weighty considerations of the national interests of the German Empire. Our*

[1] *Imperial Germany*, pp. 37–38.

navy was not strong enough for us forcibly to achieve a sufficient sea power in the teeth of English interests."[1]

The writer of this, once more, is not to be termed a hypocrite, whatever we may think of the Germans who after acclaiming the Boers gleefully massacred the Belgians. And what shall be said of the candour which dictated the following avowal ?—

> In view of the anxious and discouraged state of feeling that obtained in Germany during the ten years following Prince Bismarck's retirement, it was only possible to rouse public opinion *by harping on the string of nationalism*, and waking the people to consciousness.[2]

There are no " i's " left to dot, no " t's " to cross. The Prussian policy, officially termed one of traditional self-defence, consists in (1) deliberately " harping on the string of nationalism " to keep down political discontent; (2) building up a navy (on the plea of need to *defend* German commerce); (3) delaying an attack on England until the navy is " strong enough " —otherwise England would have been attacked when she had her hands full. (In 1914, the navy was still not strong enough; and it was not *yet* proposed to attack England.) For the rest, Socialism at home must be fought, and the Hegelian rule gives the cue—war abroad.

[1] *Imperial Germany*, p. 31. [2] *Id.* p. 18.

There is one item more. Prince von Bülow cites the "famous" article which appeared in the *Saturday Review* in 1897, calling for a deliberate war of naval aggression by Britain upon Germany, on the score that we could sink her navy and the next day get the whole of her trade. Some of us who denounced that infamous article at the time pointed out that its economics belonged to Bedlam. No party paid it the compliment of discussion: it was practically a solitary monstrosity. Now, it is latterly notorious that the littérateur who was editor of the *Saturday Review* in 1897 has been figuring in the United States since the present war began as a violent pro-German; and a number of Englishmen have strongly surmised that he acted as a German instrument in 1897. The article, in other words, was a piece of German incendiary strategy, to make easy the passing of the German Navy Bill of that year.

One day the facts may be ascertained: Prince von Bülow could perhaps help us to them. In the meantime, the important thing is that we have no reason to doubt that a German Government is capable of the course surmised. For the Prussian tradition, the Prussian code, is as we have seen the negation of every principle of moral reciprocity as between State and State, even as it has come to mean the abolition, so far as possible, of every humane restraint in

war. The ruler has duties only to his State, none to mankind. And to that ethic the German nation is committed. It has applauded the repudiation of a treaty, the murderous invasion of neutral Belgium, the slaughter and drowning of women and children as a means of terrorism, the massacre of four-fifths of the people of Armenia. And it crowns horror with farce in the assertion that in forcing war on the world it is acting in pure self-defence. For the "good German," international morality has ceased to exist. For him, as for Hegel, States are in "the state of nature."

§ 8. *The Final Culture.*

It is a truly remarkable paradox that a "civilised" nation should in our day tell most potently in the world's affairs precisely through that side of its life on which it is most backward, most primitive, most barbaric. Germany has at various periods been acclaimed by open-minded outsiders as helping or leading the world in virtue of this or that special development—cosmopolitanism, height of speculation, depth of philosophy, breadth of scholarship, thoroughness in scientific detail—all products of the higher civilisation. And now we see her, like the dragon of the prime, putting all civilisation in frightful jeopardy by the brutish *pruritus* of sheer aggregated and organised egoism.

If we permit ourselves to speak of a nation as having what the Germans call a *Weltanschauung*, a view or point of view to life or the world as a whole, we can ascribe to them none but this of Collective Self-Worship, or Collective Egoism raised to the level of a cult. In the nation which passes for being the most devoted to

philosophy, we find the ruling psychosis to be that which is most utterly alien to the philosophic spirit, if by that we understand the sublimation of all science.

The " philosophic people " is found to be that which is most completely swayed by the primary instinct of the social organism, the collective pride and lust-to-power of the tribe. And it is so primarily because it is the last of the States of Europe to reach national form and national organisation; secondarily because its national life has been from the first exploited by a ruling power which in itself had undergone no evolution corresponding to that which normally modifies the ruling power step for step with the social aggregate.

Putting it one way, we might say that Germany is a national Frankenstein, a man-made monster; putting it in another way, we might say that she is the remote analogue of ancient Egypt, where the *natural* circumstances developed the principle of State organisation in advance of individual character, culture, mind; and never allowed these so to count as to make a sound nation, living by its total intelligence.

It would be quite idle to say that such an evolution is the outcome of " national character " which founds in " race character ": we have seen the nullity of that conception at every stage in our survey. It is the totality of circum-

stances that determines that prevailing frame of mind which men blunderingly call national character. We have seen it ostensibly swing from pole to pole in a century. The specialty of Germany is that in her totality of circumstances the factor of fixed governmental guidance has played an unusually large part. Her " state of mind " has been to a peculiar extent created by one set of factors.

Looking at it concretely, we are faced by the ever-present theory and practice of collective self-praise. Nobody, broadly speaking, seems to escape that atmosphere. All virtue in Germany, all excellence, all success, is normally thought of not as human but as German. The outcome is a consciousness of German pre-eminence, which in regard to international politics exhibits itself as a consciousness of an absolute need for German supremacy in the world. Correlatively, the other and inferior peoples are fitted only to play a subordinate part. This is of course the primary barbaric sentiment of race, but it has been sublimated by a vast propagandist machinery. When the English diplomatist was unaffectedly called a barbarian by the Chinese mandarin, just as a Greek called all non-Greeks barbarians, he retorted by calling the mandarin a " presumptuous savage." The honours were even. But the manufactured German consciousness of superiority demonstrates

itself in a perpetual and quasi-scientific self-assurance.

A hundred and more years ago, as we have seen, the best minds in Germany worked in exactly the opposite way when they worked reflectively. Lessing and Kant, Schiller and Goethe, Fichte and Humboldt, were at their best above pride of race and nation: for them the existing Teutomania would have been ludicrous, as the initial eighteenth-century form was. And that very fact seems to have counted in bringing about the complete reaction. Germans had seen Germany in general humiliated by an invader because they could not act unitedly; and they could not act unitedly because they had no effective Pan-Germanic pride. So the required pride had to be cultivated; and the blame of the dividedness was partly placed on the men who had transcended the political solution to find a higher in their individual *Weltanschauung*. Men confusedly felt that there had been too little patriotism in the past; *ergo*, there must be an overwhelming quantity of patriotism for the future. Like other forms of auto-intoxication it has been found easy to begin, and apparently impossible to stop.

Since 1870, the litany of the cult has been deafening; but it was there before 1870. No man of science in modern Germany has seemed in general more truly scientific in temper than

Helmholtz; and we find Helmholtz in 1869 telling a German scientific audience that

> Though in the investigation of inorganic nature the several European nations showed a nearly uniform advancement, the recent progress of physiology and medicine is pre-eminently due to Germany. I have already spoken of the obstacles which formerly delayed progress in this direction. Questions respecting the nature of life are closely bound up with psychological and ethical inquiries. It demands, moreover, that we bestow on it unwearied diligence for purely ideal purposes, without any approaching prospect of the pure sciences becoming of practical value. And we may make it our boast that this exalted and self-denying assiduity, this labour for inward satisfaction, not for external success, has at all times peculiarly distinguished the scientific men of Germany.
>
> What has, after all, determined the state of things in the present instance is in my opinion another circumstance, namely, that we are more fearless than others of the consequences of the entire and perfect truth. Both in England and France we find excellent investigators who are capable of working with thorough energy in the proper sense of the scientific methods; hitherto, however, they have almost always had to bend to social or ecclesiastical prejudices, and could only openly express their convictions at the expense of their social influence and their usefulness.
>
> Germany has advanced with bolder step . . . a labour-loving, frugal, and moral people may exercise such boldness, may stand face to face with truth. . . .
>
> We have met here [Innsbrück] on the southern frontier of our country. In science, however, we recognise no political boundaries, for our country

> reaches as far as the *German* tongue is heard, wherever *German* industry and *German* intrepidity in striving after truth find favour. . . . A new medical faculty has been established here. . . . We will wish it in its career rapid progress in the cardinal virtues of *German* science, for then it will not only find remedies for bodily suffering but become an active centre to strengthen intellectual independence . . . and at the same time be the means of *deepening the sense of unity throughout our country.*

The confused and self-contradictory rhetoric tells of the thinker assimilating the liturgy. He had been praising Galileo and Darwin, but he must relatively disparage them for the greater glory of Germany. And his account of things is, from the point of view of true culture-history, a falsification. Leibnitz, certainly less fearlessly devoted to truth than Spinoza, was nevertheless decried as "*Glaubet-nichts*" "believes-nothing"; and no clergyman attended his funeral, which was followed solely by his secretary. Lessing, violently assailed by clerics, was finally shunned by the *bourgeoisie*. "It was a popular belief, as an organ of pious opinion announced to its readers, that at his death the devil came and carried him away like a second Faust."[1] Goethe suffered much for his "heathenism,"[2] and in his Autobiography he prudentially

[1] Sime, *Life of Lessing*, ii, p. 330.

[2] Cp. Heine, *Zur Gesch. der Rel. u. Phil. in Deutschland: Werke*, ed. 1876, iii, p. 93; Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe*, März 6, 1830; *Düntzer*, i, pp. 152, 317, 329–30; ii, pp. 455, 461.

minimised it. Strauss was persecuted and vilified to his dying day: he who thinks this had no effect on German critical scholarship may read his confutation in Strauss's writings. And he who thinks that neither Kant nor Hegel was philosophically deflected by prudential considerations in regard to religion and philosophy, must have read them very docilely indeed. We have seen how Fichte suffered for his "Jacobinism"—if it were not for his philosophy. And we have Heine's verdict that "but for Napoleon our philosophers with all their ideas would have been rooted out with wheel and gallows."[1]

It is certainly true that afterwards in Germany there was won a considerable measure of "academic freedom" as compared with what existed in England. The numerical strength of the professional class secured it a certain status. But the freedom has always been a question of degree. Eduard Zeller in 1854 told how "the exertions of our ecclesiastics, assisted by political reaction, have been so effectual that the majority of our theologians . . . look with suspicion or indifference . . . on scientific knowledge";[2] and, disgusted with their illiberalism, he turned to the task of writing the history of Greek philosophy, as Albert Schwegler turned from theological research to the writing of the history of Rome.

[1] As cited, p. 98.

[2] Pref. to his work on *The Acts of the Apostles*, Eng. tr., i, p. 86.

Carl Vogt, who confessedly began by violently attacking Darwin's theory, complains fiercely of the German abuse of him after he had adopted it; and his English translator, deprecating his tone, offers the delightful suggestion that in England theologians and men of science leave each other respectfully alone.[1] Doubtless Vogt was anti-theologically outspoken, but he suffered for it.

National pride must have become very systematic when a Helmholtz could so differently present things; and in this it conformed to the general German intellectual evolution. The age after 1815 is on that side an age of laborious research in every field of knowledge. Whatsoever things were organisable were organised: the things that transcend organisation, genius and freedom, were the things lacking. "Let any one draw up a statistical table of our literary productions," wrote Gervinus, "and he will be amazed at the decadence of poetry during the last fifty years in which Philosophy has been supreme." Philosophy, adds Lewes, "has distorted Poetry, and been the curse of Criticism. It has vitiated German literature." Since Goethe —as against the French roll of Chateaubriand, Hugo, Balzac, Lamartine, De Musset, George Sand, Michelet, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, Flaubert, Maupassant, Zola, Anatole France, and England's

[1] Pref. to trans. of Vogt's *Lectures on Man*, 1864, pp. xiv, xv.

roll of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, Byron, Thackeray, Dickens, George Eliot, Tennyson, Arnold, Browning, Carlyle, Ruskin, Fitzgerald, Meredith—Germany can name hardly three writers who after a generation of test rank as men of genius. Heine does, if ever man did; but who else? Germany has had thousands of laborious students: but of writers of enduring literature, a very few masters. Hebbel, winning a restricted success of esteem late in life, was generally forgotten, was then re-discovered, and remains a doubtful quantity; Hauptmann has in his lifetime of his own accord descended from the grade of genius to that of fourth-rate novelist. It would seem as if in the air of modern Germany genius could not prosper.[1] Heine, away from it, was home-sick, but it expelled him.

And yet Heine too had his touch of the German megalomania. Writing for the Parisians, he is fain not only to show that old Germany was a different world from that of France and the South, but that it was somehow on a different human plane; that Luther's Reformation proceeded upon *Spiritualismus* and Calvin's upon *Sensualismus*, when it would have been rather nearer the truth to reverse the proposition. He had reached a poetic notion that superstition itself is something great, and, knowing the German

[1] See note at end of section.

folk-past but not the French, he saw in the Lutheran world of devils and witches a fund of force which elsewhere was lacking; as if Paris—which he alone knew—any more summed up the life of France than Berlin did that of Germany. His wit and his elusive wisdom make his Germanising a very different thing from that of the ordinary Teutonic champion; but his way of seeing Germany recalls Goethe's way of handling the problem of Light, a wilful imposition of the poetic spirit on a material that, to be known for human interests and purposes, had to be analysed in quite another spirit. Heine himself, indeed, with his double nature of Romanticist and rebel, adorer and scoffer, supplied not a little of the concrete truth; but he had not escaped the developed or manufactured German consciousness of Germanhood, the chorus-bred conviction that the German is a specialty in Nature, not really comparable, even in his imperfections, with the rest of mankind.

If there was one respect in which formerly the ordinary German always felt himself superior to Frenchmen and Italians, it was in simple rectitude. They might be subtle, he was truthful; they might be brilliant, he was considerate; they might be clever, he was just. Having by systematic culture added to these merits thoroughness of knowledge, he exemplified righteousness enlightened by science. And the

result of it all is a nation which figures as *hostis humani generis*, a menace to mankind. In the days before Bismarck was Prussianising Germany, German writers could justly accuse ours of "insularity." The general German effort at world-knowledge gave their work a breadth of outlook that transcended Germanism. Not that they grasped world-history more broadly than did the European-minded Gibbon, or had more political insight into their own history than had Hallam, or into Greek life than had Grote; but that their acquired method all round was systematically comparative, and that they stood at a scientific point of view. Ranke, if not a thinker, was European in his outlook, as were a multitude of German students of British history: Heine, part French and part German, and fundamentally cosmopolitan as a Jew, coming to the Britain of Cobbett and Scott, found himself in a world apart, the very ideal of insularity. To-day, Britain has certainly not ceased to be insular; but there is no longer the old contrast. Germany is now essentially the most insular of all civilised countries. Systematic, collective Self-Worship *is* just insularity *in excelsis*.

The fact is in effect recognised, though not so stated, by those German politicians who avow that the Germans who have lived much abroad are latterly much less militarist than those who

stay at home. When Bernhardi went the tour of the German communities in America and elsewhere he had very little serious attention: his doctrine was fit only for home consumption. There it was merely the crassest expression of the reigning ideal, by which all literature, even Socialist literature, has been coloured.

Broadly speaking, Germany in the studious age was represented to the world substantially by her poets and by her thinkers and scholars; the world taking them as the expression of "the" German mind. All the while, in virtue of the inveterate severance between the scholarly and the other classes, they represented simply the intellectual section of Germany.[1] When once Germany was unified, and her public opinion had to be systematically made and manipulated even under an illusory "constitution," the animal side of the aggregate was bound to come into play; and as always happens in social evolution sooner or later, that has subdued to its needs —the governmental system in this case vigorously aiding—the culture-spirit of the university class. Wealth has grown by leaps and bounds: popular culture, accommodating itself to commercialism, has grown blatantly boastful of the one thing in which all feel they share, racial magnitude. Scholarship and science are of course

[1] Cp. Hillebrand, *Lectures*, pp. 196, 203, as to the entire aloofness of the thinkers from the general mind.

carried on as before by the men who write for the scholars and scientists. But wherever German culture comes in contact with the average citizen, it has become chauvinistic, nationalistic, racialistic, Germaniacal. The economists are become imperialistic in their economics, the historians and the ethnologists racial in their theories and their delineations, the theologians Prussian in their ethics and their politics, the littérateurs trumpeters.

Criticism, alike in the special and in the general sense, has become intellectually jejune. Living as it naturally does on the fresh air coming from open windows, it dwindles to nullity in the hothouse of manufactured national sentiment. Notably enough, it retains much more of sanity and virility in Austria, precisely because Pan-Germanism does not there dominate, whatever may be the other vices of the Austrian State system. From Austria comes the *Moderne Rassentheorien* of Friedrich Hertz, and the *Englische Literatur im Zeitalter der Königin Viktoria* of Professor Kellner, to whom English is a second mother-tongue. From Austria, too, the politically unprogressive empire, comes the *Volkspolitik* of Professor Anton Menger, the economist. From Germany comes the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* of the Germanised Herr Chamberlain; and even from the academic Germany of the United States we

get the *History of German Civilisation* by Dr. Richard.

The colouring of the general spirit may be partly gathered from a volume of *Essays and Addresses* by Dr. Otto Harnack, Professor of Literature and Aesthetic in the Technische Hochschule of Stuttgart. Reviewing Heine on the centenary of his birth (1899), he dutifully decides that Goethe was right in naming Byron as *the* Representative of modern poetry; and he belittles Heine as a force in comparison. Heine is for him on this side a naughty Jew-boy. "*We* believe no more in the possibility of overthrowing historically evolved and established powers by jesting and playing. And for *us* the idea of 'Revolution' has lost its fascinating power, because we always immediately ask, what of positive is to follow or arise out of the Revolution? . . . We believe no more in the paramountcy of the republican State-form and in the universal fraternity of peoples. The only party which cherishes such ideas, the Social Democratic, we accordingly pronounce Utopistic and doctrinaire. In all, certainly, there is a gain of historical insight and practical art of life (*Lebenskunst*). And from this elevation we can smile at much in Heine's world of thought."[1]

For such a critic one side of the genius of Heine can hardly be said to exist. But, not

[1] *Aufsätze und Vorträge*, 1911, p. 233.

being a mere mouthpiece of his Government, and having his due measure of æsthetic culture, he recognises that the *Lieder* are enduring things ; that " perhaps it were more profitable for us to smile at ourselves " ; and that while " we " have gained in practicality " we have lost in personal life." " We " certainly have, whatever may be the truth about the practicality. Heine was always resented in Germany for his merciless raillery of German things and personages ; still he was read for his irresistible charm. He could write limpid German prose—a thing rarely attained to in the Fatherland. But latterly his very limpidity is denounced as being un-German ; these clear sentences of his have not the true Teutonic-architectonic confusion of involution—a quality supposed to be analogous to Gothic architecture !—and finally the *Lieder* are " false."

For such readers all true art is finally false. The only right art for them is that which is in the pay of the reigning convention. Nationalism in Germany has become what orthodoxy was for early Victorian England, a strait-waistcoat in which genius cannot breathe. After the Franco-German war, whole exhibitions were filled with German pictures of German victories, abject canvases of which not one was worthy to wipe the palette of the two or three French artists who thought it worth while to shame their

enemies by showing what a war-picture could be. Tolstoy is not the greatest of Russian fictionists, but he is head and shoulders above any German practitioner of the past century. Art does not grow to governmental order, like armies and schools and professorial and journalistic propaganda. German literature, *as* literature, as an art form, has hardly at all advanced since Heine. To this day a good German book, *as* a book, as distinguished from a process of research, is a rarity. English and French Lives of German personages remain better *books* than the German productions. Even Lewes's not very painstaking Life of Goethe is more of a living book than the museum-collection of Düntzer, though the idolatrous Carlyle could never read it; and Carlyle did for Frederick what no German has contrived to do.

Athwart the hypnotism of self-panegyric, there has arisen the consciousness of literary failure; and the "General German Language-Union" has set about the twofold task of glorifying the German tongue and regenerating its prose style, grown shapeless, adipose, and nerveless under the hands of the army of academics. One of its fuglemen, after sounding the racial trombone in the racial manner, assuring his readers of their hereditary monopoly of all the virtues, and predicating the incomparable merits of their

speech, vocabulary, and pronunciation[1]—this of the most cumbrous and one of the least musical of all languages—becomes despondent enough to sigh that the aspiration for a perfected diction is " with security to be hoped for only when the people makes a return to itself and fundamentally transforms itself, when pride (*Hochmut*) and Epicureanism dwindle, and the old simplicity, fidelity, veracity and moral purity again take broad root in German regions."[2] The preaching is as likely as the panegyric to produce good writing. Endless German books have been written about good writing, and about the styles of the old masters : what is steadily lacking is the production of masterly books which, as such, the world will steadily care to read.

This might be set down to the fact that, as we have seen, Germany wholly turned aside from literary development to religious strife in the sixteenth century, while other countries were on the way to producing world-literatures ; and that she began to produce one only when they already had classic literatures behind them. The habits of good literature are not to be acquired by a nation even in a century ; though Germany has latterly acquired taste in minor

[1] The fact that in German the accent lies always on the most significant syllable is by this writer and others (*e.g.*, Richard, p. 32) claimed as a proof of the veridical character of the race, as compared with all who pronounce otherwise.

[2] Prof. D. Weise, *Unsere Muttersprache*, 3te Aufl., p. 131.

things—commercial art and book production —from France and England. But literary infelicity is a small matter as beside the infatuation which drags down all higher consciousness to the level of the *sensus gregis*, the collective arrogance of the tribe. That is the final stultification of all culture, putting vulgar feeling in the throne of wisdom, turning to naught alike the ideals of the great German humanists and the science of their academic successors. What has finally determined the total course of Germany is the negative of *Kultur*.

NOTE.—The relative rarity of literary genius in Germany, through a period of four hundred years, is an interesting problem, in view of the law of averages. It is not solved by suggesting that the character of the language impels men to seek beauty of expression in music rather than in diction, for the product of *belles lettres* has long been abundant. On the other hand, musical genius in Germany has latterly not been abundant; the old "supremacy" seems to have been transferred to Russia. The question arises whether latterly, if not always, German methods and ideals in education have not the effect of stifling genius. It was raised long ago, with great amenity, by an eminent Prussian educationist in a volume of letters on English education.. "The result of my observations," he wrote, "put briefly is: In *knowledge* our higher schools are far before the English; but their *education* (*Erziehung*) is the more real, because it gives a better preparation for life." And again: "With us an immense amount of talent is lost through early compulsion to train for a career." He seems to have found youthfulness of *character* lasting longest in Prussia, and youthfulness of *intellect* in England.[1] The repressive process here indicated is in a manner intensified by the habit of chorus-thinking. The collectivism found unattainable in the economic life is fatally facile in the emotional. Already

[1] *Deutsche Briefe über englische Erziehung*, von Dr. L. Weise (Privy Councillor in the Prussian Ministry of Education), 1855, pp. 7, 41–43, 69.

before Bismarck the national gospel was in the schools. "National education, and education in nationality, for us an ideal with which we can never cease to busy ourselves, is in England hardly spoken of."[1] As literary genius consists primarily in intensity and fineness of feeling and perception, it is not thus educable or organisable, while it *is* repressible. But the culminating effect of a great past literature—relatively lacking in Germany—is also to be reckoned with; and the question of degree of variety in the whole series of life conditions—racial mixture, class conditions, social function, education and tradition—must be considered along with the factor of collective auto-intoxication.

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[1] *Deutsche Briefe über englische Erziehung*, von Dr. L. Weise, as cited, p. 142.

§ 9. *Conclusion.*

It is not, finally, for defects of culture and political backwardness, or for simple self-esteem, that we indict the German people before the civilised world. To such an indictment, in the normal course of things, the answer would be, Let the nation that is without sin cast the first stone. What people is in a position thus to indict another, apart from any national quarrel? No sane Englishman, Frenchman, or Russian disputes in general the defectiveness of his nation's life. He who can miss ground for melancholy in his everyday environment is either strangely secluded or strangely insusceptible. The sane temper and tactic for civilised men is confessedly that which seeks betterment at home and wishes well abroad, each people trying to learn something from the others and each taking satisfaction in the others' progress. We hear much of late years from German patriots of the "hate" cherished for Germany by her "rivals." It would be safe to undertake to prove that in the past half century there has been three times as much praise

given to Germany in general by English and French scholars as Germans have in that period given to any country whatever.

Had the German evolution gone on peacefully; had even the German self-worship remained a self-regarding parade of national vanity, it could hardly have engendered in other nations any severity of collective censure. Folly of that kind is not confined to Germany; though nowhere else has it ever been organised as a national religion. And the nations in the past have been able to criticise and banter each other without setting the world on fire. But it has been the achievement of Germany deliberately to do that by way of consummating the supremacy to which her people have been taught to feel themselves called. We have finally to do with deeds, not words.

In the World-War, not yet two years old, Germany has caused far more slaughter and devastation than were wrought by Napoleon in twenty. The mere mass of evil thus brought upon mankind is wholly beyond human realisation. No circumstance of cruelty, horror, and wickedness that ever belonged to war has been lacking. And the whole hideous sequence, from the infernal invasion of Belgium to the monstrous massacre of the Armenian people by their Turkish ally, has been loudly acclaimed by the great mass of the German people—professors, preachers,

philosophers, theologians, poets, scientists, Socialists, artisans, women—only a handful of exiled Social-Democrats dissenting. *This* is the outcome of a hundred years of freed German civilisation, and of forty years of German empire : this death's-head between the world and a sun turned to blood.

That Germany as a State sought the war, forced the war, and could by a word to her ally have averted the war, is as certain as the fact that a war is being waged. Empty as a death's-head is now the polemic of the German professors who a few years ago rated us for our want of good-will, our suspicions, our envious opposition to every German step towards expansion, our refusal to see that Germany was bent solely on self-defence. One of them, actually putting on his pamphlet the motto : *Ohne Welt-Macht, keine Welt-Recht*—" Without World-Power, no World-Law," a formula meaning, if anything, that the World-Power must be Germany's—told us that when we started to our feet at the episode of Agadir we were but egotistically resenting a modest German attempt to provide a coaling station.[1] German professors do sometimes manage to live *in vacuo*, with their field-glasses scanning the world ; but it is staggering to find one either ignorant,

[1] Professor Böhtlingk, of Stuttgart, *England und Deutschland, oder der europäische Friede*, 1912, p. 16.

or taking for granted that we are ignorant, of the fact that in 1911 Germany had prepared to invade France—as she had been much disposed to do in 1906; as she was ready to do in 1908 had Russia resisted Austria—and was only warned off by her bankers![1] And it is no less staggering to find him exhorting us to see the wisdom of a good understanding with Germany when he not only knows that Germany repeatedly and absolutely refused to entertain the notion of a restriction of naval armaments, but expressly approves of that refusal. How in the name of reason are good understandings to be set up?

It is perfectly true that in the past there have been, as this author tells us, manifestations of ill-will in England and France towards Germany. How should it be otherwise? It is exquisitely idle for a German professor of history to dilate on the national animosities of others as a ground for German militarism. Let him read the preface of Gervinus to the fifth edition of his *Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung*, published in 1870, and tell us whether instructed men in any other nation had then preserved such a rancour of hatred to France since Napoleon's time as is there exhaled. Let him turn to Bismarck's speeches and peruse that which revealed *his* smouldering hate for England. Let him

[1] As to the real German intentions at Agadir, see the note at the end of Prof. R. G. Usher's *Pan-Germanism*, 1913.

remember, too, how German nationalism began in the eighteenth century, by way of poetic raving against the Romans for doing in ancient Germany what all the German tribes did to each other, not to mention what Frederick did to Poland. And let him, instead of reminding us that during the Boer War France was as anti-English as Germany, read the volume in which Prince von Bülow in effect avows that Germany gladly *would* have attacked Britain in 1900 *if* only her navy had been ready.

By our Professor's own admission, neither Russia nor Britain would ever have backed France in a simple war of revenge against Germany. In France the dwindling spirit of *revanche* would never have revived but for the chronically repeated menaces of Germany, and the humiliation of the demand that M. Delcassé should be dismissed as the price of peace, even as the triumphal march of the German troops through Paris in 1871 was the price of the retention of Belfort. Our Professor tells us that Bismarck did not crush France more than was necessary: he does not recur to the fact that Moltke and half Germany were eager to attack and utterly crush France in 1875 for the sin of prosperity. Saying nothing of that, he naturally does not raise the unsettled question whether Bismarck was primarily willing or unwilling.

That France, brutally menaced by Germany five times between 1870 and 1914, should exhibit anti-German animus, was rather more in the nature of things than that Germans should hate France in 1914 for Jena, as they did and do. That Englishmen, whatever were their merits in regard to the Transvaal, should remember the Kaiser's ostentatious hostility, and should see in his designs on France a preliminary to an attack on Britain, would surprise none but a German professor. But all that is beside the case. The question for men not possessed by the Roman madness was whether the nations could not still regulate their relations towards better things. And the German answer, in word and deed, has been that they could not. And the nation that professed to sympathise with the Boers in 1900 has been the nation that bludgeoned Belgium in 1914.

German professors and the German people may declaim as they will for another century, but history will preserve the cold truth that in 1914 the Austrian Government, Germany's subservient ally, made a pretext of an Archduke's assassination for a war on Serbia which she had actually proposed to make in 1913; that in 1914 as in 1908 Germany proclaimed her determination to allow of no intervention between Austria and her Slav victims; that she refused to join in any plan of arbitration; and that of

all the Powers of Europe she was in every particular the most thoroughly prepared for the war upon which she had determined. In every particular, that is, but one ! She had not reckoned on Britain's defence of the rights of Belgium : Britain was not to be attacked till later, when the German fleet should be duly strengthened by the annexation of the French and the Russian, if not of the Dutch.

History, too, recording the fact of the bestial invasion of Belgium as Germany's way of capping Austria's invasion of Serbia, will keep on her shelves the German war literature, wherein are revealed by a hundred voices the vogue of the aspirations and ideals made current before the war by Bernhardi. Of that literature, much is usefully and most readably summarised for British readers by Mr. Alexander Gray, in his three pamphlets, *The Upright Sheaf*, *The New Leviathan*, and *The True Pastime*,[1] a perusal of which might suggest to some German professors an examination of the beam in the German nation's eye. From the second pamphlet, which dissects among other things the German polemic over the invasion of Belgium, may be gathered the tolerably pregnant fact that, in the general German opinion, Belgium *had* to be invaded.

[1] Methuen & Co., 6*d.* each. See also Professor Ch. Andler's pamphlet *Pan-Germanism* (Fr. and Eng. 1915), and Professor Usher's book of the same title, noted below.

And if it be objected that the war literature is a product of the war, we have but to turn to the American professor Roland G. Usher's work on *Pan-Germanism*, published in 1913. German professors bent on national vindication can hardly escape dealing with that. Professor Usher, who has no anti-German prejudice, and who lays down the pleasing doctrine that "it is as selfish for them [the Triple Entente] to insist upon peace as it is for the Germans to demand war,"[1] maintains as an indisputable thesis that "the Germans aim at nothing less than the domination of Europe and of the world by the Germanic race."[2] Professor Usher had, as we see, no moral objections to make: he merely doubts whether the Germans can do it. And he writes, as of things not open to dispute, of the "economic weapons about which the Germans talk so glibly, the starving of England, the depriving her factories of raw materials, the cutting-off of her supplies for the maintenance of a fleet."[3] All this talk was going on while Professor Böhtlingk was lecturing us on our unjustifiable suspicions of Germany. All the while, too, the German navy toast "To the Day" was being regularly drunk—as is now freely admitted in the German press—while Germans were officially denying the fact, and lecturing us on our

[1] *Pan-Germanism*, p. 248.
[2] *Id.* p. 1.
[3] *Id.* p. 280.

suspiciousness. Professor Böhtlingk will do well to say whether he has found any equivalent evidence.

But this is superfluous.

It is really not necessary to go beyond the final proposition that Belgium *had* to be invaded. That is just the conclusion to which all our survey has pointed, that for twentieth century Germany the last extremity of international wickedness had become not simply a defensible but a necessary thing. The nation which had taken as its typical heroes Frederick and Bismarck, men devoid of international morality and of every notion of human duty outside their own State, had become worthy of its *numina*. In other words, Germany in things international still lives by the standards of pure savagery. It is the culmination of her culture, her race-worship, her sublimated insincerity.

Given the sequent points in the popular German creed—that German barbarians, trampling down other tribes and nations, were glorious heroes; that the Romans, in seeking to conquer and rule Germans, were hateful tyrants; that the Teutonic Knights, slaughterers and enslavers of Slavs, were noble civilisers; that Frederick, snatching Silesia and partitioning Poland, was a godlike benefactor of Prussia; that Napoleon, putting his heel on Prussia, with the complacent assent of Saxony and Bavaria and Würtemberg,

earned for France the eternal hatred of all Germans ; that Britain played a detestable part in making war on the Boers, with whom she had a quarrel, good or bad, and from whom she received an ultimatum ; and that Germany, bestially destroying Belgium, with whom she had no pretence of quarrel, is justified by her self-certificated necessity—given all this, to what do we come ? To the conclusion that Germans in the State-aggregate are at the moral level of Arminius; and that if European civilisation is to be saved or secured it will only be by rendering Germany impotent for further evil.

There is no need of a Hymn of Hate to keep the civilised world on the alert in her regard for the future. Hate there will be in plenty, for that matter, with or without hymns. Belgium has no need of such reminders : the history of the war will suffice for the other combatants, if not for neutrals. If Germany continues to chorus her very characteristic Hymn—said to be the best piece of recent German verse—she will only be continuing her past method of national culture, and giving a superfluous reminder to her foes. She has taught the world its lesson fully enough without that. Her stereotyped ideal of military supremacy, always calling itself self-defence, is the exact duplication of the system of ancient Rome, which always used the same pretext, and whose attainment of *Welt-*

Macht meant the overthrow of the whole civilisation of Europe for an era. Haply, Germany is not going to succeed, though she has shaken civilisation to its foundations.

Count Hermann Keyserling, writing on the war in a very philosophical and judicial spirit,[1] fully recognising the guilt of Austria and Germany, yet deprecates the thought of any future ascription of unpardonable sin to Germany by the world. The French people, he reminds us, were not held guilty in the nineteenth century of having opened an era of war by beginning the French Revolution. It is a distinctly lame analogy. The French Revolution began in a revolt of a section of the French people against the ruling system of France. The strife was extended beyond France by the deliberate intervention of Prussia and Austria in French affairs; and was extended yet further by the intervention of Britain, on an inadequate pretext—a course duly repented of by the British Government. Prussia, Austria, and Britain among them made Napoleon; and it was Napoleon who inflicted another decade of war upon Europe. There had never been a general French conspiracy against an innocent Europe. In this war we are faced by the fact of the unscrupulous unanimity of the German nation, acting again in

[1] Art. *On the Meaning of the War*, in the *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1915.

concert with Austria. Germany has of set purpose forced war upon Europe, acting upon a German creed of racial superiority, national destiny, and deliberate determination to secure world-power. And the invasion of Belgium and the massacre of the Armenians exceed tenfold in brutal wickedness all the international sins of the French Revolution.

Count Keyserling philosophically suggests that a generation hence the German people may very well exhibit moral superiority to the rest of Europe.[1] One is almost forced to surmise that the hypothesis is framed in virtue of an inherited German necessity to boast of something! The writer means that Germans, chastened by the frightful penalty they have brought upon themselves, will begin a new and better life, and that their posterity, travelling on the new path, will have reached a moral attitude towards all humanity. The Blatant Beast will, in short, be metamorphosed into a communion of saints. It is a bold forecast. But two considerations —if they can appreciate them—will certainly deter most Germans in our day from welcoming it. Moral superiority is not really compatible with "taking a proper pride in our pirate ancestors." Worse than that, where there is

[1] "It may happen that the vicarious sacrifice (!) imposed on the Germans this time will soon be rewarded by a period of moral supremacy." (Art. cited, p. 540.)

a boast of moral superiority there is no moral superiority! And a Germany happy in not boasting is a difficult conception. It will certainly not be realised in our day. If it ever should be, at least one fallacy will have been eliminated from literature—the theory of race-characters!

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